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History of the Conflict
The Colonial Period
1. For nearly 500 years the inhabitants of the island of Tindoro have been unable to exercise self-rule. From the mid 1800s to 1941 it was a direct rule colony of initially the Dutch and then the British. This control was broken during World War II, however after the war the British reassumed control after a three year internal struggle. During the British colonial period, the government exercised administrative authority in the island and the British Army suppressed any pro-independence movements. The most significant of which occurred in 1927, and is considered the start of its true political path to independence and nationality. During the breakdown of control during World War II the fires of independence continued to rage and many guerilla groups were formed that subsequently fought against re-establishment of control by the British.
2. Neighboring Samagaland has had a similar history with colonization by the Dutch and occupation during World War II. Given its larger presence in the region, the Dutch influence in Tindoro has been significant particularly in the north through migration of Samagalanders in search of other farm and economic development opportunities. Regardless, the Samagalanders and the Tindorans formed political and military alliances that opposed and at times took up arms against their respective colonial masters and wartime occupiers.
3. At the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations (UN) both the governments of the Netherlands and the UK succumbed to international pressures and established a 10-year plan to grant independence and assist in the establishment of democratic governments. Both indigenous populations accepted this approach, as they believed the intervening period necessary to rebuild infrastructure and industry destroyed during the war as well as re-establishing economic wealth and wellbeing for their populations. Even though the plan was accepted at the political level, instances of civil unrest particularly within the union movement increased.
4. Samagaland moved first and through elections supervised by the Dutch an independent government was duly elected and assumed control in early 1951. This outcome was disputed by the now opposition and political turmoil was followed by the emergence of strong military leadership that staged a coup assuming control of the government in early 1952. The new leadership immediately launched political initiatives and military expeditions to expand their territories. Politically the rhetoric was centered on the non-recognition of previous colonial boundaries. Despite the outcomes in neighboring Samagaland, Tindoro embraced its opportunity for independence and held peaceful elections in 1953 that resulted in the pro-independence movement winning with 67 percent of the vote.
The First Independence Period
5. After taking office the pro-independence movement in Tindoro and its political party, the Independence National Party (INP), began to face a very strong and well-financed opposition from the Samagaland Union Party (SUP). The well-orchestrated demonstrations staged by the SUP began to paralyze the INP and obstructed its ability to govern. At times violence erupted in the legislative chambers. By 1954 it was clear that two factions were emerging in the island, those who wanted independence and those who wanted a union with Samagaland.
6. During 1953/54 acts of violence and political terrorism continued to increase in intensity throughout the island of Tindoro as both sides mobilized armed movements. Through these years the government of Samagaland aided the SUP and its armed movement the Peoples Union with Samagaland Front (PUSF). These elements operated primarily in the north with cells in Launceston and in the mountains near Devonport. The fledgling Tindoro Armed Forces (TAF) responded within its capabilities however by March of 1955 a full-scale civil war was precipitated by the assassination of Raoul Gullar, the elected vice-president of Tindoro.
Samagaland Intervention and Occupation
7. By November of 1955 it appeared that the INP and the TAF were going to prevail in the Civil War. However, in January of 1956, Samagaland armed forces intervened, overran all opposition and annexed Tindoro making it one of its provinces. From 1957 till 1986 Samagaland established provincial rule supported by a strong military and police presence. Samagaland used these years to expand its economic and resource base by relocating industry and population to the island. International access to Tindoro was tightly controlled until late in 1986. In retrospect, most analysts comment that Samagaland was not totally successful in their endeavors in the south, but gained considerable support with those sympathetic to the union in the northern part of Tindoro; at that time about 20 percent of the population had Samagaland origins. The actions of Samagaland over the proceeding decades had effectively achieved a line of demarcation within the island, however it was not widely supported by the international community with almost ‘government in exile’ support in many former British Empire territories. Reality showed a de-facto partition of the island with pro-independence supporters controlling the southern part of the island and pro-union members doing likewise in the north. Details of this partition are shown on the map at figure 2. The capital of South Tindoro was Hobart, while in the north the city of Launceston quickly became the center of Samagaland authority.
8. During this period political resistance activities led by the INP and supported militarily by the remnants of the TAF – the Independence Movement Front (IMFR) continued to disturb the stability of the island. These activities increased in numbers and violence through the late 1980’s prompted intervention by the international community led by UN. After negotiations between the UN and the parties to the conflict, it was agreed that a referendum would be held in southern Tindoro to determine its political future. The referendum was held in February of 1990 with the separatist movement attaining a resounding victory. Nearly 86 percent of the population voted for the independence of southern Tindoro. However, Samagaland fearing loss of revenue and economic growth announced they would not abide by the election results and refused to withdraw its military elements deployed in the island.
9. Violence erupted immediately following the elections. Supported by police and the Samagaland Defense Force, bands of North Tindorans launched political assassinations in the south, and expulsions and killings of South Tindorans that resided in the north. There was a steady stream of people fleeing in both directions across the border between North and South Tindoro trying to escape the violence. Often bands of people from North Tindoro were seen in hot pursuit killing at will. In the south explosions in government offices and demonstrations orchestrated by SUP members began to destabilize the situation. The blood bath continued for six months and created an international outcry of concern over sovereignty and the increasing humanitarian disaster.
1992 UN Intervention
10. Supported by the international community the UN passed a Security Council resolution and launched political initiatives to restore order in Tindoro. In 1992 negotiations between representatives of leading factions in the north and south resulted in the San Francisco agreement. This document framed the formal separation of the states. North Tindoro became a province of Samagaland and South Tindoro attained its freedom once again. The UN arbitrated the negotiations and established a UN peacekeeping mission led by Joseph Springer, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The mission included military, civilian police, administration and humanitarian components focusing on emergency relief, law and order and capacity building of institutions of good governance.
11. The United Nations Monitoring and Support Mission in Tindoro (UNMSMT) was successful in capacity building initiatives and establishing a stable environment through the successful separation of opposing forces by the peacekeeping force (PKF). Both parties outwardly accepted the provisions of the San Francisco Agreement and by early 1998 the mission had been able to transition all functions of government to the South Tindoro elected leadership. In mid 1999 the mission withdrew a greater part of the mission from South Tindoro leaving behind a small contingent of personnel headed by the resident coordinator. The balance of the commitment included some UN military observers (UNMO) and training advisors, an electoral element that was to oversee an internal election scheduled for 2000 and some members of UNHCR and WFP. The UNMOs were deployed along the border with North Tindoro and had liaison officers co-located with the Samagaland Defense Force in North Tindoro and Samagaland. The advisors were also assisting in raising and training the new South Tindoran Defense Force, (STDF).
Political Situation in 1999
12. South Tindoro, with a host of international observers, held elections again in early 2000. Michael Tisner, a former pro-independence leader was elected President. John Silvia became his Vice-president. The elections produced a divided parliament, although the INP held a substantial majority. The opposition accounted for 15 percent of the members of parliament and maintained the focus and structure of the SUP.
13. In Samagaland the former military strongman General R.V. Winkle suffered a third stroke and died in early 2000. In a classic political power struggle retired General S. Klaus emerged as the new leader. He was confirmed by the People’s Consultative Assembly and immediately appointed General Richard Brahman, a former commander in the SDF, as the Minister of Security for Samagaland. General S. Klaus touted a new “era of stability” in his political speeches.
Initial Indicators of Strife
14. After almost a year of relative stability but contentious relations, indicators of difficulties began to show in February 2001. A blast in Hobart seriously wounded President Tisner and Vice-President Silvia. The STDF and police leadership blamed the SUP and immediately the police ordered the arrest of all their members in parliament. The SUP protested the action and threatened retaliation. In March, with the roundup of SUP parliament members still on going, a riot erupted in Queenstown resulting in injuries to three INP officials and the destruction of a social services office. A week later an STDF post in Ross was attacked by what was reported to be a paramilitary force. The parliament attempted to convene but eventually suspended all actions amidst significant political friction. It became clear that the incapacitation of President Tisner had South Tindoro in a leadership crisis.
15. These events did not go unnoticed in Samagaland. Claiming fear of a “spill over” of violence into North Tindoro, Samagaland deployed two infantry battalions to reinforce the forces and supporting elements already in North Tindoro. General Brahman, in a public statement to the international press, urged South Tindoro to “handle the political crisis before it becomes Samagaland’s issue.”
Build up of Tensions
16. In April 2001 a senior SUP parliament member, Daniel Block, declared himself acting President and had followers of his party seize the building. The South Tindoran police and the military surrounded the building and threatened violent action. Negotiations, between the members of SUP occupying the building and the surrounding police and STDF began in earnest. In the meantime acts of politically motivated violence occurred along the border as well as inside the territories of North and South Tindoro. Tensions rose and UNMO and training advisors were being targeted in order to score political advantage.
17. In Hobart the potential for violence in the besieged parliamentary building increased with Daniel Block stating the Government of South Tindoro was unrepresentative of the people and that members of the SUP and pro-unionists were being victimized. General Brahman supported Block’s statement at an international news conference. President Tisner, from his hospital bed in Hobart, called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and appealed for restraint from Samagaland, however the violence escalated. Police stormed the building and 4 SUP members were killed, 6 others taken into custody and the building was essentially destroyed. Daniel Block escaped and declared later that the 4 SUP members had been summarily executed. Samagaland reacted with the deployment of a further infantry battalion to North Tindoro and reports indicated that there was additional mobilization of the SDF. In the meantime unrest and civil disorder through July 2001 continued to spread in the predominantly SUP district of Queenstown. Civil policing along the border started to fracture with many people sympathetic to the SUP and action it was taking in government openly engaged the STDF, police and community.
18. The continued state of chaos began to take its toll on the STDF. Their patrols along the border with North Tindoro became less frequent and focused on the immediate area surrounding established positions. UNMOs and military advisors reported a decrease in morale and a decline in the state of readiness of the STDF. The SDF attacks against STDF border posts and hamlets continued through the month of August 2001. Particularly affected was the region between Derwent Bridge and Bronte Park.
19. In September 2001 President Tisner returned to office and led negotiations that restored control of Parliament to the INP. To accomplish this he declared “Special District” status for an area near Queenstown. The SUP in effect became the government for that district and all other governmental offices in the district were closed. This created disruption of government services and maintenance of water and power supplies as government workers, families and other disenfranchised groups moved south. Law and order in this and other border regions quickly became chaotic.
Escalation of the Crisis
20. Throughout 2001 violent actions plagued Tindoro. The diplomatic relations between South Tindoro and Samagaland remained strained and additional pressure was building through the efforts of the international media. Although Samagaland had constrained military operations in North Tindoro, it continued to use every opportunity to add legitimacy to their claim that South Tindoro was part of their country. President Tisner on the other hand pursued alliances that would help guarantee the independence of South Tindoro.
21. In September 2001 the UN Security Council in a resolution recalled the integrity of South Tindoro and Samagaland founded in the San Francisco Agreement and confirmed by plebiscite. The resolution also noted that the Council would monitor the situation in the region closely. Although carefully worded, Samagaland interpreted the resolution as a blow to their diplomatic efforts. Shortly thereafter, well-orchestrated demonstrations against the resolution were conducted in the city of Launceston, the capital of North Tindoro. The demonstrations, growing more and more violent, called for the unification of all Tindoro within Samagaland authority.
22. In January 2002, while the demonstrations were still ongoing in North Tindoro, a car bomb exploded in the market at Saint Helens. The explosion was well timed to coincide with the hour when the market would be most crowded. Twenty-six people were killed, including six children. The IMFR claimed responsibility for this explosion and a mortar attack ten days later on the village of Campbell Town also in North Tindoro. Samagaland reported over 100 casualties in Campbell Town but UNMO or humanitarian agencies operating in the area could not verify this. This was followed with tit-for-tat reprisals along the length of the border.
23. Through June and July 2002 the situation along the border between North and South Tindoro became a de-facto combat zone. STDF resupply convoys were frequently ambushed and exchanges of mortar and artillery fire across the border became common. This resulted in a worsening humanitarian situation with the civilian population moving in both directions and the inability of either government to provide basic amenities. South Tindoro response was predictable; it implemented emergency powers and commenced to mobilize their reserves in order to heighten international awareness of the plight of their numerically weaker military but diplomatically strong position.
24. In August 2002, the Samagaland 17th Light Infantry Brigade started to disembark in Devonport in preparation for action along the North-South Tindoro border. The official Samagaland position was that the forces were being deployed to protect North Tindoro from potential spillover of the unrest in the South. Calling the official Samagaland position a travesty of the truth, the South Tindoran Prime Minister suggested that UN intervention might be required to restore stability and security. On the same day the marketplace in Derwent Bridge was mortared
25. Bands of IMFR were reactivated in south Tindoro and commenced operations around SUP supported areas of Queenstown as well as previously INP strongholds of Campbell Town, Fingal and St Helen. These actions and subsequent response by the SDF further deteriorated the humanitarian situation in both regions as the capacity of UN and indigenous non-government organizations were overwhelmed.
26. To compound the problems being experienced by the population on both sides of the border unexpectedly heavy rains started across the whole island in late August and continued throughout the month of September. Within weeks it was evident that the crop expected in December/January would be greatly reduced, roads and communications arteries became almost impassible to commercial vehicles and water systems were flooded. Two major dams near the border were threatened and electricity production was halted. An already serious problem in health, shelter, sanitation and food became more urgent, as was the need for emergency relief operations.
UN Resolution and Intervention
27. By end September the 17th Brigade was complete in North Tindoro and additional forces were continuing to build up. In October, a bomb attributed to the IMFR exploded destroying the headquarters of the SUP in Queenstown. Faced with a realistic assessment of the situation, President Tisner formally requested UN intervention. This request was based on the military operations against South Tindoro in order to forcibly assimilate South Tindoro into Samagaland society and on the worsening humanitarian situation. On November 10th, Mr. Lee Thong Ng (UN Special Envoy for the Region) led negotiations and both Parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities. The major outcome of the long negotiations that followed was the Siam Agreement that established a new border that integrated each Party’s disputed strongholds into their respective territory. It was agreed that North Tindoro would remain a province of Samagaland and South Tindoro would remain an independent country.
28. On November 20th, the UN passed Resolution 136 that called for the increase of UNMSMT acting under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The mission was to increase to 300 observers and included UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) plus administration. The mission would patrol the new border between North and South Tindoro and ensure implementation of the Siam Agreement. The New Chief Military Observer (CMO) would be COL Manuel Suarez (Brazil).
29. However through December 2002, before the mission could fully deploy new observers, the situation continued to deteriorate as encounters along the border and demonstrations in the major cities of both North and South Tindoro continue to be staged. Samagaland strongman S. Klaus stated in a speech given at the gathering of the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly that Samagaland had to adopt a forward defense policy, intervening to stop problems outside their borders before they threaten internal security.
30. In late January 2003, retired General Brahman denounced the UN resolution, calling it interference in the internal affairs of Samagaland. He further portrayed the mission as a charade to stage neocolonialist forces for the future invasion of Samagaland. Violence escalated quickly. In one incident, over 66 people killed and more than 100 were injured in two attacks near Hobart by what appeared to be a Special Forces raid. Additionally, increased radio traffic was reported along the border and it became clear that a significant incursion was imminent. UNMO and CivPol teams all along the border were attacked with four observers killed and several others wounded. Three CivPol disappeared and rumor indicated that they might have been assassinated.
31. The humanitarians fared no better with several warehouse sites attacked by unknown assailants, convoys struggling over the difficult routes were ambushed and five local drivers and two international staff killed. Because of the seriousness of the situation the UN Security Coordinator ordered the departure of all mission personnel. Most personnel departed by 15 February 2003 and established a temporary base in Adelaide the capital of Rabenneste.
32. As a result of the deteriorating state of affairs the Secretary-General called for a military force to be deployed along the border to de-escalate the situation and re-establish the humanitarian operation in the devastated land. Samagaland and South Tindoro leaders were pressured to open a dialog to restore the situation even as rogue elements of the military and bands of uncontrollable paramilitary forces continued to terrorize the border area and key built up areas.
33. Based on the reports the Secretary-General called for an emergency sitting of the Security Council to debate the issues. The Secretary-General advised the Council that given the situation in Tindoro, the acceptance by the leadership of both countries of the crisis and the number of concurrent UN peacekeeping operations, that the Security Council mandate a regional operation.
34. Samagaland and South Tindoro agreed that a significant military force was needed to stabilize the crisis and should it be successfully brokered, a regional multinational force was acceptable. On March 15th, 2003 DPKO assessed the situation and submitted a Report to the Secretary-General. The Report recommended the deployment of a multinational force (MNF) to separate opposing forces, to restore peace and security and within capabilities re-establish the UNMSMT and Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Japan offered to work with the other contributing nations to finalize force structure and resource contributions.
35. The UN Security Council met to consider the Report and passed UN Security Council Resolution 147 that sanctioned the MNF and enumerated the tasks expected of the Mission including the need for more emergency humanitarian aid capacity and civil policing for the border. Mr. Lee Thong Ng was appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to coordinate the increased UN responsibilities and the new structure involving a UN sanctioned MNF and a parallel UN Mission.