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Humanitarian and military institutional concerns may differ significantly when these groups are working in the same environment. That is certainly to be expected. However, these differences acquire special significance when they lead to hostile attitudes and behavior or the active questioning of motive in situations where there is an overlap in the working environment or perceived objectives. All sides are losers when this occurs, most especially, the communities affected by this discord. As a further complication, when the U.S. military is present as part of a peacekeeping initiative (and thereby ostensibly a neutral entity), its presence may be seen in a different light than in the case of a humanitarian intervention responding to a man-made crisis, as in Somalia. There the military, initially seen as present to assist the humanitarian enterprise, came to be seen by many as belligerent, taking sides and therefore an actor in a little understood political environment. In short, there is no clearly defined image of the military that fits all encounters. During an occupation, as in Iraq, the situation can be even more complicated. The role of the military, as seen by the populace, by humanitarian observers, and the military itself, is constantly changing in response to events and decisions emanating from a range of sources. On the other hand, during the response to a natural disaster, the reaction to military involvement is generally much more favorable. The military’s special advantage in logistics, for example, is heavily relied on to assist in the rapid delivery of aid over potentially long distances and into otherwise inaccessible areas. In this case, humanitarian organizations have fewer concerns about the role of the military in providing immediate relief. Natural disasters play no favorites and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations, local structures, and the military often function as a team. Here we are focusing on situations where hostility is either present or likely to occur. The Guidelines The recent progress made in the level of communication between the humanitarian and military communities is very encouraging. The work of the Non-Governmental Organization consortium: Interaction, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, in developing and launching the “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments”1 marks a significant step forward in clarifying what has often been a relationship productive of misunderstanding on assumptions and objectives. The following remarks, looking at the varying perceptions of the communities on the same issue, are intended to provide some background and assist in putting the Guidelines in perspective. For example, as we all know, it is increasingly common for the humanitarian and military communities to occupy the same working space. Whether either side sees this as desirable is not necessarily the dominant question, though characterizing it as one or the other remains a matter of discussion. The comparison used in what follows is intended to assist in clarifying some of the expectations and assumptions that get in the way of effective communication between the military and civilian organizations. It is an attempt to capture the concerns and interests of the respective communities. The challenge is to find, to the extent possible, areas of common concerns and mutually reinforcing actions. The goal is to devise strategies for military and civilian actors that do not compromise their fundamental views on roles and mandates but which enable all sides to function as effectively as possible in the interest of those being served. I will draw on examples from the Guidelines as illustrating an ongoing approach to the issues. Security in the Field: Responsibilities and ConcernsNGHO Views and Behavior The concept of security is closely tied to staff protection, protection of beneficiaries and the concept of “humanitarian space.” This last is defined in different ways, but a fundamental statement turns upon the need to have a safe and secure environment in which to do humanitarian work. Further, the word “protection” has more than one understanding. It applies to physical protection in the sense described above, and also to legal protection defined by humanitarian norms and international law. Military Views and Behavior Here again, the military view includes a focus on the means by which security is established and control of the requirements for maintaining security. NGHOs rarely establish security procedures beyond maintaining the tools of self-protection, such as warden networks, secure housing, staff training, and issues of safe access. The military does not take this more indirect approach to security. For the military, operational plans assume the imposition of security as part of mission objectives. Sections A and B of the Guidelines speak to this issue. As an illustration of the approach taken, Section A addressed to the military states, in part: When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. While Section B addressed to NGHOs states, in part: NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items. Leadership during Conflict or Civil StrifeNGHO Views and Behavior From the NGHO perspective, leadership, to the extent it is seen as required or desirable by the community on the ground, may reflect the lead agency approach and not a command-and-control relationship. This approach is increasingly taken by the United Nations. It may be a function of individual initiative, simply being first on the ground, or having and sharing resources. In some circumstances, the determination of which NGO takes a leading role (usually implicit as opposed to stated) may be connected to variables such as experience in the area, staffing levels, and relations with the local community. Military Views and Behavior Who is in charge is a fundamental concern for the military. Overall responsibility is determined by institutional imperatives, training, and a defined mission statement. Effectiveness is very much related to a chain of command, which is imbued in military culture, but can also be personality-driven. However, clear delineations of roles, responsibilities, and unity of command are viewed as necessary in order to ensure mission success. In those cases where the military objective is either planned, or results in a need to include humanitarian assistance, decision-making need not necessarily take into account considerations of civilian expertise or previous arrangements with the local community. This, of course, does not resonate well within the humanitarian community. Section C of the Guidelines proposes ways through which coordination or cooperation facilitating the sharing of leadership roles may be initiated. They recommend a liaison mechanism directed at enhancing the possibility of informed communication between the communities. Specific attention is paid to sharing Information or IntelligenceNGHO Views and Behavior NGHOs see information as a tool for improving program implementation and planning. In this sense, it is clearly distinct from intelligence, with its connotation of military application. Information is related to training and program objectives in establishing humanitarian aid standards, such as the SPHERE Project,2 and questions of monitoring and evaluation. Its value, in these terms, is its objective character and the expectation that accurate information should be of value to any service provider. The use of information is also presumed to be consistent with the tenets of the various codes of conduct governing the provision of humanitarian assistance. Military Views and Behavior In military parlance, information and intelligence are seen as virtually synonymous. Both terms are applied to the tools for tactical and strategic decision-making and action. Information, therefore, is deemed essential to providing an advantage over anopposing group. This leads the military to see humanitarians working in their area of operations as an appendage to military objectives and, therefore, valuable as a source of first-hand information. Section C.3 of the Guidelines proposes: There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure, if any, plans, concerns, etc. The expectation is that this clear statement should overtake the assumption that information and intelligence are interchangeable terms. As Things Stand: Some Concluding ObservationsThe Public’s View of the NGHO Community Speaking in general terms, public and donor expectations of the NGHO community takes more than one form and are closely related to the source of their funding. In the eyes of the public, the role of relief organizations is pretty straightforward. They exist to save lives, assist the needy, and demonstrate the humanitarian values of the communities from which they come. Individuals tend to see humanitarian agencies as an extension of a strongly felt need to ameliorate the suffering of others. This support takes many forms, from cash donations to direct provision of material aid. NGHOs, however, may require the support of a variety of donors. The larger the crisis, the more dependent they may become on a broad base of donor support. Donors will follow different approaches. Ideally, NGHOs would prefer funds that have no strings attached in order to make decisions based solely on their own professional judgments. While NGHO actions are based on mission statements and program activities reflecting those statements, an NGHO may act differently depending on the expectations of the donor. Donors routinely place tight controls on expenditures. For a time, this was seen as primarily related to issues of accountability. Increasingly, however, there is a realization that donors have responsibilities to Again, speaking generally, the military has a constituency which does not usually see it as primarily concerned with providing humanitarian assistance. This view may change, in the absence of ongoing conflict, if the humanitarian community is seen as lacking the capability to deal with a humanitarian task. Nor does the military see itself in this role as a normal operational assumption. A recent U.S. Department of Defense Directive, DoD 3000.05, has somewhat altered this perception. This Directive requires that the armed services include stability operations, which can include peacekeeping, as a core mission.3 That having been said, the mantra that the military exists primarily to “fight and win our nation’s wars” still permeates the mindset of many officers as well as that of the public. On the other hand, in times of large-scale disasters, there is frequently an expectation that the array of resources available to the military will and should be tasked to respond. A clear difficulty lies in how much preparation the military can realistically undertake to meet the expectations of the Directive and today’s realities. Military training objectives are necessarily different from those of humanitarian agencies. The degree of concentration on specific skills also varies considerably. Overcoming this obstacle represents a significant challenge.
Notes
Mr. Williams was previously Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Response, of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). He was appointed to this post in January 1998 and served until January 2001. USAID is the U.S. government agency that provides economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide. As head of OFDA, Williams oversaw disaster preparedness and relief and rehabilitation programs throughout the world. Before going to OFDA, Williams served with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for 12 years. From May 1996 to January 1998, Williams was IRC’s Vice President for Overseas Policy and Planning. From 1993 to 1996, he was Vice President for Overseas Programs, and from 1985 to 1993, he was Director of Operations. During this time, Williams led efforts that resulted in the conceptualization, creation and staffing of IRC’s Emergency Preparedness Unit. He helped to establish and staff IRC offices in a variety of places including Northern Iraq, Jordan, the Balkans, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. From 1979 to 1985, he served with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), formerly known as the International Committee for European Migration (ICEM). During this time he served as Chief of Operations in Geneva, Switzerland from 1983 to 1985; Regional Director in Bangkok, Thailand, from 1980 to 1983; and Country Representative in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 1979 to 1980. From 1976 to 1979, Williams was Assistant to the Director with the American Council for Nationalities Services in New York. Williams has a Bachelor’s degree from Columbia University. He also studied at the Columbia University School of Law. |
Howard Roy Williams is presently President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Humanitarian Cooperation. He also serves as an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a Visiting Professor at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.