Asia-Pacific

Enhanced Peace Operations Program

Seminar

Pre-Deployment/Deployment Planning

28 February to 4 March 2005

Suva, Fiji

Co-Sponsored by

Republic of Fiji Military Forces

The United Nations

and

The United States Pacific Command

Executed by

the Center of Excellence

Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Seminar Components	Seminar Book	Issue

Introduction	Executive Summary	28 Feb 05

Scenario	Opening Narrative

Timetable	Schedule of Activities	28 Feb 05

Briefings	Seminar Overview	28 Feb 05
	Evolving UN Peace Operations	28 Feb 05
	UN HQ DPKO PSO Planning Process	28 Feb 05
	UN HQ DPKO Guidelines PSO Training	28 Feb 05

Discussion Topic 1	National Issues Pre-Deployment Planning for Future Peace Operations	1 Mar 05
Topic 1 Reading	The Need for a Contemporary Peace Support Operations Doctrine	1 Mar 05
Discussion Topic 2	National Issues Pre-Deployment Planning for Training for Future Peace Operations	1 Mar 05
Topic 2 Reading	Peace Support Operations Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives	1 Mar 05
Discussion Topic 3	Regional Issues Pre-Deployment Planning & Training for Future Peace Operations	2 Mar 05
Topic 3 Reading	Principles & Mechanisms to Enhance Cooperation	2 Mar 05
Discussion Topic 4	UN Role – National/Regional Pre-Deployment Planning & Training for Future Peace Operations	3 Mar 05
Topic 4 Reading	Extract from Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2004 Report: Cooperation with Troop Contributing Nations	3 Mar 05

Seminar Readings
Seminar Reading 1	UN Charter Chapters VI, VII & VIII	27 Feb 05
Seminar Reading 2	Brahimi Report - Executive Summary	27 Feb 05
Seminar Reading 3	High-level Panel Report Threats, Challenges & Change – Executive Summary	27 Feb 05

Concluding Brief	Oral Report on Proceedings	4 Mar 05

Executive

Summary

Asia Pacific

Enhanced Peace Operations Program Seminar

Pre-Deployment/Deployment Planning

Suva, Fiji

28 February- 4 March 2005

Purpose

To share information and exchange experiences on military pre-deployment and deployment planning and related training activities associated with multilateral, multifunctional, peace support operations with a view to capacity building in the nations of the Asia-Pacific Region.

Focus

Examination of key pre-deployment/deployment issues related to military planning and training in preparation for future complex, multi-national, multi-dimensional UN operations.

Seminar Objectives

· Develop an understanding of the key issues which need to be addressed in order to properly plan for deploying a national military forces capable of participating effectively in the complex, multi-dimensional, UN peace support operations of today.

· Generate awareness of pre-deployment/deployment planning strategies that would be appropriate for use nationally and regionally.

· Develop an understanding of the key issues which need to be addressed in order to properly train, long and short term, for deploying national military forces capable of participating effectively in the complex, multi-dimensional, UN peace support operations of today.

· Generate awareness of pre-deployment/deployment training strategies that would be appropriate for use nationally and regionally.

· Create an environment conducive to an effective exchange of information between participants with the support of appropriate Subject Matter Experts.

· Enhance interactions and understanding on critical pre-deployment/deployment issues within nations and the link between nations to UN HQ and regional assets where appropriate.

· Examine in some detail the pre-deployment and deployment training and planning issues of particular concern preparing to work with the wide range of civilian peace support operations partners found today – NGOs, CivPol, etc.

· Explore all pre-deployment and deployment issues from a strategic/ operational/tactical perspective.

· Enhance national and regional planning and associated training capacities within the context of pre-deployment/deployment activities for UN missions of today and tomorrow.

Seminar Concept

The pre-deployment/deployment planning seminar is a 4 1/2-day, unclassified, scenario-driven event. The scenario is based on national preparations for future participation in a multi-dimensional, multi-functional UN peace support operation. Major activities within the seminar address four separate issues which explore important dynamics of national pre-deployment planning and associated training. A variety of background briefings will be provided to set the scene prior to working group discussions on each issue. Each major seminar activity is divided into three parts: an introductory plenary to ensure the task is clear, a working group session, and a concluding plenary. Working groups will be integrated (humanitarian, military, police and civilian) and will consist of 12-15 participants assisted by a facilitator. The concluding plenary for each activity will take the form of group out-briefs to a role-playing senior officer with national responsibilities for operational preparedness of units deploying on UN peace support operations. Discussion on group conclusions will follow and comments will be sought from subject matter experts supporting the seminar.

Opening Briefs & Plenary Discussions

Following each scene-setting opening brief, short plenary discussions will be held to explore any issues which arise with respect to pre-deployment planning and training concepts for UN missions.

Requirement 1 - Pre-Deployment Planning

Given a short scene-setting scenario, discussion groups are asked to provide suggestions on how to improve planning efforts for deployment of national forces in support of a future multi-functional, multi-dimensional UN peace operation.

Requirement 2 - Pre-Deployment Planning for Training

Given additional information, working groups are asked to provide suggestions on how to plan to improve training efforts prior to and while deploying national forces in support of a future multi-functional, multi-dimensional UN peace operation.

Requirement 3 - Regional Roles

Planning and Training for Future UN Missions

Given additional direction, working groups are required to identify the key issues that, from a national perspective, regional agencies could be responsible for with respect to improve planning and training efforts for a national contribution to a future UN peace support operation.

Requirement 4 - National/UN

Operational Planning/Training Responsibilities

Given additional direction, working groups are required to identify the key issues that, from a national perspective, should be looked at with respect to the Troop Contributing Nation – UN dynamic to improve national planning efforts and training in preparation for future UN peace support operations.

Scenario

OPENING NARRATIVE

You are a newly appointed staff officer working in your national military headquarters.

You are the newest member of the Peace Support Operations Branch. Your Branch is responsible for planning national military participation in peace support operations. Your Branch also has responsibility for ensuring units are operational capable prior to deploying to theatre and for the actual deployment to theatre.

The Chief of the Peace Support Operations Branch has frequently expressed his concern over the rapidly changing environment in which our national troops will be expected to operate. One only has to read a few of the daily headlines from conflict areas around the world to see the significant changes taking place:

“Attack on French forces in Côte d’Ivoire, fatal air strikes by national armed forces condemned by Security Council”

UN Press Release SC/8239 6/11/2004

“DR of Congo: kidnapped UN staffers released after having been tortured” UN News Service 30 December 2004

“Sudan grave challenge not only to Africa, ‘but to all humanity’, says Secretary-General to Nairobi Security Council meeting” UN Press Release SC/8248 18/11/2004

“Secretary-General strongly condemns latest series of attacks in Iraq, Says UN will do everything possible to assist elections, transition” UN Press Release SG/SM/9654 20/12/2004

Afghanistan will need continued international assistance until transition is complete, Secretary-General tells Berlin conference” Press Release SG/SM/9236 31/03/2004

The few preceding headlines only scratched the surface of the changing operational conditions. There are many significant ones: Threat to peacekeepers from all parties to the conflict, attacks on NGOs, insurgents who operate like terrorists, significant law and order gaps, great difficulty providing humanitarian aid, great difficult with development efforts and establishing good governance, a demand for greater effort reforming the security sector, etc. etc.

Your Branch Chief wants to ensure his Branch does all it can do to ensure that operational planning for future peace support operations and plans for the training needed to support those operational deployments are conducted as efficiently and effective as possible. Accordingly he has directed that a study be conducted to address the impact of these significantly changing operational conditions on planning at all levels for peace support operational deployments and the training which needs to be conducted to ensure the unit deploying is ready for the new challenges they will face.

It looks like you have arrived at your new desk during interesting times. The job in front of you and your colleges is a significant challenge – one that your Branch will have to get right.

Its time to start collecting a few thoughts about the issues you think are significant in the current and future environments that your national units may be serving in conducting peace support operations. There are already some issues that you know are not being addressed properly now in the arenas of pre-deployment planning and training. Its time to jot down a few preliminary notes for those study discussions you know will be taking place shortly.

Timetable

Schedule of Activities

Asia Pacific

Enhanced Peace Operations Program

Pre-Deployment/Deployment Planning Seminar

Text Box: Briefings BRIEFINGS

Discussion Topic 1

Pre-Deployment Planning

Well things are starting to happen in earnest now with regard to the Branch Study on planning procedures and associated training efforts preparing for national forces deploying on UN peace support operations. Preliminary discussions were held at the Branch Chiefs level to focus our efforts and some key decisions were taken. The most significant one was the decision to separate logistic and operational considerations – we will not be examining the logistics issues – another Branch will have that responsibility. The second important start point issue was identifying the major focal points for our work on the study – there will be two: first, the planning process itself for getting our forces into theatre effectively and efficiently and secondly, the associated training activities which need to be planned and in place in order to ensure that those forces are properly prepared to meet the operational challenges they will face.

The first discussion on planning issues will take place very shortly. You have been directed by your section chief to give the planning dynamic some thought and to be prepared to offer your point of view on what planning issues you feel are important and what changes you would recommend.

Although you have only been working in the national headquarters for a short time it is clear to you that you will have to look at planning dynamics at all levels: the strategic level – how you plan effectively with UN HQ, your Permanent Mission at UN HQ, other government departments, and non-government organizations, the operational level – the UN mission or coalition of the willing force in place in the conflict area, as well down at the tactical level – the impact on the actual forces being deployed.

Thinking back to your staff college days, the critical process of examining the right factors when planning and making the proper deductions from those factors immediately jumped into your mind. There are certainly some significant changes in the operational environment that will have to be fully examined before we really know their impact on what we do and how we do it in our planning and training efforts.

Although your experience with UN peace support operations is a bit dated and limited, it always seems that we get tasked late and do not have the time or information required to adequately plan and prepare. Perhaps there are planning processes or procedures that can be put in place, which will provide us more warning of upcoming operations and more detailed information. Perhaps we need to be more pro-active in how we do peace support operational business – Contingency planning for possible missions? Dedicated planning staff and forces for peace support operations?

Requirement 1

From a national perspective what changes could be made to your planning process in order to ensure that national forces are capable of arriving in theatre prepared as effectively and effectively as possible to meet the challenges of current and future peace support operations?

In your discussion groups address the preceding question and prepare a 15-minute brief to highlight your general conclusions.

Your brief can address any issue you consider pertinent but must cover the following topics:

· Identifying the factors that have changed significantly which need to be examine carefully and their impact with respect to preparing national forces for future peace support deployments

· Mechanisms for improving the planning effort (time, information, processes / procedures):

o At the strategic level

o At the operational level

o At the tactical level

· Integrating civilian peacekeeping partners input into the national military planning process and plan.

Topic 1 Reading

THE NEED FOR A CONTEMPORARY PEACE

SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

111. The end of the Cold War altered the strategic context in which PSOs were conducted. As international actors¹⁵ have elected to ‘do something’ in response to genocide, famine, and barbarity, controversially, recourse to ‘intervention’¹⁶ has increased. Responses have, however, been far from uniform, frequently being determined by issues and interests beyond humanitarian or legal obligation.¹⁷ The UNSG had this to say in 1998:

‘Why was the UN established, if not to act as a benign policeman or doctor? Can we really afford to let each state be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in another state’s internal conflict? If we do, will we not be forced to legitimise Hitler’s championship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? Most of us would prefer, I think –especially now that the Cold War is over - to see such decisions taken collectively, by an international institution whose authority is generally respected’.¹⁸

Intervention, Sovereignty and Obligations

112. Debate over recent years has struggled to balance the precepts of sovereignty with theories that support a higher and imperative obligation to uphold human rights. Whilst international law has not yet accommodated these altered perceptions, state and regional organisation practice, coupled with UN Security Council precedents, suggests that changes in international law, or its interpretation, are occurring.

113. There are occasions when a national government or sub-national organs of government fail to uphold international norms. They may be unable, or unwilling, to prevent abuse, or perhaps prove to be the sponsors of abuse; they may be unable or unwilling to prevent a faction or group being subject to, or threatened with, significant harm. When this happens, a ‘fundamental dissociation’¹⁹ may have occurred.²⁰ Consequently, a responsibility to provide protection²¹ may fall upon the international community. This shift in the concept of sovereignty places obligations on a governing authority as a pre-condition for that governing authority’s own protection under international agreements. Thus, membership of the UN confers the protection of the UN Charter, by moderating inter-state relationships, whilst in parallel imposing intrastate obligations²² that seek to ensure effective governance in accordance with United Nations Charter purposes and principles. To respond to these changes, and the associated responsibilities, those who are tasked with, or choose to assist with, upholding, renewing or restoring acceptable governance need an expansion of the concepts and doctrine that guide their actions.

Working in a Civil - Military Complex

114. The 1990s brought a significant blurring of the boundaries between civil and military personnel engaged in supporting peace. (Synopses of key international and non-governmental agencies commonly encountered in PSOs are given at Annex B.)²³ The complex of participants, particularly the non-military, is increasingly diverse. However, there are signs that many agencies bringing security, aid, and assistance to those in need are increasingly able to identify common goals and to derive mutually advantageous operating agreements.

115. In parallel, government departments traditionally associated with military action, and other departments, are increasingly working in collaboration. Even so, PSOs do impose demands in planning, executing, and supporting action that may be at odds with the different departmental working cultures. These cultural differences manifest themselves in varying attitudes towards coordination, tolerance of ambiguity, the need for and nature of planning and, critically, the legitimate role of the military.

116. Many civilian agencies and departments of state routinely function with a high tolerance for ambiguity. In these agencies and non-military departments, several differing perspectives on an issue may hold sway at any given time, and decision-making has evolved to accommodate the ebb and flow of international and domestic sentiment, political will, political intent, and media attention. In these areas, ambiguity affords freedom to negotiate and manoeuvre. In contrast, military staffs generally seek to minimise ambiguity by making informed assumptions where absolute clarity proves impractical. In mounting and directing PSO neither ‘institutional’ position should be regarded as improper. Facets of each approach are appropriate to the PSO environment, and collectively improve the probability of success.

117. For many civilian agencies and government departments, the term ‘planning’ is associated with higher management process and the need to formulate programmes driven by economics or donor considerations. Whilst analogous planning is undertaken in the management of defence, military planning at the operational level is focused on the use of military force and is conducted using highly developed and trusted procedures. Although wedded to the value of detailed planning, most military staffs are acutely aware that no plan is ever executed without revision. Accordingly, British Defence Doctrine, especially the concept of Mission Command,²⁴ places great emphasis on timely action and initiative, whilst remaining responsive to superior direction.

118. Notwithstanding the wider intervention debate, there is invariably tension between government departments as to how and when military forces should be used. Until the 1990s many held that military force, as an instrument of foreign policy, was too frequently held idle waiting for wars that might never arise. Events have since demonstrated the wider and near constant utility of military force and the prevalence of protracted PSOs. The demands of this new era have seen scarce military resources, training capacity, and equipment expended in activity well in excess of earlier planning assumptions. In such a changed environment senior commanders and ministers face a difficult task in matching capability to commitment, especially as many PSOs are of indeterminate and potentially long-term duration. Budgetary, procurement, training, and manning plans are now adjusting to accommodate the new reality.

The Comprehensive Approach

119. Events have shown that the prospects of success in a PSO are much enhanced if a comprehensive response is used. In adopting such an approach, planning and execution must be coordinated across government departments and potential participants. Unfortunately, there remains a tendency for government mechanisms to be optimised for the demands of routine government, or short-term crisis response, rather than the specific, complex, and protracted demands of PSOs. In the absence of unifying leadership and suitable coordinating structures, the full range of contributions may not be used, or may be delivered in a less than efficient manner. Rivalries may manifest themselves in obstructionism or the imposition of conditions for engagement. Moreover, the rivalry may become part of the problem. Further risk may also be introduced by the tendency, in moments of crisis, for ad hoc arrangements to subvert proven working practices, methods of communication, and decision-making. Such ad hoc arrangements prejudice the chances of long term success by seeking short-term gain only.

120. In the United Kingdom a crisis management organisation has been established to counter many of these pitfalls. For the military commander, at the operational level and above, understanding precisely how the Defence Crisis Management Organisation²⁵ (DCMO) is configured for a given emergency is of critical importance. The commander must know how strategic direction of the campaign will be determined and how he can support or exploit the range of effects available to his force, the contributing governments and the mandating authority. Adoption of a comprehensive response demands that strategic and operational level planning be conducted using a sophisticated doctrine to guide a suitably configured command and control system.

The Way Ahead

121. The key to success in effectively underwriting peace is the will to fund the necessary action, the will to do what is needed for as long as it is needed, and ultimately the will to accept casualties in defence of the basic freedoms of distant strangers.

122. If collective security is to become a universal reality a more reliable understanding of the rights and obligations conferred by sovereignty is needed. However, to assist in bringing this into effect military doctrine must respond to the existing perceptions. Hence this evolution of PSO doctrine. By updating and reviewing the United Kingdom national PSO doctrine, the ability of Her Majesty’s Government to underwrite peace and augment the rule of international law may be enhanced.

123. There is an aspiration that others will accept this experience-based revision of the United Kingdom approach to PSO, and in particular the military contribution. Ideally, it will achieve a near-universal, consistent, and more flexible doctrine. This may, in turn, guide the actions of those seeking to uphold the principles of the UN Charter and contemporary conceptions of collective peace and security. Practically, recognition of the need for a symbiotic relationship with, and by, the military is key, so that the objectives of all those contributing to a PSO, their working practices and cultures continue to be acknowledged and, importantly, deliver benefits.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________-

13 The inherent right to use force in self-defence is well-grounded in law and readily understood.

14 During operations to protect minorities in the north and south of Iraq following atrocities after the first Gulf War.

15 The expression ‘international actors’ has been used to encompass both states and the many international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

16 Here, intervention is considered as inclusive of all actions, both military and legislative, which are designed to exert influence within the jurisdiction of an independent political community.

17 Actions by groupings that sought to ban the use of anti-personnel mines are illustrative of this trend.

18 Kofi Annan, UNSG, in an address at Ditchley Park, 26 June 1998.

19 When it can then be argued that an authority cannot claim to be by, for, or of the people a fundamental dissociation between the people and the ruling elite or governing body can be said to have occurred.

20 This view was first expressed by Weller in, “Sovereignty and Suffering”, Harris, ed., The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (1995), p. 33 et seq. And subsequently in “Access to Victims: Reconceptualizing the Right of Humanitarian ‘Intervention’, Asser Institute, ‘International Law and The Hague’s 750th Anniversary as the Capital of Internationa Law’(1999), p.353 et seq.

21 An extensive literature exists on this topic, and whilst no work can yet claim to be definitive, ‘The Report of The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Dec 2001) does offer a comprehensive, balanced and compelling contemporary analysis of the intervention / sovereignty paradox. See also www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_GG/GG.index.

22 These obligations have 3 facets. Firstly, the governing body is responsible for the safety and welfare of its citizens. Secondly, failure to discharge this responsibility will be subject to internal censure by the people and ultimately by the international community through the UN. Thirdly, these obligations are personal in character such that individual agents of the state can and will be held responsible for their acts of commission or omission. The inception of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands testament to this reality and the resolve to uphold and enforce international human rights norms as codified in treaties and other legally binding instruments.

23 Synopses are also given for the key agencies and departments of the United Kingdom government, and of the government of the United States of America (as a result of its pre-eminent position in international affairs).

24 JWP 0-01.1.

25 More detail on the Defence Crisis Management Organisation is provided in Chapter 5.

Extract from UK Joint Warefare Publication 3-50 Second Edition

The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations

June 2004

Source: http://coe-dmha.org/PKO/USA04/images/references/jwp3_50.pdf

Discussion Topic 2

Pre-Deployment Planning for Training

There were certainly some interesting discussions in the first planning related meeting for the Branch Study. It was a good thing that we did the operational planning side of things first because a lot of the issues we discussed impact on planning the training dynamic.

It is certainly clear now that we need the right training at the right time in order to ensure that we are capable of planning properly, preparing forces efficiently and deploying them prepared to meet the challenges of today’s peace sup

Timetable

Discussion Topic 3

Concluding Brief

Scenario

Asia Pacific

Enhanced Peace Operations Program

Topic 1 Reading