Text Box: Annex R-6

 

 

 

 

EXTRACT FROM THE

 

“PLANNING PROCESS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS”

DOCUMENT

 

 

Produced by

 

DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MILITARY DIVISION

MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE

 

September 2001

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

 

PLANNING PROCESS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

 

OVERVIEW

 

I.    There are three parts that make up the overall planning process for military operations in support of peace operations:

 

a.   A conceptual approach allows complex situations to be reduced to solvable component problems;

b.   The planning process itself, that ensures planning in the United Nations (UN) is conducted in an integrated and coordinated manner, with the right information presented to decision makers at the critical stages while meeting all of the requirements of UN guidance-

c.   A set of formats which present plans and analysis in a structured simple-to-follow manner.  Formats also serve an additional use in providing a guide or aide-memoir to those conducting planning.

 

2.   This document covers the overall planning process by first reviewing the conceptual approach to the planning of peace operations that might involve the deployment of military personnel. The document then steps through the planning process used within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for the planning of military operations in support of peace operations. Finally the document covers the formats used as part of these processes.

 

3.   In planning for military operations there are a number of Divisions within DPKO that are involved in the planning process. A brief review of the planning role of some of the units referred to in this document is as follows:1

 

a.   The Office of Operations (00). The 00 is the political arm of DPKO. In the context of planning for the deployment of military personnel in support of UN missions, the 00 is responsible for overseeing the planning process for new missions. This includes providing the overall framework, developing options for courses of action (COAs), leading reconnaissance missions to the field, and coordinating and integrating inputs from within the department and from other entities, including military, police, humanitarian, electoral, human rights and other aspects, into a comprehensive plan for approval by the Security Council. The 00 is divided into three divisions, defined by geographical groups: Europe and Latin America, Asia and Middle East and Africa. The 00 also maintains the Situation Centre.

 

b.   Military Planning Service (MPS). MPS is part of the Military Division. It is responsible for the production of all concepts and plans for the military component of potential and actual UN peace operations. Based on the work of the Service, the UN Military Advisor (MILAD) provides information that can be integrated into multi-dimensional planning.

 

c.   Force Generation Service and Military Personnel Service (FGS). The FGS is part of the Military Division. Force generation is the process whereby military forces and equipment are obtained from troop contributing countries (TCCs) to meet the requirements of the concept of operations (CONOPs).2 The FGS manages the force generation, rotation and repatriation process of both formed units and individuals deployed as part of the military component of UN peace operations and is the point of contact for TCCs.

 

d.   The Civilian Police Unit (Civpol). The Civpol Unit in DPKO is responsible for preparing, plans for the civilian police components of field missions, monitoring their implementation and revising them as necessary. It also assists in the identification, selection and deployment of personnel from contributing countries to field missions.

 

e.   Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD).  FALD is headed by a Director who is responsible for the three services of FALD. These are:

 

(1)    Finance Management Support Service (FMSS).  In planning for new missions, responsibilities of FMSS include coordinating, preparing and submitting to the UN Controller proposals for resource requirements for new, expanding or on-going field missions, for review, finalization and submission to legislative organs. Part of this responsibility includes leading the memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiations with TCCs that cover the provision of contingent owned equipment (COE). FMSS is also responsible for participating in the deliberations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee on matters relating to peacekeeping budgets;

 

(2)    Logistics and Communications Service (LCS).  There are two key units in the planning process for deploying military forces in support of UN operations:

 

(a)      Logistics Plans Unit (LogPlans). LogPlans will coordinate the provision of logistics, communications and medical support. It will also provide specialist logistics advice for the development of MOU on COE with TCCs and manage their implementation;

 

(b)      Movement Control Unit (MCU).  MCU is responsible for monitoring the services provided by air charter operators on short term contract; 3 deploying, rotating and repatriating military contingents and groups of civilian police officers and military observers; and managing all air and sea contracts in support of field missions;

 

(3)  Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS). The PMSS Military Travel Unit arranges the travel for the deployment of individuals, in particular UN Civilian Police (Civpol), military staff officers, UN military observers (IJNMOs) and UN military liaison officers (IJNMLOs), to a new mission where these personnel travel in groups that are too small to justify charter of an aircraft.4   It also subsequently arranges travel for rotation personnel in-bound to the mission.5

 

 

PART ONE: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE PLANNING OF PEACE OPERATIONS

 

4.   Modern conflicts are characterised by their increasingly complex nature. Typically they involve not just military conflict but include problems of civil administration, humanitarian issues, institution and capacity building. Even the military involvement is increasingly complex. Not only are forces being asked to monitor and report on the implementation of ceasefire and/or peace agreements; but increasingly they are involved in the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of forces supporting the parties to the conflict.

 

5.   In order to plan peace operations in such complex situations it is necessary to reduce the complexity by breaking the problem down into more manageable components. A structured approach is required to do this.

 

6.   The structured approach used is not new, but adapts ideas well known in strategic and military planning to the particular situation of planning for peace operations. Problems are considered in two dimensions. First, operations can be considered as a series of tiers. In the military these have traditionally been the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.  High level or strategic planning is initially conducted to provide the outline of the operation, its tasks and the resources available. Subsequently more operational planning will develop the operational concept and detailed plans. A different team of planners will often be responsible for these subsequent tiers of planning.

 

7.   The second dimension used in considering the operation is time. In moving a conflict from its present state to one of sustainable peace, a number of objectives need to be achieved. Clearly capacity, resources and time will dictate that these cannot all be achieved at once. In addition some objectives are perquisites for others. Thus the objectives must be sequenced into a required order. Each of these objectives, or in some cases a group of these objectives, may be considered as the focus of a phase or stage of the operation.

 

8.   Phases or stages can in turn be further broken down. Each phase will be characterised by a main effort, that is one or a number of major tasks to be achieved as the focus of the phase.  However, to enable the completion of these tasks, preliminary operations may be required. In a similar manner, there may need to be subsequent operations that follow the completion of the main effort to allow the operation to move from one phase to the next. Figure I provides a schematic view of the approach taken.

 

 

 

Figure One: An example from MONUC of strategy, phasing and staging of an operation

 

9.     As shown in the schematic, phases are not necessarily distinct. More often operations overlap. Sufficient progress in one operation may allow commencement of a subsequent operation.  Each and every case will be different. Planners and commanders will have to consider each situation and its unique circumstances.

 

 

Planning Documents and Their Outputs

 

10.    There are three key planning documents in planning for military operations in the UN:

 

a.   The Strategic Estimate;

b.   The Operational Estimate; and

c.   The Operational Concept, more commonly referred to as the CONOPs.

 

11.    The Strategic Estimate.  The strategic estimate is the overarching document. It determines the potential scenarios that the present situation could develop into. For each of these scenarios the document then reviews the options. Options are expressed at a high level; for example in a particular scenario the options could be no UN involvement, UN provision of a Security Council resolution (SCR) for a coalition of the willing, a UN combat force, a UN combat and military observer force or a UN military observer force. Options may differ for each of the scenarios considered with some options not being presented for some of the scenarios. The strategic estimate provides a recommended option for each of the scenarios put forward. Where the estimate will be passed to the field for generation of the operational estimate, the strategic estimate will also include the phasing envisaged for the options recommended for each of the scenarios.

 

12.        The Operational Estimate. The operational estimate takes a scenario, from the strategic estimate, along with its recommended option.  Through the estimate process it then provides a range of COAs for the option before recommending a specific COA for adoption.

 

13.    The Operational Concept or CONOPs. Further planning and detailed development of the approved COA produces the CONOPs.6  The CONOPs is the product needed by the force in the mission to implement the plan.

 

14.    A schematic of the process is provided in the following diagram.

 

 

 

PART TWO: THE PLANNING PROCESS WITHIN DPKO

 

Overview

 

  1. A generic process is followed more or less universally through militaries across the world for the planning of military operations. The planning process within DPKO takes a parallel approach to these generic processes. (Where the strategic estimate identifies that the best option for the UN is to have a coalition of the willing undertake the mission, there will be no need for the UN to complete the process of generating forces and UN military planning will be completed at an early stage of the planning process.)

 

16.    Throughout the planning process key assumptions on which planning is based should be identified and kept highlighted so they can be tested frequently and at every critical step. Assumptions can rarely be proved as fact, but at any stage they are proved wrong by additional information, the plan will need to be revisited. It may be necessary to return to an earlier stage of the planning process and re-plan based on the new information.

 

17.    Planning follows a number of stages. Each stage includes seeking advice from higher authority, undertaking some planning and then returning the results for confirmation and approval by higher authority. This process ensures higher authorities are kept aware of the state of planning and the key issues. It also ensures planning remains close to the direction intended by principals, even when a situation is evolving or in a state of flux.

 

18.    Note that planning for operations tends to be an iterative and recursive process rather than a linear one. While this process should be used as a definitive guide it will frequently require iterations and jumps forwards and backwards in the planning process as the situation unfolds.

 

19.        The planning process is broken down into the following eight phases:

 

a.     Pre-Initiation;

b.     Initiation;

c.     Strategic Planning;

d.     Initial Operational Planning;

e.     Concept Development;

f.      Plan Development;

g.     Deployment; and,

h.           Execution.

 

20.    Note that military planning is but one planning process conducted within the integrated planning processes establishing a mission (e.g. Civpol planning, humanitarian planning).  The nature of the inter-relationship between planning and force generation will necessitate close consultation and coordination in the day-to-day activities of MPS and FGS.

 

21.    Force generation does not occur as a single phase; rather portions of the force generation process happen during each phase once planning Is Initiated.7  Factors which affect force generation include:

 

a.     Political acceptability;

b.     Military capacity;

c.     Preparedness, which is the combination of readiness and sustainability8;

d.     Geographic representation;

e.     Cost9;

f.      Command and control; and,

g.     Self sustainment capability

 

 

22.    Force generation begins with the first informal contact with a potential TCC and continues through the COE negotiation process. During the process of force generation there will be numerous meetings with TCCs. At the start of the process all those with the capacity to participate in a meaningful way will be invited. As the process proceeds attendance will be by invitation. There may be a requirement for renewed force generation throughout the life of the mission.

 

 

PRE-INITIATION PHASE

 

23.    The pre-initiation phase in the planning of military operations is characterised by a conflict situation in which there is no direct DPKO involvement. Normally such situations are closely monitored by Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and frequently there will be either a DPA Office or the Secretary-General (SG) will have appointed a Special Advisor.

 

24.    The DPA is tasked with the provision of advice and support on all political matters to the SG in the exercise of his global responsibilities under the Charter relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace and security. As part of this task DPA provides a global watch, monitoring, analysing and assessing political developments throughout the world and identifying potential or actual conflicts where the UN could play a useful role in the control or resolution of the conflict.10

 

25.        The pre-initiation phase is an Information-gathering phase, which as it develops will increasingly require MPS to be in a position to provide military advice to political staff." Normally DPA, because of their day-to-day role, will be able to provide considerable background on the conflict.  Contact with DPA will only be initiated following the approval of Chief MPS.

 

Existing Situation

 

26.    MPS will develop area files as part of standard work procedure. Since MPS planning teams are structured on a regional approach, the appropriate regional team will monitor related hotspots.  Key items cf information will be collected on an opportunity basis for an), hotspot in the region.  The aim at this stage is to obtain awareness of the situation and what is happening in the area.

 

Evolving Situation

 

27.    As a particular hotspot develops, a stage will be reached where the threshold is crossed that means MPS staff choose to actively watch the evolving situation. This may result from either direction by the Chief MPS or as a result of the Planning Team Leader recommending that MPS watch a particular spot.  In deciding to put an additional situation formally "on watch" a review of team priorities and workload will be conducted.

 

28.    Once it is agreed that a watch will be maintained, profiling will occur to assist in the collection of information. Profiling will target particular information elements. As part of collection of information, MPS will maintain close contact with the civilian humanitarian and developmental organisations.

 

29. The aim at this stage is to obtain knowledge of the situation and what is happening in the area. Rather than collecting information on an opportunity basis, information will be collected on an organised basis. Collection of information will be targeted towards achieving the information requirements that will be specified for the mission in accordance with Annex B.

 

Overwatch of the Specific Situation

 

30.    At this stage there is direction from either the MILAD, Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) 00, Under-Secretary-General (USG) or SG to watch the situation. This is the formal commitment of personnel to the task. It acknowledges the possibility of UN military involvement at some future date. While previously the aim has been knowledge of the situation, the aim is now to have understanding of the situation. Once an overwatch is established MPS should be able to provide formal advice on the situation.

 

Political Involvement in the Situation

 

31.    As a situation develops and the likelihood of UN involvement increases, DPA involvement is likely to increase. Political involvement in the situation will most frequently occur once there are opportunities for peace. DPKO (MPS) will be in a position to provide military advice to DPA or to other political appointees engaged in the process such as, for example, external bodies and special envoys of the SG.

 

Peace Process

 

32.    The "peace agreement" is of critical importance to the success of peacekeeping. A peace agreement provides the legitimacy for a peacekeeping operation and defines the role that organisations like the UN and regional security bodies will play. The peace plan therefore provides the basis for the overall interagency strategic or campaign plan. A carefully constructed peace plan that lays out the stages of the peace process will make it easy for planners, to be able to set the phases and stages in the strategic plan for a peace operation.

 

33.    Because the peace agreement becomes the basis for such things as the subsequent UN SCR, it is fundamental to the success or failure of the future UN missions. It is therefore of critical importance that the peace agreement be carefully thought through and that a strategic approach be adopted based on sound political and military advice with clearly defined goals, objectives and tasks.

 

34.    Normally the UN will endeavour to at least have observer status at peace talks that will potentially result in an agreement that will generate a requirement for a UN presence. Timely advice during the development of the plan is critical to ensure that tasks that may eventually become a UN responsibility are achievable.  Advice may be required where:

 

a.     It is assumed there will be military involvement, or,

 

b.     Commentary is requested on the military implications of a proposal or a process.12

 

35.    The value in the provision of military advice during the peace process will be the ability of the advisor to provide information on the situation and the military implications of the current and envisaged future situation. The advisor will be able to provide advice on whether there is a role for a UN military involvement, what form that might take and what conditions and timeframes would be required to make a UN military presence viable. Sound military and technical advice will increase the probability that any subsequent UN military deployment required will ultimately be successful.

 

36.    The conclusion of a peace agreement or cease-fire will be a clear indication that pre-requisite conditions for involvement of the UN in an area could be met in the near future.

 

 

INITIATION PHASE

 

Requirement for UN DPKO Involvement Identified

 

37.    The planning process will be initiated by the MILAD when he decides that there is a high likelihood of military personnel being deployed in support of a UN mission in the area of interest. Triggers for this stage would include:

 

a.     Direction from USG or ASG:00 DPK0;13

b.     Formal statement by the President of the Security Council;

c.     A Security Council Resolution (SCR).

 

38. The need for action will become apparent at a stage where the necessary conditions for peace have either been put in place, or are likely to be present in the near future. In taking the decision to initiate planning a decision will also be made to assemble an integrated planning team.

 

Assembly of the Mission Planning Team

 

39.    Within MPS a team will be formed to plan for the specific mission. The NIPS team will usually be formed by reprioritisation of work within an existing planning team or sometimes by creation of a dedicated team from scratch. This is the team that will be responsible for planning the military component of the mission.

 

40.    The MPS team will immediately make contact with the OO, FGS and FALD: LCS: Future Ops Desk Officer who will contact any other specialist FALD officers that may be required for the particular mission under consideration e.g. transport, engineering, medical etc.  The FMSS and PMSS desk officers should also be identified at this point and be considered a member of the team.  A team approach will help ensure that operational and support planning are synchronized from the start.

 

Integrated Mission Task Forces

 

41.    Planning for peace missions will be done in an integrated and coordinated manner. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (with DPA and DPKO taking the lead) will decide when to recommend to the SG that an integrated mission task force (IMTF) should be formed, what its composition should be and who should lead it.14   Task-force leaders for IMTF's established for peacekeeping operations will report to the USG DPKO.

 

Obtaining Strategic Direction for Planning

 

42.    It is the responsibility of the Chief NIPS to obtain strategic guidance. Strategic direction will always be available but may at best be vague. It will often require MPS staff to assemble from all sources the strategic guidance they believe is available and then to seek MILAD confirmation that the assembled guidance is to be used as the basis for planning. Alternatively MPS staff may be required to generate the questions that require answers from the MILAD, ASG and USG, as appropriate, in order to be able to commence planning.

 

43.    Sources of strategic direction may include:

 

a.       Peace or cease-fire agreements;

b.        The body of knowledge that has been assembled to date from all   sources including regional organisations;

c.       A position expressed by the SG;

d.       SG Report to the Security Council or the General Assembly,

e.        The Security Council in:

(1)      SCRs;

(2)      A Presidential Statement; and/or

(3)      Views of the member states.

f.        Direction or intent of IUSG for Political Affairs;

g.       Direction or intent of USG for Peacekeeping Operations;

h.       Other UN Reports and Estimates.

 

44.    Strategic direction that would be of considerable assistance to planning at this stage includes:

 

a.     political constraints and restraints;

b.     the strategic objectives;

c.     the strategic desired end-states;

d.     intent; and,

e.     tasks.

 

Information Requirements

 

45.    A structured approach is needed to ensure the effective and efficient assembly of a wide range of information and data.  All available sources will be used to collect this information. Detail of generic information requirements and the recommended approach to collect these requirements is provided in Annex B.

 

Definition of UN Interests/Objectives in the Area of Operations

 

46.    The full range of UN interests/objectives in the area of ope rations (AO) will be defined.  This will include, for example:

 

a.     Political;

b.     Humanitarian;

c.     Administrative;

d.     Institutional; and,

e.     Military.

 

Identification of the Criteria, Factors and Limitations

 

47.      At this stage an initial list of assumptions that will underlay the planning should be developed and documented. Where insufficient guidance is available for planning, assumptions should be used. Any essential criteria, factors and limitations that need to be taken into account in planning should also be identified.

 

Clarification of DPKO Requirements by either Formal or Informal Direction