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The purpose of this article is to explore the utilization and role of large United States Navy vessels for domestic disaster response. Although responding to domestic disasters is considered a nontraditional role for the U.S. Navy, the capabilities found on aircraft carriers, amphibious vessels, and other vessels are unparalleled in terms of operational mobility and providing critical capabilities during a coastal disaster. In the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, U.S. leaders, both civil and military, called for a reassessment of plans to better support future disaster response efforts. This article attempts to answer that call by informing leaders, policy makers, and professionals involved in disaster management as to why and how sea power may be effectively leveraged as a nontraditional response to a future domestic disaster.1 In an attempt to prevent future underutilization of nontraditional assets, this article provides a general framework regarding how the Department of Defense (DoD) mobilized and employed sea power during the nation’s most devastating recent domestic disaster, examines the capabilities and constraints found aboard selected Navy vessels, and concludes with an assessment regarding how information and coordination through the capacities found on naval vessels may be best applied in future domestic disasters on or near coastal regions. The intended audience for this research includes civilian disaster planners, policy makers in the U.S. legislative branch, and military leaders, such as National Guard Adjutants General in coastal states. The methodology for this research employed a case study focusing on specific vessels and personnel involved in response to Hurricane Katrina. During the first few days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005, the USS Bataan sat offshore and remained largely underutilized as a crisis quickly developed in New Orleans.2 While federal, state, and local officials attempted to direct response efforts in an increasingly chaotic urban environment where power and communications were inoperable, it quickly became apparent that the systems and networks to control and mitigate disaster response were incapable of accomplishing such tasks. In the aftermath of the failures that occurred in New Orleans, a consensus among policy makers formed with respect to the slow delivery of resources and inadequate preparations made by the majority of responsible parties. The underutilization of nontraditional assets, such as those found on the USS Bataan, seem to have arisen primarily from two issues: insufficient awareness of such capabilities, and the procedural or legal hurdles that precluded usage of said capabilities. As many of the institutional lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina have sought to address federal agency coordination and communication between the various layers of the U.S. bureaucracy, there will likely be improvement in future processes as federal stakeholders involved in disaster response adapt their practices to respond better in future disasters.3 However, there still remains a knowledge gap for civil authorities and disaster managers regarding how and where they may successfully leverage support from the military. A Massive Undertaking during a Muddled Response On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States after having battered communities across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama for nearly a week. While the full impact of this Category 3 storm bypassed the city of New Orleans, the attention of the nation was fixed on the events that unfolded as local, state, and federal agencies attempted to marshal sufficient personnel, supplies and equipment to alleviate the issues that evolved in the storm’s aftermath. The activation of the Louisiana’s National Guard by Governor Kathleen Blanco, the movement of emergency resources and equipment in the region, the evacuation efforts in the city managed by Mayor Ray Nagin, and the direction of Under Secretary Mike Brown, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), all indicated that efforts were underway to effectively respond to the storm. However, the lack of situational awareness regarding the impact of levee failures and insufficient resources in the city to assist stranded citizens were both clearly evident in the chaotic response that occurred after Katrina’s landfall. The delayed announcement that identified the storm as an Incident of National Significance and the muddled request for support from Louisiana’s leaders required that military units would assume an active role in domestic disaster response without full preparation and analysis of the mission they would be tasked to accomplish.4 The lack of preparedness and readiness for this crisis was further compounded because the planned response by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Operation Plan #25014,5 had not been updated to provide effective guidance, designate responsibilities, or share relevant information regarding how DoD would be required to work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)6 and local civilian authorities during a domestic disaster.7 Furthermore, the lack of communication between civil leaders, volunteers, and numerous organizations already working in the impacted areas of the Gulf Coast determined that creating a centralized, coordinated effort must precede any coherent response to improve search and rescue efforts, as well as the evacuation of stranded citizens who were unable or unwillingly to leave prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.8 Sea Power during Hurricane Katrina Without situational awareness regarding both the needs and capabilities on-ground following Hurricane Katrina, the DoD developed a rapid and massive response that occurred through two major components, U.S. military’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM)9 and the National Guard.10 While the National Guard deployed the majority of the personnel from state activations during the initial response period (see Figure 1), NORTHCOM spearheaded federal efforts under its Joint Task Force Katrina (JTFK).11 Major General Russell Honore, a Louisiana native, was appointed to lead the task force as the commander, and he directed operations for all components of the federal military units that participated, including the Air Force, Navy, Marines and Army. In order to support what would normally be a humanitarian assistance mission in a foreign country, a large number of Navy assets were deployed across the Gulf Coast in a nontraditional grouping that emphasized the enormous impact that Katrina had made.12 In total, seventy-seven aircraft, eighteen vessels, and over ten thousand Navy personnel were sent to support JTF-Katrina’s operations. 13 The nontraditional role for sea power exhibited during Hurricane Katrina is best understood in the role reversal which transpired in order for response efforts to occur. Traditional operations for the U.S. Navy utilize the organization of a Carrier Strike Group,14 where helicopters and jets are launched from the deck of an aircraft carrier and supported by numerous other vessels and personnel. During Hurricane Katrina, many of the vessels normally utilized for support assumed the leading role. Moreover, the composition of the Naval Task Force responding to Hurricane Katrina involved a much larger force that focused on bringing logistical, medical, and amphibious assets to remedy the issues that had developed in the aftermath of the storm (see Figure 2). Some of these vessels were located near the disaster area and simply steamed in to lend assistance, such as the USS Bataan. Other vessels, including the USS Truman, USS Iwo Jima, and USNS Comfort, were rapidly uploaded and embarked from other regions along the U.S. eastern seaboard (see Figure 3). The Impact of Sea Power The subsequent push of military personnel, materials, and equipment did not have the immediate impact that many had envisioned. A post-disaster review from independent Congressional committees cited the lack of situational awareness, inadequate materials, and poor communication with other organizations as negatively impacting the responsiveness of DoD units and personnel.15 However, such criticisms were not directed specifically at naval forces, as sea power had a significant impact that unequivocally resulted in positive effects, which are summarized below:16
While this information provides some insight as to how sea power performed, the question unanswered is why were they so successful? Although not all-inclusive, the following factors may be of some assistance in understanding the utility that sea power brings to domestic disaster response that occurs around coastal areas. First, sea power provided the appropriate assets to respond after the crises. While other organizations, such as the Coast Guard and FEMA, have significant responsibilities for the security and management of U.S. ports and coastal communities following a disaster, they do not have any equipment or systems comparable to the vessels examined in this paper. Moreover, the human capital, rapid surge capabilities and self-sufficient communication and computer networks found on these Navy vessels are not financially replicable for other federal organizations with smaller budgets. Nor are such expensive vessels possible for state and local communities to maintain with their limited revenue and yearly balanced budget requirements. Accessibility is a second factor that enabled sea power to have critical impact during Hurricane Katrina. Unlike other land-based components of the federal government that responded, such as the National Guard and Army units (that were blocked by damaged roads and infrastructure), Navy vessels had unrestricted movement across much of the impact area following the storm. Thus, the dual logistical bases established in Pensacola (Florida) and New Orleans (Louisiana) were capable of rapidly transporting personnel, supplies and equipment to regions such as Biloxi, a coastal city in Mississippi, while continuing to support broader response efforts occurring throughout the Gulf Coast.17 Furthermore, the mix of aircraft and sea vessels that the Navy provided created two avenues of response that could address issues. With teams of engineers aboard vessels reopening and dredging sea lanes to improve accessibility, while helicopter pilots, mechanics, and air traffic controllers coordinated air support from onboard vessels, sea power provided task-specific teams by both air and sea. Finally, adaptability is a third factor that enabled naval vessels to succeed in providing support in the wake of the storm. After FEMA became overextended and relinquished many responsibilities to the DoD, Navy vessels and logistics proved to be flexible and versatile in delivering goods and services into the region while also providing the lift capabilities to conduct evacuations. This flexibility was possible in part because vessels were operating on seaways unhindered by traffic and pushing forward assets, even when sea lanes had not been completely cleared. Additionally, as command and control was largely delegated to vessel commanders and leaders working directly with the communities that needed support, rapid responsiveness in services was possible.18 While not the only success story in a time of troubles, Naval sea power assisted in responding to civil authorities by modifying internal networks and operations to support first-hand information, and bypassing the cumbersome task organization and reporting requirements that were found in the National Response Plan (NRP). In summary, the impact of sea power during Hurricane Katrina was overwhelmingly positive, and the Navy provided several important assets to local leaders and emergency managers who sought to remedy needs such as food, shelter, medical assistance, and electrical power. The ability to interface directly with military decision makers who can provide materials, information, and communication to the outside world will allow civil authorities and disaster planners to maximize the full effect of sea power. The following section will provide some insight into what they can expect to see and receive by reviewing four types of vessels, which were employed in response to Hurricane Katrina. Examining Some Alternatives to Traditional Response The purpose of this section is to profile four unique Navy vessels that participated in Hurricane Katrina, and play a significant role in naval operations both now and in the future. While Navy vessels have always maintained pivotal roles in national security and foreign policy, their usage has often been overlooked as an asset for communities and state governments to rely upon. This is due to the provisions found in the federal government of the United States preventing them from doing so without a clear request from those local governments. This section attempts to briefly highlight the roles that these vessels played and better enable professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds to gain more insight into their capabilities and limitations. Amphibious Assault Vessels (USS Iwo Jima) Amphibious assault vessels appear to be smaller versions of aircraft carriers on first glance, though their purpose and capabilities are vastly different. The primary warfare role of an aircraft carrier is to launch aircraft from at sea to impact targets far removed from the aircraft carriers position. On the other hand, the primary warfare role of the amphibious assault vessel is to transport, rapidly deploy, and direct large numbers of Marines, vehicles, and equipment to shore on smaller landing craft and helicopters that are all stored on-board. While the United States Ship (USS) Bataan was the first vessel to respond during Hurricane Katrina,19 the USS Iwo Jima proved to be an excellent example of what an amphibious assault vessel can provide during disaster response. After briefly stopping in Biloxi, Mississippi to provide supplies and equipment, the USS Iwo Jima steamed to New Orleans and became the center for relief operations upon arrival on September 5, 2005. The Iwo Jima served as the flagship for multiple senior officials, including presidential visits, and provided facilities and equipment to enable staff coordination, information dissemination, and public affairs briefings on a daily basis. The Iwo Jima also had many other unique roles during response efforts to include: being the only functioning dental clinic in New Orleans; acting as the proxy air traffic control agency (in lieu of the Federal Aviation Agency); providing approximately 3,000 extra meals per day for first-responders and National Guardsmen; and producing 120,000 gallons (454,200 liters) of water and 6,200 kilowatts (6.2 megawatts) of electrical power to support the numerous ongoing relief activities while working pier-side in New Orleans.20 Amphibious assault vessels will clearly be a resilient and multidimensional asset during a coastal domestic disaster, as they are staffed with a good mix of medical, technical and specialized personnel capable of supporting and directing disaster response efforts across lines of operation. These include: air evacuation, sea-based logistics, medical support, and command and control functions. Amphibious assault vessels have the capacity to provide ship-to-shore linkage by working pier-side. They can also send out smaller launching craft while simultaneously having robust rotary-wing air support (i.e. helicopter) features. Therefore, amphibious assault vessels, such as the USS Iwo Jima are ideal platforms to manage a coastal disaster in an urban region that has a seaway able to support the depth of this rather large vessel. Hospital Ships (USNS Comfort) Hospital ships are easily identified by their distinctive white color and bright red crosses, which are visible from both the sides of the ship and from overhead. Hospital ships are converted San Clemente-class super tankers, which were built to provide transcontinental delivery of oil. Unlike the other vessels examined in the article, hospital ships are not fully manned and operated at all times. Rather, they are maintained in a “reduced operating status” in which they are docked and maintained by a small crew of civilian mariners, and a small number of full-time medical and support personnel. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the United States Naval Ship (USNS) Comfort mobilized and steamed around Florida to the Gulf Coast in less than three days. During Hurricane Katrina, the medical support provided by USNS Comfort personnel enabled over 1,528 patients to be treated aboard ship in Mississippi. A further 7,000 patients received treatment at clinics and hospitals staffed by naval medical corpsman and doctors who deployed from the USNS Comfort. The utility of this vessel during Hurricane Katrina was further proven in the deployment of medical personnel, normally tasked to provide advanced critical care during wartime at sea, but focused instead on giving outpatient and advanced care to residents in land-based facilities. Noteworthy constraints for hospital ships derive from the fact that there is limited support for air operations, little room for additional non-patient personnel as the majority of the space is allocated for the 1,000 patient berths, and lack of cargo space to carry food and water for deployment and delivery. Hospital ships are not likely to provide immediate response efforts following a disaster, unless they coincidentally reside close to an impact area. However, these vessels will still continue to play a definitive role in meeting the needs of survivors who require patient care on a more routine and sustained basis, such as would occur in the weeks and months following a disaster along a coastal region. It is noteworthy to recognize that the USNS Mercy, the USNS Comfort’s sister ship, also provided post-disaster relief for 40 days following the 2004 tsunami disaster in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Furthermore, the USNS Mercy also provided relief following the March 2005 earthquake that struck near Nias Island, Indonesia and in response to the World Trade Center attacks in New York City in September 2001. The high-speed catamaran, HSV-2 Swift, appears on first glance to be an unlikely vessel on which to rest the future of sea-based logistics. With two keels, a relatively low profile, and a helicopter platform, this vessel appears to be something out of the modern day cinema, rather than a powerful vessel that has been built to infuse next-generation technologies into the world of transportation. With its unusual shape, the vessel can sustain rapid speeds that have exceeded 60 knots-per-hour in test scenarios and have enabled the vessel to complete transoceanic crossings without being replenished with fuel. Another noteworthy feature includes the vessel’s extendable ramp that can enable large diesel trucks to drive directly onto the vessel while it docks, significantly cutting down on on-loading and off-loading. There is little room to expand services, such as medical facilities and command suites, to facilitate large groups unless the cargo space is converted from storage to berthing quarters. During Hurricane Katrina, the HSV-2 Swift completed only three round-trip logistic runs from Pensacola to the Gulf Coast. However, the rapid pace and delivery of over 800 tons of water, materials and supplies demonstrate that HSV-2 Swift fulfilled a relatively simple, but absolutely essential role: to move people and equipment as fast as possible.21 In terms of future coastal disaster response efforts, sea-based logistical networks can rely on HSVs as a nontraditional “work-horse” that will rapidly support various non-combat missions across numerous environments. Aircraft Carriers (USS Harry S. Truman) As the single most expensive asset in the U.S. military’s inventory, valued at over $4.5 billion per vessel, aircraft carriers traditionally provide comprehensive support for air combat and serve as the centerpiece for all sea-based operations. In terms of national security, the aircraft carrier is the ultimate example of U.S. security interests across the world. During the week leading up to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the USS Harry S. Truman remained docked at Norfolk, Virginia for scheduled repairs and re-supply of ship stores. Upon notification of activation from Naval Command and after the levees broke in New Orleans, mass loading of food and water from nearby warehouses rapidly occurred while the vessel’s crew was recalled for immediate deployment. As the vessel steamed around Florida and headed to the Gulf Coast, numerous helicopters were received on the flight deck, significantly altering the traditional mix of aircraft on-board the vessel traditionally set aside for fighter jets, such as the F-16, and reconnaissance aircraft. First assigned to be Joint Task Force Katrina’s flagship, the USS Truman later served as the “lily pad and fuel station” that directed and supported air operations to reach victims, and provide logistical support over extended distances to numerous vessels spread across the Gulf Coast region.22 Such rapid, nontraditional mobilizations are in line with previous exploratory research conducted by the RAND Corporation, which has the power and versatility of the vessel to respond.23 Aircraft carriers are large, powerful platforms that may accomplish numerous tasks over vast distances. As the primary focus of a carrier is to manage, support and direct long-range air operations, the capabilities aboard the vessel must be significantly modified to accommodate close-in disaster response. While this transition quickly developed in response to Hurricane Katrina, guarantees that such an opportunity will exist in the future are difficult to foresee. Clearly, there are both space and abundant resources aboard these vessels to accommodate numerous needs during disaster response. However, the lack of inherent ship-to-shore assets on the carrier may preclude it from supporting the logistical delivery of heavy equipment and supplies [e.g. a 1000k (1 MW) generator] when air operations cannot occur due to adverse weather conditions. This constraint, coupled with the strategic role maintained by carriers for upholding U.S. strategic security interests abroad, determine that carriers will likely play a supporting role in future domestic disasters, only when the situation allows them to and if modifications can be conducted rapidly enough when the vessel is at sea. Conclusion The purpose of this research was to examine the role of sea power during a domestic disaster, and provide policy-makers and disaster planners with more insight as to how Navy vessels were employed. Based on the data and in view of the impact of the profiled vessels during Hurricane Katrina, “big deck” amphibious assault vessels, such as the USS Iwo Jima mentioned above, appear to provide the most diverse set of capabilities to conduct rapid, close-in disaster response efforts. While the other vessels are clearly not one-dimensional, significant tradeoffs are required for them to operate in a disaster assistance role. Specifically, the lack of adaptability and air support onboard hospital ships, the limited berthing and medical capabilities aboard the HSVs, and the lack of large-bodied sea transport vessels and influential national security role maintained by aircraft carriers, rule these vessels out as the optimal prospect for nontraditional and consistent sea-based domestic disaster response. While the nontraditional employment of Navy vessels will continue to be controlled by federal agencies and national decision makers, maximizing the use of the assets discussed here requires that those who make the request for assistance and receive the support are well-informed and prepared to leverage the opportunities that sea power can bring. Leaders and disaster managers at the state and local levels must be fully engaged to utilize sea-based support for the best results. Policy changes must also be made to implement U.S. sea power assets into domestic disaster relief planning. Without such changes, the employment of U.S. sea power will continue to remain a matter of reaction rather than an integrated, powerful component for response efforts to enable and direct disaster response in coastal regions. Ultimately, sea power will be insufficient to remedy disasters in the long-term, as land-based operations provide greater space and proximity to those in need. However, in the short term, sea-based logistic networks may be a faster and more effective method to deliver supplies and equipment to coastal areas. The independent communication networks, medical facilities, refueling and re-supply capabilities, and command and control opportunities found onboard Navy vessels can provide unparalleled support for state and local leaders. Future research regarding sea power and disaster response might focus on the numerous international humanitarian assistance missions that the Navy is engaging across both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, as the nontraditional and non-kinetic usage of sea power is leveraged to achieve U.S. strategic goals.
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Captain Tim Jackson is currently completing his second combat tour in Iraq as the Executive Officer for Task Force 134, Multi-National Forces-Iraq. He has completed overseas tours in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Southwest Asia, and held various leadership and staff positions in eight years of military service. He was awarded a Master’s Degree in Public Policy Analysis at George Mason University in 2007, and has completed graduate studies abroad at Oxford University in the United Kingdom and Tsinghua University in the People’s Republic of China. He received his Bachelor’s of Art Degree in Psychology with honors from Wheaton College in 2000. He may be reached for comments and questions at timothy.a.jackson@us.army.mil.