Saving Lives & Delivering Hope:
Singapore Armed
Forces’ Involvement in
Tsunami Relief Operation

A year has passed since the earthquake and tsunami in Asia on Boxing Day 2004 resulted in unprecedented death and damage. The sheer magnitude of the disaster and its proximity to Singapore called for an unusual response on the part of Singapore’s military, resulting in a record level of our involvement in an international disaster response. Resources from Chinook (military) helicopters to Landing Ship Tanks (amphibious craft) and personnel of varied specialist skills were marshalled on a scale and with urgency never done before in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).

The SAF mission was clear: to provide emergency relief in support of the Indonesian government’s effort to help the victims of the earthquake and tsunami. The two main imperatives in the mission were to save lives and to provide and facilitate humanitarian relief assistance to the victims.

Sequence of Events in SAF Tsunami Operation

Week 1: In the aftermath of the tsunami, there was immediate and direct communication with the Indonesian authorities on how Singapore could help with the relief operations. After a day of consultation and co-ordination, the first C-130 (cargo) aircraft was flown into Medan with relief supplies on 28 Dec 04. A day later, two Chinook and two Super Puma helicopters were sent to Medan. The SAF deployed its first medical team into Banda Aceh to support the Indonesian relief effort. On New Year’s Eve, the SAF sent its Humanitarian Assistance Support Group1 to Meulaboh.

Week 2: A week after the tsunami, the SAF relief operation in Indonesia swung into full force. The Contingent Headquarters and helicopter detachment were in Medan, the medical task force and liaison elements were based in Banda Aceh, and our main humanitarian initiative was in Meulaboh. Singapore’s Prime Minister and the Defence Minister also visited Sumatra on 4 Jan 05 to get a first-hand feel of the situation on the ground before attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Tsunami Summit in Jakarta two days later. During this time, Singapore also made available its air and naval facilities, office space, warehousing, and logistics facilities to the United Nations (UN) and other aid agencies.

From Week 3 onwards, the relief work continued, from providing ground information and transportation to other stakeholders, to facilitating access into Meulaboh. The SAF provided military capability that was useful and critical at the emergency stage. Once access was opened and UN and other civilian agencies began to move into the area of operation, it was also timely for the military to take a step back. Only the UN and its agencies could sustain and support such a large-scale humanitarian relief operation. What we did was to ensure that the systems we set up would be sustainable even after we left. Therefore, the hand-over of our systems and processes was co-ordinated with the Indonesian authorities, supported by UN and other agencies.

Overall Commitments

Overall, this operation stood out as the largest military operation that the Singapore Armed Forces had launched. The SAF deployed more than 1,500 personnel, together with ships, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, construction engineers, and medical field hospitals. On an international scale, these numbers may be modest. For Singapore with its limited resources, this was a big commitment. As such, the SAF focused its efforts on where it could credibly make a significant difference and add value to the relief efforts of the Indonesians.

Experiences in our Tsunami Relief Operation

Many valuable lessons were learned in this operation – a large scale humanitarian relief and disaster response (HADR) operation. From the SAF perspective, civil-military coordination and cooperation at all levels (inter-agency, inter-ministry, operational, and tactical) is one of the key success factors in saving lives and delivering hope to the affected civilians of this disaster. The following paragraphs will attempt to provide some insight into SAF experiences and perspectives of civil-military coordination.

Maintaining Goodwill and Trust

One of the success factors for SAF operations in Aceh was the ability to establish and maintain goodwill and trust on the ground. We did not go in with the mindset of telling people what to do. Rather, we adopted a spirit of partnership and co-operation with every stakeholder; in particular, the Indonesian authorities and UN agencies. We took pains to understand the host nation’s needs and to establish a good working relationship. To us, “slow is fast” because when we can work closely together, we are more effective in achieving the mission in the longer run.

Cultural Sensitivity and Understanding

Language was an important component, but cultural sensitivity and understanding were perhaps more critical. We ensured that down to the last soldier, we treated the people affected by the tsunami with respect and dignity. For example, we made sure that our soldiers did not wear sunglasses when talking to the locals, nor throw food and supplies out of helicopters or passing trucks. We did not take goodwill for granted. One silly, unthinking act by a soldier on the ground would have been all it took to unravel all the good that so many had achieved.

Liaison and Interlocutor Roles

Our soldiers involved in the Tsunami Operation performed the roles of liaison and interlocutors at Medan, Meulaboh, and Banda Aceh. Our liaison officers attended meetings chaired by the UN and the Indonesian authorities to facilitate the humanitarian assistance to affected areas. They visited the victims to understand the urgent needs so that they were able to accurately match the demand on the ground with the supply that we provided. Our liaison officers worked very closely with the Indonesian authorities and humanitarian agencies at Meulaboh and Banda Aceh to ensure that unmet or urgent needs were accorded highest priority and addressed immediately. Through their interaction, they were able to sense and provide feedback of on-the-ground sentiments and problems to their headquarters. One liaison officer even brought along a soccer ball to initiate a soccer game at the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, to bring everyone together.

Precise Application of Aid

Aid and assistance must be focused, timely, and relevant to be effective in making a difference to those in need of it. For example, when it became obvious that the airports at Medan and Banda Aceh were over run by aid supplies, the need to better match supply and demand of aid became apparent. We did this by being fully plugged into the Indonesian system and working with the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations (IOs), and foreign militaries to co-ordinate aid distribution. The platform for networking and coordination among the various stakeholders was the daily civil-military meetings in each location, led by the Indonesian authorities. These meetings helped to disseminate critical information and synchronize the overall relief effort by all the stakeholders. The coordinating roles played by UN agencies – like the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Joint Logistics Center and the World Food Programme – together with the Indonesian authorities, were instrumental in bringing the right assistance to the right people at the right place and at
the right time.

Civil-Military Coordination

In Medan, our officers assisted the Indonesian authorities in the day-to-day conduct of Civil-Military and Aids Cooperation Meeting (CMAAC)2 to ensure that military assets were prioritized and optimized to bring the humanitarian agencies and relief aid to affected civilians in the shortest possible time. Our liaison responsibility extended from the CMAAC, through which military assets were assigned, to the delivery and receipt of the relief items with our Point-of-Contact at Meulaboh and Banda Aceh. At its peak, the CMAAC attracted more than 100 NGOs each day as they gathered to share information and coordinate the humanitarian relief efforts.

Information Sharing

There was an information gap during the initial stage of the relief operations – particularly in the areas of situation awareness, security update, and assessment details. It was obvious to us that a lot of NGOs came to the CMAAC wanting to know more about the affected areas and how they could become useful. In the daily meetings, information on the situation, including security at Meulaboh and Banda Aceh was provided. Assessment of the needs required in other areas were provided so that some of the efforts could be redirected from Banda Aceh, which at that point in time was overwhelmed with many NGOs and relief aid. The meeting also provided a platform for NGOs to update others on critical information which they had received, to minimise duplication of efforts. A good example was when the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) announced that the road from Medan to Meulaboh (previously inaccessible) was opened to traffic. This information resulted in many NGOs shifting their efforts and attention to Meulaboh.

Working with Our Military Partners

The SAF operation in Aceh also made us realise the importance of interoperability with our military partners. In the case of the Indonesian Armed Forces, a strong working relationship has been established over the years through regular bilateral activities, exercises, and exchange. This linkage came in useful during the Aceh operation, during which both militaries leveraged the strong bonds to work towards a common goal.

Working With the United Nations
and Other Civilian Agencies

Through this operation, the SAF learned the need to integrate with UN and other civilian agencies in providing relief. The efforts in Aceh dovetailed with those of various UN, IO, and NGOs agencies, such as the Singapore Red Cross and Singapore NGOs like Mercy Relief. As such, we could confidently hand over most of the relief operations in Aceh to the UN agencies and Singapore NGOs once the situation stabilised.

Way Ahead for Civil-Military Cooperation

The SAF experience in Indonesia showed that military forces and civilian agencies could complement each other in disaster relief efforts. In the way ahead, the following suggestions are recommended:

a. Disaster Response Mechanism.
For a start, member nations could integrate their civilian and military agencies to establish a national disaster response structure to facilitate future relief operations. The military could respond fast with emergency relief assistance to stabilise the situation. However, as a national security force, the military cannot sustain disaster relief efforts for prolonged periods. UN and its agencies have access to a wider array of resources and are structured to sustain long-term relief efforts. These agencies, however, need time to gather their resources and expertise. Therefore, to complement each other during a disaster, the military could be activated to provide emergency relief assistance and stabilise the situation in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. UN and other civilian agencies should be mobilised at the earliest time possible to take over and continue with subsequent phases of operation. For civil-military collaboration to work, both military and civilian agencies need to make the effort to understand each other’s capabilities, define clear roles and responsibilities, and establish procedures and processes for future co-operation.

b. Information Sharing.
It is imperative that a mechanism for information sharing should be established so that the military and humanitarian agencies can leverage a common system to share critical information in the immediate aftermath of any disaster. This can be instrumental in shortening the learning curve and response time for any organization coming into the operation, thus providing effective and precise application of aid and saving lives.

c. Regional NGO Framework.
A regional NGO framework and database could be established to provide crucial life-saving capability to kick-start any humanitarian assistance effort. A collaboration framework for training with credible and dedicated NGOs during peace time could provide the UN with immediate standing capability to mobilize and harness the strength and resources of these organisations. The framework could be further operationalised through regional exercises involving militaries and UN, IOs, and NGOs.

Conclusion

The success of the SAF mission to Aceh was attributable to its years of preparation and training. However, we are also mindful that there were many external factors that work in our favour such as our close proximity to the operation, a relatively small area of operation, and a good relationship with the Indonesian military. While the SAF was not specifically structured, trained, nor prepared for a disaster relief mission of this nature and scale, it was able to quickly deploy a sizeable force with a range of relevant capabilities to assist in the relief operation.

NOTE: The author wishes to thank BG Goh Kee Nguan, SAF Contingent Commander for the Tsunami Relief Operation, for sharing his perspectives and presentation on this topic at the UN ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Conference on 14 July 2005.

Endnotes:
1 This Support Group was not a standing force. It was configured from elements right across the Singapore Armed Forces, and tailored to the anticipated needs within the initial few days.

2 This body was set up and chaired by TNI (the Indonesian Armed Forces); with the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), and in due course the U.S. Marines as co-chairmen. These groups worked alongside UN agencies and NGOs to formulate strategy for asset allocation, track demand and supply, coordinate registration and entry of NGOs into the area of operation, and provide information to facilitate the humanitarian relief. This responsibility was eventually taken over by UN OCHA.

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