The Self-Defense Forces Overseas:
Japan’s Lessons from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Assistance

Since the 1980s, Japan has been seeking active involvement in international disaster-relief operations. At the beginning, participation was modest, but gradually has become one of the central missions of uniformed officials in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In that process, there has been a constant debate over how Japanese SDF people should be involved in the humanitarian activities. This article sketches out the main issues for civil-military relations in Japan, and for the SDF’s involvement in international operations, including peacekeeping and disaster response.

Japan’s Humanitarian Assistance to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Victims

On December 26, 2004, a destructive tsunami caused by a huge earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale struck coastal regions along the Indian Ocean. The seismic sea wave caused devastating effects: the loss of lives, destruction of properties, and damage to infrastructure. Immediately after the disaster, international relief efforts were requested. In response to the international crisis, the Japanese government, along with others, dispatched disaster-relief teams to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Maldives. They were involved in conducting rescue operations, identifying casualties, and providing medical services and relief supplies.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) joined the disaster-relief operations in Thailand and Indonesia. On December 28, three Maritime SDF warships, on their way back to Japan from anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, were sent to Thailand for rescue operations. On January 4, 2005, the Japanese Minister of State for Defense ordered the dispatch of a joint SDF rescue team (ground, maritime, and air) to Indonesia. The team engaged in transportation activities, epidemic prevention, and medical services. About 1,600 SDF personnel were sent, and their operations in Thailand and Indonesia were their largest-ever international disaster-relief operations (Japanese Defense Agency, 2005a, pp. 249-259).

These operations provoked the debate over how the SDF would be involved in international aiding activities in future.

It’s Not the Military, but the Self-Defense Force: Political Constraints Over Japan’s Assistance Abroad

During the 1990s, Japan’s international role with respect to security expanded to include not only conducting United Nations peacekeeping operations, but also playing a role in humanitarian relief operations. Both issues of the Self-Defense Forces’ dispatch to hot spots were related to each other in the following way.

First, “human” contributions have become valued more than financial contributions. Although it bankrolled nearly a fifth of the total cost of the coalition forces’ military operations during the 1991 Gulf War, Japan’s financial contributions were condemned by the United States as “too little, too late”. The government stipulated several laws for the dispatch of SDF personnel to overseas areas: the Peacekeeping Law in 1992, the U.S.-Japan security guidelines in 1999, and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001. Since the September 11, 2001 incident, it is clear that the Japanese government has showed its readiness to dispatch SDF personnel with the goal of doing more than what other countries had pejoratively labeled “checkbook diplomacy” to criticize its role in the Gulf War.

Second, among various issues of “human contributions,” the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas has become a focal point of discussion. For the last decade, the Japanese government has recognized its relationship with the UN and its security relationship with the U.S. government as the institutions that enable the country to play a bigger role in international affairs. On the other hand, the fear among East Asian countries that Japan’s increasing unilateral contribution would lead to Japan’s remilitarization has dissuaded Japan from dispatching its SDF troops abroad (Hook, et. al., 2001, p. 323). Deliberations over Japan’s security role for the last decade in the Diet focused on whether and to what extent the Japanese government would be able to dispatch SDF personnel and still maintain the traditional “pacifist” stance in keeping with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.1

Finally, reflection of Japan’s failure to dispatch SDF personnel in the Gulf War prompted a more general debate over whether Japan, with its military operations restrained by Article 9 of the Constitution, would ever become a “normal state,” with the capacity to conduct international relief operations as it sees necessary. Discussion of Japan’s sending SDF personnel overseas has also expanded into discussion over the need to establish new diplomatic norms and political values that will create a more positive image of Japan with a role in international responsibilities that transcends its traditional “pacifist” stance (Shinyo, 1995, chap.2).

In the large process of redefining the Japanese SDF’s role, the 1991 Gulf War marked a turning point. The absence of the Kuwait government’s appreciation for Japan’s financial contributions prompted the government to reconsider the roles of the SDF both in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

First, the decision-making process involved in the passage of the Peacekeeping Law focused on whether the dispatch of SDF officers would violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sought to hammer out a consensus with moderate political parties, such as Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), regarding the conception of what constituted “substantial activities” of peacekeeping. Eventually, it was decided that Japan’s peacekeeping should be limited to logistical and rear-area support. Komeito and the DSP also demanded that Japanese peacekeepers be immediately recalled from assignments if they were exposed to “excessive danger,” and also urged that sending SDF personnel to hot spots around the world require prior Diet approval. With these conditions imposed, the bill was finally passed in June 1992.

The first SDF personnel Japan dispatched under this law joined the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Right after the Peacekeeping Law was passed, 8 SDF soldiers, 600 SDF engineers, 41 civilians (election monitors), and 75 civilian police were sent to Cambodia. Their assignment generally went smoothly. Soon, however, the SDF soldiers were asked to do more than what was stipulated in their original assignment.

Second, regarding disaster-relief operations, the Japanese government amended the International Relief Law at the same time the Peacekeeping Law was enacted. During the debate, there was a clear division of public opinion on the SDF’s involvement in disaster-relief operations. The opposition parties and their supporters were worried that the amendment would lead to dispatching the SDF beyond the Japanese borders. However, the consensus of the three parties (LDP, Komeito, and DSP) finally succeeded in passing the amendment so that the SDF could engage in broad international activities.

The Japanese government explained the three reasons for amendment as follows: (1) a bigger size of relief operation teams would be needed in some disasters; (2) they should have self-sufficient capabilities; and (3) they need to improve transportation capabilities. Judging from their domestic experiences in the past, the SDF’s activities were limited to four areas: (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster-relief personnel by helicopters; (3) water supplies using water-purifying devices; and (4) use of transport planes and ships to carry disaster-relief personnel and equipment to the affected areas (Japanese Defense Agency, 2005b, pp. 64-71).

With that said, the SDF had to wait another six years for the first international disaster-relief operation. In 1998, they were sent to Honduras, which was attacked by Hurricane Mitch. Since then, a variety of disaster-relief operations have been carried out, as shown in Table 1.

Learning to Collaborate with Non-Military Organizations

The Japanese government as a whole has more than a decade of history in international disaster-relief operations; overall government involvement began long before Japan’s SDF started to engage in these activities. In 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the Japan Medical Team for Disaster Relief (JMTDR) with the assistance of other ministries and medical organizations. The creation of the JMTDR was a response to the criticism on the lack of competent relief programs for the refugees around the Thai-Cambodia border at the time of the 1970s Indo-China war (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2005).

In the mid-80s, the Japanese government decided to enhance its operational abilities, and to establish an integrated international disaster-relief structure along with competent human resources, facilities, and legal systems. The International Disaster Relief Law was enacted in 1987, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency organized Japan Disaster Relief teams (JDR). These teams, created for the purpose of emergency relief when major disasters occur overseas, especially in developing countries, are composed of three types of groups: rescue, medical, and emergency management expert teams.

The SDF has been confronting the difficulties of collaborating with private organizations in disaster operations. The SDF has always been in the center of prominent political conflict, and that position puts the SDF into an unstable situation in domestic and international disaster-relief operations. There has been a constant debate over how the SDF should collaborate with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international disaster-relief operations since the SDF joined the JDR. In 2001, Japan’s Defense Agency pointed out its own five challenges for international disaster-relief operations in a White Paper. One of the challenges was to strengthen effective collaboration with NGOs2. Some Japanese NGOs were clearly against the SDF’s involvement in the JDR from the beginning (“NGO ya Enjodantai,” 1991). They were skeptical about the SDF’s role and capacity in “international” disaster-relief operations, since the SDF had no experience of overseas activities since its establishment in 1954. Also, historically and structurally speaking, the SDF did not have many collaborative operations with NGOs in domestic disaster-relief operations. Before the 1995 Kobe earthquake hit western parts of Japan’s mainland, some local governments were quite reluctant to have any political and administrative connections with the SDF. The SDF’s characteristics in disaster-relief operations as well as their self-sufficient capabilities made it difficult for them to collaborate with other relief bodies. Their activities in international disaster-relief operations were intentionally focused on initial responses, and their operations were not adequately coordinated with other relief activities.

Nowadays, in spite of those difficulties, there is a growing need for cooperation between the SDF and NGOs. In international disaster-relief operations, various assets held by the military or civil defense organizations are effective for the initial response phase to natural disasters. Military or civil defense organizations usually stay in the afflicted area for less than a few months, and then non-military governmental organizations and NGOs accept responsibility for the later stages of recovery. In the case of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Indonesian government requested foreign forces not to stay in distressed areas for more than three months. In severe disaster areas, it may take more than several years to accomplish the recovery program. The smooth transition from initial response to recovery programs is required for quick restoration and development of devastated areas.

The SDF is still searching for the correct position within the disaster-relief network. At the 10th Tokyo Defense Forum (Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region), held in June 2005, the Director-General for International Affairs of Japan’s Defense Agency mentioned that “the participants shared the view that coordination between many actors (including NGOs) in disaster relief…is important, in order to avoid overlapping as well as to fill the gap from the perspective of division on labor concerning roles, missions, and capability.” (Japanese Defense Agency, 2005c). It is a pressing issue for them to establish a more collaborative civil-military relationship for effective and efficient operations.

The Changing Nature of
Civil-Military Relations in Japan

The incremental progress in the SDF’s “international” roles implies that activities of Japan’s Self-Defense Force in the postwar history have been constrained by legal frameworks including the Constitution, anti-war feelings among the Japanese people, diplomatic relations with other Asian countries, and so forth. Interestingly enough, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government has prompted Japan towards a more positive international security role, and the Japanese government has responded to the U.S. requests by providing “human contributions”.

In terms of the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations are a new field for SDF officers. The changing roles of the SDF concerned the division of labor within the entire U.S.-Japan security alliance. During the 1950s, when Japan recovered its independence through a security alliance with the United States, the bilateral relationship rested on the exchange between the U.S. provision of security for Japan and Japan’s provision of territories for the U.S. military. In the 1970s, Japan’s provision of economic assistance to Southeast Asia was newly included as a part of Japan’s share in exchange for continued U.S. provision of Japanese security. Now in the new century after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Government seems to envision a much more equal sharing of the responsibilities for security in the Asia-Pacific region with the Japanese government. The U.S. condemning Japan for “too little, too late” cooperation and assistance during the1991 Gulf War signaled the beginning of this new era when the U.S. Government expected and demanded direct Japanese cooperation in overseas operations (Ito, 2002).

Moreover, in terms of civil-military relationships, the new functions of the SDF provide the uniformed people with unprecedented roles that seek cooperation with people in hot spots and disaster areas, and dissemination of SDF activities to the public. Theoretically speaking, the constraints on civil-military relationships are imposed on the military so that it projects power into civil society, and in this sense, civilian control is exercised over the military. However, the civil-military relationship in disaster management looks for a functional cooperation between uniformed officers and grass-roots level citizens who have lived in the hot spot for many years.

In that sense, the expanding roles of Japan’s SDF that go beyond war-fighting activities imply the existence of uniformed people should be legitimately accepted by civilians, while at the same time the SDF should maintain the capabilities to conduct relief operations by themselves.

References
Hook, G. D., Gilson, J., Hughes, C. W. & Dobson, H. (2001.) Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security. London and New York: Routledge.

Ito, G. (2002.) Redefining Security Roles: Japan’s Response to the September 11 Terrorism. The Journal of East Asian Studies, 2-1. Boulder: Lynn Rienner.

Japan Defense Agency (2005a.) Defense of Japan, White Paper. Tokyo: National Printing Bureau: Bouei Hakusho.

Japan Defense Agency. (2005b.) Defense of Japan 2005 White Paper: English Summary. Retrieved October 18, 2005 from http://www.jda.go.jp/e/publications/wp2005/

Japanese Defense Agency. (2005c.) Defense Agency 4th Asia Security Conference.
Retrieved October 18, 2005 from http://www.jda.go.jp/e/publications/wp2004/
pab/joint/20050629a.htm.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). History of Japan Disaster Relief Teams. Retrieved October 18, 2005 from http://www.jica.go.jp/activities/jdrt/gaiyo.html.

NGO ya Enjodantai, Hanpatsu to Kangei to: Kokusai Kinnkyuu Ennjotai no Jieitai Sanka [Pros and Cons of Dispatching SDF Overseas: From the View of NGOs and Aid Organizations]. (1991, September 29). Asahi Shimbun [Morning Edition], p. 30.

Shinyo, T. (Ed.). (1995). Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Nyumon [An Introduction to World Peace Cooperation]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.

Endnotes:
1) Even after the Peacekeeping Law was passed, the Japanese Diet made a distinction between substantial, military-related operations and less military, support-oriented peacekeeping operations, saying that the former “shall not be implemented until a date to be set forth by a separate law.” Japanese peacekeepers can monitor elections, provide bureaucratic advice and guidance (e.g., police administration, medical care, transportation, construction), and conduct humanitarian relief operations (e.g., rescue and repatriation of war refugees); while monitoring ceasefires, patrolling buffer zones, and inspecting weapons are not included in the “rear-area support” that is allowed. After the September 11 terror attack, the Japanese Diet passed a legislation that enables Japanese SDF personnel to conduct activities of peacekeeping forces (”substantial activities”).

2) The Japan Defense Agency pointed out five challenges for its effective international disaster-relief operations in Defense of Japan 2001 White Paper as follow: (1) establishing information network among ministries and agencies; (2) strengthening of collaboration with NGOs (3) securing the transportation for international disaster-relief operations; (4) capacity building of SDF; (5) enhancing the publicity activities on disaster-relief operations.

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