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When Capt. Mac Bollman first asked me to come and speak at this workshop on irregular warfare (IW), my response was “USAID doesn’t do irregular warfare! Why do you want me to define it?” After some discussion, it became clear that defining irregular warfare in the context of stability operations is an important part of what we’re here today to do. From a USAID perspective, classic irregular warfare is characterized by kinetic operations involving either Indeed, many at USAID and in our community of partners would be highly resistant to having their activities labeled as any kind of warfare, let alone irregular warfare which conjures up Black and Special OPS [operations] types of engagements. In this case, words matter, and it is important that we have terminology that moves the conversation forward, so we don’t get stuck on semantics. To make matters even more confusing, the National Security Strategy (NSS)2 of 2006 and the National Military Strategic Plan on the War on Terrorism,3 published a month before the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),4 made no mention of IW. A JFCOM [US Joint Forces Command]5 Special Study on IW (August 2006) found that the term IW is “too broad a term to gain consensus as to its meaning” and that consequently, “there would be no value to the warfighter to address IW in joint doctrine.” The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense recently approved a draft definition of IW. It recognizes that among other activities, IW could contain elements of Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, SSTR [Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction], CT [Counter-Terrorism], COIN [Counter-insurgency], CMO [civil-military Operations], PSYOP [Psychological Operations], IO [Intelligence Operations], Intelligence, and Counter-Intelligence, all of them complex operations in their own rights. The IW Joint Operational Concept6 (Sept 2007) and the recently published Air Force IW Doctrine Document 2-37 (Aug 2007) acknowledge that the solutions cannot be purely military but leave the reader with very little substance in non-military applications. Whatever the terminology that is decided upon to describe this new environment that our nation is faced with, LEADERSHIP will be critical. We need to begin breeding leaders, across government, that are highly adaptive, comfortable in chaos, and who can creatively apply a mix of standard and non-standard elements of national power. I would argue that we are in short supply of these people … but I digress from my assigned topic … . In USAID, we generally talk about the kinds of work we do in conflict-affected situations in terms of the SSTR framework – security, stability, transformation and reconstruction. I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know when I state the obvious, and that is that USAID and its partners have a critical mission in SSTR and stability operations, one that should be done in cooperation with our partners in the military and the interagency. If you want to consider what we do as “irregular” because it is not kinetic, then, as I mentioned earlier, the civilian side of the soft-power equation will push back. But if you want to consider WHY we do what we do in places like the Sahel or Yemen or Mindanao, then maybe we’re not that far apart. And the WHY is an important part of the discussion because in USAID to say you’re doing a developmental-like project to counter violent extremism or deny sanctuary, [means] you are moving into “irregular” programming. But our mission IS to use soft-side interventions – humanitarian and development assistance – to promote stability and human security in SSTR contexts. We do this in coordination with a multitude of actors in the U.S. government, the private sector and NGO [Non-Governmental Organization] community, and the host country. Our combined efforts to promote stability, to counter insurgency, to combat those who use terrorism as part of their toolkit, have up to this point … decidedly mixed results. We still have a lot to learn about the agenda and motivations of our common opponents, the spoilers to our efforts to promote peace. Shifting Sands: The New Counter-Insurgency Operating Environment In the interest of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I have drawn heavily on the work of Frank Hoffman and David Kilcullen in developing the thoughts I am about to share with you, thoughts and ideas which are NOT entirely accepted within USAID because they are so non-traditional, even “irregular.” Our opponents in modern counter-insurgency are neither homogenous nor neatly organized. In fact, modern insurgency theory suggests that they are organizing into increasing complex structures that bear more of a resemblance to a nebula than a complex … network.8 The classic patterns of insurgency as described by David Galula and others may no longer be, as Hoffman writes recently, relevant to today’s insurgents or irregular warfare fighters. Not surprisingly, our responses should be adjusted to perhaps recognize this adaptation. Perhaps it’s not just about “the people” as articulated in the COIN manual, but something deeper that we’re just now recognizing. These amorphous organizations of insurgents are not limited to al Qaeda and jihadists. Today’s tapestry includes traditional thugs from Africa, apocalyptic cults, such as the Japanese Aum Shrinryko group, as well as clan or tribe-based opponents in Somalia, the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]9 and southern Philippines.10 They also include former military or para-military forces, like the remnants of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Chechen nationalists and Iraq’s fedayeen, [according to Hoffman].11 This multitude of actors makes it difficult to define the nature of the opponent, and [to] assess his strategy, structure, and means. As a result, we find there is no one-size-fits-all response or even a moderately adapted approach to respond to similar situations. [S]eemingly parallel situations require a much more nuanced understanding of the cultural, sociological contexts that somewhat attempts to bring us the deeper understanding that people like Montgomery McFate are trying to help establish through the lens of [a] cultural anthropologist. These actors we don’t understand are operating in a transnational environment, exploiting media and information to draw on popular support across the world. They are no longer dependent on developing a popular base of support at home to pursue their ends – they can develop a constituency abroad. They can take advantage of the anonymity of urban centers around the world as their base of operations.12 New Approaches to Programming Needed These factors make it extremely hard to know what is happening in any given insurgency. As many of our military colleagues in Iraq have discussed, trying too hard to find out can get you killed, but so can not knowing.13 Given the complexity of the operating environment, and the multitude of actors, even if we are able to determine something about our opponents, chances are that it is either quickly outdated, or not applicable across the entire operating environment.14 [R]ather, it could be province-specific. I know for example that a CT [counter-terrorism] program aimed at the Pashtuns in say, FATA, isn’t going to mean anything to their fellow Pashtuns in Helmand.15 [W]e are facing a dilemma where perhaps the answer is multiple, often times shifting, flexible response networks that adjust to the situational dynamics – a nightmare to plan and train for, and almost impossible to explain to a determined Congressional staffer. One size doesn’t fit all, unfortunately, and the shifting sands of people’s desires and frustrations reflect our inability to adapt to the rapid changes occurring on the ground. What we at CMM [USAID’s Conflict Management and Mitigation Office] have learned, and what David Kilcullen points out, is that there are no fixed, standard operational techniques to counter the modern insurgency.16 In civilian responses, as well as military, we need to adapt our programming in response to changes in the character of an insurrection. As David is fond of saying, adapting our responses required that we understand the environment in detail and in its own terms, then diagnose the drivers and key characteristics of the insurgency, and develop tailored approaches to counter each stage of the insurgent system. There are some parts of this diagnosis that we, in USAID, using a Conflict Assessment Framework, have become quite good at. We can look at structural causes of violence like failures of governance, economic deprivation, or social cleavages, and determine where fault lines may exist. We can identify triggering events, like elections, natural disasters, political decisions or attacks on individuals or groups, that lead to escalation of violence. We can analyze networks of financial and logistical support for insurgent groups. At USAID, and throughout the U.S. government, we have tools and programs that are well-equipped to counter each part of the insurgent system. Addressing these conditions doesn’t necessarily mean abandoning the tools we have used for development. It means using them in a different way and in conjunction with our partners in the interagency. For example, over the last several years, the USG [U.S. government] has been tracking an increase in terrorist activity in the Sahel. A joint USAID/EUCOM [U.S. military’s European Command] assessment in 2005 identified several motives for this activity in different regions and led to the development of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership [TSCTP]. The TSCTP is an interagency (DoD, State, USAID), multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits, with USAID focusing its efforts on Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. The communities and populations identified as sources for terrorism were geographically or socially isolated and neglected by central actors. This gave them a motive for violence – grievance over inequities in the distribution of resources – and an opportunity to foster terrorism because of their isolation in relatively ungoverned spaces. Regional conditions, including terrorist cells in other parts of the Sahel, brought the means for violence in terms of weapons, training and recruitment to these communities. USAID and EUCOM developed a tailored program based on the problems in specific communities to help prevent escalation of tensions that already existed and to mitigate factors that might lead to additional violence. For example, in Niger the program identified a lack of information, knowledge, and skills as a key barrier for giving isolated young people a voice and stake in their own development. One youth activity teaches both job skills and leadership skills through a peer education model to engage young people in the community-level decision-making processes that directly affect them, and to reduce their isolation from the broader community. Integrating them into the community, and giving them a constructive role to play, reduces their susceptibility to recruitment for terrorism or other violent activity. TSCTP is an example of how to tailor our programs so we can get at the root structural and environmental causes of insurgency and conflict. But there is still a significant gap that we are learning to address between how we program resources as a development agency, and the goals and objectives of sister Agency and Department program[s]. At the end of the day, it’s still too early to call this a success. We’re not at the Mission Accomplished stage yet…. In USAID, TSCTP is a non-traditional or irregular program. [W]hile there is increased consensus on how we use our resources, the question WHY we do so remains a hot topic, and there is no consensus that the WHY should be to counter extremism or deny recruitment and sanctuary. In my opinion, our greatest challenge is in understanding and responding to the issues of identity and culture that are characteristic of modern insurgency. In places like Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, Chechnya, and the entire Muslim North Caucasus and Afghanistan, there has been a spiritual awakening with a strong anti-globalization ethos that is alien to how we in the West understand peace and security, and that we need to learn how to take into consideration. Frankly, our learning curve is steep, in my humble opinion. All too often, our response to counter-insurgency results in well-intentioned programs that do not take into account the cultural aspirations or values of the people we are trying to serve. For example, when I worked in Afghanistan under the Taliban in 1997-98, several women’s movement organizations from Hollywood and elsewhere started programs to liberate women and find them employment. These were well-intentioned programs focused on equality between genders, a strong American value. Women in Afghanistan were perplexed by the program. They appreciated the assistance, but the jobs that were on offer weren’t appropriate. At the end of the day, if the job available was for a ditch digger, or clearing our sewer, they didn’t want it. Also, they didn’t always feel like they had a choice in the kind of liberation being offered. There was a heavy focus on clothing, but many of the Afghan women were comfortable with what they were wearing. They were happy to have a broader choice available, but wanted conservative dress to be part of the array. The programming was based on what we thought was good, not what they thought was good. Similarly, the international donor community shut down boys’ schools because the Taliban closed girls’ schools. I had women come to me to protest. They said that boys needed to understand the value of education. Then they would begin to see why it was important for girls to have access to it as well. Denying them education would make it worse for women because they would then be open to ideologies that devalued it. We are still limited by our world view. The tools we have developed to improve governance, to create jobs, and to provide services may not address the deep cultural identity issues at play. As Hoffman points out, victory against the fervent and fanatical individual who finds the notion of transcendence through death enticing, rather than forbidding, will not be gained by outgoverning those that do not seek So one way to begin to improve our programming, to make it more nuanced and in tune to the cultures and identities of the people we are trying to assist is to develop better ways of listening to them. We may then be forced to consider programming that does not necessarily conform to our way of seeing the world, but acknowledges their vision for their society, and has a better chance of bringing greater stability. Conclusion The programming I have described above is a critical part of a counter-insurgency or, perhaps, an “irregular warfare” program in an SSTR framework. USAID is working as a part of the interagency [effort] to learn and to adapt its programming to the ever-changing environment, tactics, and motivations of the modern insurgent. The context we work in today is characterized by irregular warfare, both on the part of insurgents and on the part of our military, and those of our allies. For USAID and its partners, irregular warfare is a symptom of the underlying conditions fostering conflict, and a tactic used by armed actors in kinetic activities. Our mission is to address the underlying conditions that lead to conflict, and to reduce the need or desire to engage in classic irregular warfare. That mission will hopefully lead us to programming that increases security, promotes stability, facilitates transition, and provides sustainable reconstruction.
Notes References
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Elisabeth Kvitashvili serves concurrently as Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development where she is responsible for leading USAID efforts to analyze and respond to instability, extremism, and insurgency. She is a career senior foreign service officer with tours in Afghanistan, Russia, and Honduras. She served in Afghanistan, 2002-2003, where she was head of the USAID reconstruction program and Acting Mission Director. In the mid-1980’s she was based in Peshawar, Pakistan where she designed the USAID Cross Border Humanitarian Assistance Program for Afghanistan. During 1997-1998, she traveled for USAID throughout Afghanistan undertaking humanitarian assessments with the UN. She has also spent significant time in the North and South Caucasus, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea working primarily on humanitarian and conflict-related programs. She previously served 3 years as the director of the Disaster Response and Mitigation Division in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance where she led a number of DARTS and one year in the Office of Transition Initiatives as a senior program officer. She holds a Master’s Degree in Near East Studies from the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies and a Diploma in International Relations from Paris University School of Political Science. She is fluent in French, Spanish, and Russian. She is currently adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS).