Peace Operations
in the Solomon Islands
The Military in Support of Other Agencies

In July 2003, Australia led a ‘strengthened assistance’ mission, Operation Helpem Fren, in the Solomon Islands achieving a dramatic turnaround in the law and order situation in the Solomons. The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (or RAMSI) represented a new model of regional intervention using the full complement of diplomatic, economic, police, and military assets in a coordinated, whole-of-government approach.

The Solomon Islands are 1,900 km (1,200 miles) northeast of Australia and consist of a chain of mountainous islands and hundreds of coral atolls. Due to the strategic significance of the Solomon Islands as a power projection base to the Coral Sea, the area was the scene of heavy fighting during World War II. As a consequence of this, the pre-war administrative centre was destroyed and the capital shifted to Honiara following the establishment of a large American base nearby on Guadalcanal. Significant ethnic-based tension evolved between the Guadalcanal people (or Gwales) and the neighbouring-island Malaitans when a large number of Malaitans shifted to the new capital during WWII.

By late 1998, this resentment boiled over into armed conflict as Gwale militants forced approximately 20,000 Malaitans from their homes in Guadalcanal. A rival Malaitan militant force emerged which raided police armouries and staged an armed coup in mid-2000. At that time, Australia and New Zealand assisted in a cease-fire that led to the Townsville Peace Agreement in October 2000 and the deployment of an unarmed International Peace Monitoring Team until June 2002. Although the Townsville Peace Agreement stemmed high-level violence, in effect it was a toothless tiger, and former militants continued to operate personal fiefdoms and engage in internecine conflict and criminal activities.
An ongoing state of rising lawlessness was underscored when the former Police Commissioner and National Peace Councillor, Sir Fred Soaki, was assassinated in February 2003. In July 2003, the Solomons Prime Minister requested assistance from the Australian Prime Minister. A ‘strengthened assistance’ mission was planned to stop the descent of a neighbouring nation into the realm of failed state.

The military task force’s mission was to protect and support the visiting police force as they re-established the rule of law. Notably, although the military force was significant – some 1,800 personnel initially supporting 200 police – the military were not the lead agency. The mission was headed by a Special Coordinator, a diplomat from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and there was a governmental aid agency, AUSAID, responsible for leading humanitarian, administrative, and economic assistance. Although the military elements had worked closely with police and other government agencies previously, it was the degree of integration and the supporting role of the military that set this mission apart.

There were important preconditions for success. It was essential that the intervention was at the request of the sovereign Solomon Islands government and supported by legislation. It was important that the response was a multinational Pacific effort (Five nations: Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea committed military forces. Nine sent police). Furthermore, there could be no doubt that we had sufficient military force to defeat any opposition. For a lasting solution, all levels of civil order and administration required attention and our planning had to encompass long-term solutions for the country, beyond our military presence. Finally, all our efforts had to be underwritten by the ongoing backing of the local people.

It was important that the tone of our military presence was carefully managed. All ranks understood that their personal behaviour and demeanour were significant to the success of the mission. Care was taken to ensure that the intervention could not be perceived as a military invasion. This we achieved largely by limiting the unnecessary intrusion of our forces in public places, which denied the media the opportunity to portray Honiara as a garrison town or to record footage that could be replayed and deter tourism for years to come. It also avoided the creation of a false economy through the sudden and transitory injection of military expenditure. Indeed, all planning was underpinned by an emphasis on minimising the impact of the military on the local economy. We sought to avoid creating expectations or dependencies that could not be supported beyond the military force’s presence. Our aim was to facilitate lasting peace and lasting prosperity.

Significantly, our servicemen and women only acted in support of police activities so as to constantly reinforce the primacy of the police effort. By mutual agreement with the police, despite the military having the powers of the constabulary under the supporting Solomon Islands legislation, our servicemen and women only acted with police present.

The mission was quickly assembled in only a matter of weeks in early July 2003. The military task force included an infantry battalion, a maritime task group of seven vessels, and an air task group with a range of fixed and rotary wing assets. It was difficult enough to assimilate the disparate military elements in this time, let alone create cohesive bonds across the agencies. We were fortunate that the police and the military have complementary cultures that can, in general, be aligned at short notice. However, different planning methodologies hampered early efforts to define support requirements prior to the deployment.

A pragmatic and cooperative approach at all levels helped progress during the difficult early days. An interagency synchronisation ‘wargame’, held just prior to our deployment was helpful in focusing the range of agencies on the first hours, days, and weeks of the intervention. This event went a long way to aligning the agencies’ understanding of how the mission would unfold. The importance of this activity should not be underestimated and similar activities should be an essential part of preparations for future interagency missions.

The success of the interagency relationships on Operation Helpem Fren relied on both a collegiate spirit and careful management. The mission was marked by a genuine unity of purpose among the senior leadership of RAMSI and by the skilful completion of tasks at the lower levels. Complementing this was a coordinated interagency voice from Australia. Inter-Departmental Conferences (IDC) in Canberra, usually held weekly, were conscientiously attended by all stakeholder agencies and feedback from these meetings was important to the degree of cooperation achieved on the ground.
In the Solomons, interagency coordination was a close and daily affair under the steady eye of the Special Coordinator. For the military, a key challenge was managing other agencies’ expectations and I expect that the other agencies felt the same way. Flexibility, patience, and a sense of humour were well valued at this time. For future missions such as these, early education on each other’s capabilities, requirements, and priorities would be time well invested. Interdepartmental Memorandums of Understanding prior to deployment would also be useful.

A capability that was not used in its traditional role in this environment was our Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) team. CIMIC is generally considered an essential and highly effective interface between the military and other agencies on military lead operations. In this case CIMIC were best used as liaison to AUSAID rather than direct practitioners.
In recent years, on many peace support operations, our soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women have proven themselves considerate and respected ‘armed ambassadors’. They are adept at applying rules of engagement and can grasp the subtlety required for missions such as this. But soldiers are not the best way to impose law and order indefinitely. In RAMSI there was a deliberate proportional scaling back of the military as quickly as the security and logistical situation permitted. This fed a national sense of progress and also did not allow an ‘occupation force’ mentality to emerge.

RAMSI is a good example of a subtle employment of military force in support of other government agencies — with careful regard to the tone of military operations and how they are perceived. However, it is not a template for other situations. This response worked because it was the right response, at the right time. Public sentiment was in favour of an impartial intervention and there was the necessary political impetus and commitment of resources. A change in the balance of these would have, at least, complicated the operation and, at worst, made it untenable. A reluctance to deploy a strong military component — either fewer combat troops, or fewer ships and aircraft, could have left RAMSI another toothless tiger and not permitted the rapid success across the length of the islands.

With RAMSI, dramatic results were achieved in a bold act of preventative diplomacy. This included a new style of military-support mission deploying a substantial force with the necessary range of capabilities to overcome an array of challenges from threat groups, the weather, and the imposing terrain — in support of other agencies. Pleasingly, the overwhelming support of the local people was maintained and despite the potential for conflict during arrests and weapon collections, not one shot was fired in anger. Most importantly, the Solomon Islands now have the peace and stability needed to rebuild a more robust government and economy.