The Liaison - Center of Excellence DMHA - Hawaii

Vol. 3 No. 1

Features

Interpreter 101
For When Logic...
Reflections of...
Malaysia's Peace...
Raising the Standard
There's No I in...
A Role Player's...
Cultural Attrition
In the Beginning...
ITEA...
Why Bin Laden...
Book Review


UNMOs and a local BIH liaison officer visit a recent mortar incident at a local Tuzla residentÕs home. Note interpreter. Photo by Janel Schroeder

 

 

There's No I in Team?
Why and How Interpreters Must Be Made Members of the Team

By Roy Thomas

Introduction: Why are Interpreters Key?

Resources don't put their lives on the line, people do! Interpreters are people, not talking machines. Language barriers requiring interpreters often appear under dangerous, emergency, or difficult circumstances. Consider these four examples:

Sarajevo, 1993: A Dangerous Investigation Demands an Interpreter

Interpreters can mean the difference between life and death. In one instance, the Serb Liaison Officer refused to go further! Quite rightly he felt that mines and trip wires would be difficult to detect in the falling darkness. A violation was alleged. However, the team's 'United Nations' status was less clear in the fading light. "Last light" is when belligerent or prohibited activity can be expected. The Bosnian Serb lady who acted as the UN military observer interpreter was asked, "Do you wish to stay with him?" meaning with the Liaison Officer. "Who will talk to the Bosniaks if soldiers are there?" the interpreter responded, as she moved forward to share the dangers facing the unarmed UN military observer team.

Turkey, 1999: Medical Team Requires Interpreters

"Who will talk?" is a challenge faced by most individuals or teams working in a foreign environment. The Canadian Disaster Response Team (DART), deployed to Turkey after a catastrophic earthquake, noted in their After Action Report that a large number of interpreters made it possible for the DART to function, specifically, "The majority [of interpreters] were needed in the medical station to aid the medical staff in treatment."

Vietnam and Turkey: Contributing Cultural Inputs Through Interpreters

The cultural aspect of using locals as interpreters has been well documented. A former Commanding Officer of a Royal Australian Regiment battalion in Vietnam said that his interpreters formed a social bridge between him and the person he was speaking to. More recently in the Canadian DART report, the Turkish interpreters were cited as providing welcome cultural advice to the Canadians.

Haiti, 1996: Contributing Cultural Outputs Through Interpreters

Transmission of cultural values is a two way street which planners should consider carefully when deciding what to do about sourcing interpreters. In Haiti, local Haitians working with the UN Civilian Police, at least in cases involving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel, were exposed to police methods very different than those practiced by the Haitian Army who had performed the police function prior to 1994.

What do these examples tell us?

The major lesson is that interpreters may be key for mission success across the peace support operational spectrum. Some further lessons are shared so that planning implications can be considered and possible leadership challenges discussed, recorded and disseminated. Hopefully interpreters will benefit from this small "lessons learned" article just as military members benefit from the After Action Review process.

There are planning implications. For example, this two-way cultural transmission could lead to a decision to use more local citizens as interpreters rather than bringing in foreigners with a language capability. On the flip side, interpreters observing inappropriate behavior by expatriates can result in the transmission of ideas and messages that international organizations may not want passed to local communities.

Leadership is needed. It is clear that individuals employed as language and cultural bridges are more than just resources to be managed. Interpreters must be made part of the team. In team-building, as in the military, and as so many civilian agencies already know, leadership is the ingredient that achieves cohesion. As General Lewis Mackenzie said in a recent talk, "leadership is doing what is right." Doing what is right is important when trying to incorporate interpreters into a team.

Some definitions: are we 'doing right' by interpreters?

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language. This encyclopedia assigns the word "interpreter" to those who turn the meaning of the spoken word in a source language into the spoken word in a target language. Translators, on the other hand, are those who work with written language. Throughout this article, when referring to interpreters, I refer to local citizens employed as translators and interpreters under this definition.

The United Nations. The local citizens in Sarajevo and Haiti who functioned as United Nations interpreters in Sarajevo, Macedonia and Haiti were not classified as interpreters but as 'language assistants.' The qualifications to become an interpreter in the United Nations are quite demanding as might be expected for a New York appointment in which ability to provide flawless simultaneous interpretation is the requirement. As those with experience know, selections of individuals to perform the language bridge functions of interpretation or translation in the field may be limited to the pool of those few people who know some English and at least one of the local languages. Proper compensation and status are at issue. In Afghanistan, the UNGOMAP drivers "doubled" as interpreters for observer teams, however they weren't paid "double."

OSCE. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) claims that the OSCE had no interpreters with the Kosovo Verification Mission, that is, none that the OSCE classified and paid as interpreters. However, Serbs and Kosovars carried out the interpreter function for monitors and indeed for the Head of Mission himself.

A question of leadership: How can we responsibly integrate interpreters?

ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES

In general, security is one of the first concerns in any organization, whether military or civilian, working in a conflict area. It is also a concern for individuals. For example, in April 1989 few expatriates were living in Kabul because of threats to individual security. Security is an issue even with those expected by their profession to confront danger Š just ask any American officer with SFOR experience in Bosnia about "Force Protection" to obtain an idea how important an issue security is to the military partners in the peace process. But there are several security risks that particularly apply to interpreters and translators.

Security Risk 1: Association with Expatriates

Mere association with an expatriate no matter what organization that foreigner works for may put a locally hired interpreter at risk. Interpreters by the very nature of their function must be seen in the company of the outsiders who don't know the language! Indeed the cultural sensitivity acquired by employing locals as interpreters comes with a price: their neighbors may disapprove of individuals in their community working for you! In Sarajevo for example, both Bosnian and Bosnian Serb interpreters were subjected to community harassment, which at times took the form of violence. UN military observer teams had to pick up and return interpreters to their homes for weeks at a time on both sides of the frontlines.

Security Risk 2: Uncertain Status

A major consideration when thinking of interpreters as members of a team, and not just talking machines, is that they don't hold the same passports as other team members. The status of interpreters may be simply that of very casual employees, hired on a month-to-month basis. This was the case in Sarajevo in October 1993. Such weak status robbed these individuals of whatever protection that UN military observers were accorded as result of their foreign passports and temporary membership in a United Nations organization.

Security Risk 3: Lack of Equipment.

The temporary status of as 'language assistants' made it difficult for UN military observers to obtain flak jackets and blue helmets for these individuals, yet these items were mandatory wear for most patrols in Sarajevo in 1993. Their leaders could not take interpreters not properly equipped into danger with them to perform their role. In fact, the Chief Observer in Zagreb was told that without the same protective equipment worn by military observers, their interpreters would not be working. The blue helmets and flak jackets provided some of the protection accorded locals employed as interpreters who worked with the Canadian and British battalions in Bosnia. The locally hired interpreters of these units wore Canadian or British military uniforms without rank in addition to their UN issued protective equipment of flak jacket and helmet. Wearing uniforms gave interpreters extra protection from harassment or even being seized by one or more of the warring parties. Military observers wore a variety of uniforms (39 different countries) so no standard uniform for their interpreters was possible unless issued with the same uniform as the UN Field Service.

Security Risk 4: Spies, Part I

Concern about locals being spies is valid. However, on any military observer team in Sarajevo any two of 39 different countries could be represented. Many of these observers reported back to others than just the Senior Military Observer, although this practice was against UN regulations. For example, the Dutch observers talked directly about anything they choose to talk about to the Chief Military Observer in Zagreb, a Dutch General without previous observer experience. In the case of local employees, it is better to acknowledge the possibility of these individuals being informants openly.

Security Risk 4: Spies, Part II

In Sarajevo most males were forced to choose sides and bear arms. The few males who worked as interpreters often had private reasons for wishing to avoid the fighting, such as having one parent who was Muslim while the other was Orthodox. This of course made these individuals vulnerable to pressure from both communities as well as subject to taunts from the belligerents. Females were subjected to different pressures. Many had husbands or fathers or brothers in the trenches, while sometimes a former boyfriend may have been on the other side. Thus in the case of locals hired as interpreters, these individuals could indeed be conduits of information for their communities and no doubt, at minimum, low level intelligence operatives. However, for every betrayal of information (and only one interpreter had to be dismissed under these conditions in Sarajevo from October 1993 until July 1994) there are countless examples, which to this day should not be openly discussed, in which locals working as interpreters provided warnings or other information which assisted in the security and protection of UN military observer team members.

Security Risk 5: Witness Protection

An interpreter or 'language assistant' being used to interview a suspect or witness in a UN Civilian Police matter, or indeed any international investigation, such as was done in Haiti, deserves the same protection as those being interviewed. Interpreters can be "bound" not to talk but care must be taken to ensure that they can continue physically to talk even after the case is closed. Names of interpreters involved in such cases cannot be common knowledge or displayed on a public duty roster, as has been done in the past!

Security Risk 6: Casualties

The topic of security implies risk and therefore casualties. 1993/94 experiences with attempting to have the United Nations assume responsibility for medical care of the 'language assistants' employed by the UN military observer organization were frustrating, to say the least. Good military units have a reputation for taking care of their casualties. So do caring non-governmental organizations and other organizations involved in delivery of humanitarian relief. Not only do local interpreters sharing the same risks deserve the same equipment for self-protection, but they also deserve the same assurance of medical care if they become casualties. Serbs who worked as interpreters for the UN military observers in Sarajevo were not accepted by the same hospital in Ancona, Italy, which accepted UN local employees labeled as "Bosnian."

TRAIN THE INTERPRETER

Training Requirement 1: First Aid

As a natural segue from the security discussion, every member of any team, whether a local or expatriate must have current first aid proficiency, no matter how benign the environment. Traffic accidents are a fact of life in many places where people deploy. Although interpreters are usually local citizens, they are part of the team and must be included in first aid training. Unfortunately some organizations do not recognize the need for any training, either for upgrading or for refreshing skills, and certainly not for their local employees. Team leaders may very well have to use their own initiative to ensure every team member has first aid skills. It should be noted that interpreters might, in fact, have the skills to teach each other and even expatriates!

Training Requirement 2: Driver and radio training for interpreters

Security and the question of possible casualties also raise another local interpreter issue. In Sarajevo, interpreters, including most females, could drive more skillfully than some of the observers who were seeing snow for the first time! (Sarajevo was the site of the 1984 Winter Olympics and is now seeking the 2010 Winter Olympics) Moreover if the two UN military observers on a patrol became casualties, then the third member of the team, the interpreter, had to be able to drive and use the radio to obtain assistance. Similarly in Macedonia, the mountainous conditions were much more familiar to local interpreters than to most UN military observers. However the status of the locals employed as interpreters worked against successfully obtaining agreement, at least officially, to authorize these individuals to drive UN vehicles.

Training Requirement 3: Upgrading Interpreter and Translation Skills

Generally in conflict zones individuals employed as 'language assistants' may very well be educated, but often in fields with limited application to the task at hand - interpretation. In Sarajevo, lawyers, engineers, teachers, tourist guides as well as high school students all worked for the UN military observer organization as interpreters. Many did not know aids to assist in interpretation, and if nothing else, merited the same post-operation discussion time as observers and military personnel have to consider "lessons learned." Teams had to prepare locals performing the interpreter function to act as translators while remaining aware of limitations in undertaking translation tasks due to absence of terminology references and other documentation.

Training Requirement 4: Training Expatriates in the Use of Interpreters

The British Army feels so strongly about this requirement that the Ministry of Defence has developed several excellent training videos on the subject. Courses preparing military personnel for overseas deployments should include, at minimum, tips on employing interpreters. For example, simple practices such as addressing the person being talked to, and not the interpreter, are found in deployment guides and should be known before working with an interpreter teammate. In the absence of such training before arrival in-theatre, team leaders must ensure not only that new team members are oriented on team practices, but also of how to utilize the skills of their new interpreter colleagues.

Training Requirement 5: Reaching an Understanding on Terminology

This is more an educational as opposed to a training issue. Time for both the expatriate and the language assistant to discuss terminology must found. The same will be true for any agency working in a foreign environment. Difficulty with both oral and written terminology should be no surprise. In Sarajevo many UN military observers from air force and naval backgrounds did not know the English terms for various types of artillery ammunition, a fact which created problems when a carrier round was misidentified as a chemical round and the shell could not be described correctly. In Sarajevo local interpreters had to know what the words meant in the military recognition books of their observer colleagues not only in English but also in the variants of Serbo-Croatian, now of course labeled Croatian, Bosnian and Serb. Terminology is one key to preparation for both the expected and unexpected. A mob scene at a funeral or food distribution center is not the time to have a misunderstanding over word usage in either the source or the target language.

Other considerations

Be specific when selecting interpreters

Selection of locals to work as language assistants becomes critical if there is no time to educate these individuals, such as when responding to an earthquake. In the case of the Canadian DART team in Turkey, fortunately enough individuals with medical backgrounds volunteered to serve as unpaid language assistants with the Canadian medical elements. Until these individuals were selected and integrated into the team, the Canadian DART elements had difficulty in performing its mission. This time lag is a factor that must be taken into account by planners. The language barrier may well prevent a truly immediate response.

Include interpreters in long range plans

For longer-term situations, i.e., anything beyond response to an immediate crisis, upgrading of 'language assistants' capabilities must be a consideration just as it is for any other member of the team. Planners must campaign for training programs not only for expatriate but also for locals working as members of the team in the field.

Remember the human needs of interpreters

In Sarajevo, UN military observers were rotated out on leave every six weeks or two months for at least a couple of days. This rest and relaxation was needed. For example, on 22 December, three days before Christmas, the unarmed Sarajevo military observer teams reported on over 2,500 artillery impacts on that date alone. Bodies had to be counted where they were hit, at collection points and finally in morgues so that propaganda numbers were countered by correct figures for decision-makers far removed from the shelling. There was definitely a high degree of stress, which a policy for compulsory time away alleviated. No such policy existed for our local employees working as language assistants who shared the same dangers as their observer colleagues. Leave was given, but unofficially. Of course there were no insurance or medical plans to invalidate in any case, but there should have been!

Take into account long term needs

Long Term Need #1: Security after the Internationals Leave

The luxury of having someone on the team able to talk to the gunman pointing his or her AK-47 at heads at a checkpoint is a very immediate problem. However, other team members must remember that the person with the gun and their interpreter may still live in the neighborhood after expatriates are long departed. The unfortunate fate of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) interpreters who were left behind in March 1999 when expatriates were evacuated remains to be determined. There is evidence of murder by both Serbs and KLA as the KVM interpreters were not only language and cultural bridges but also potential bridges between the communities, having seen both sides in the course of their OSCE duties. No one likes to leave team members behind to face danger and possibly death. Some KVM team members in fact disobeyed orders to leave locals behind.

Long Term Need #2: Wounds/Injuries

It shouldn't be left to private charities, as was the case for a Serb female from Pale who was seriously wounded while working for the United Nations as an interpreter, to provide long-term recovery and rehabilitation care. It shouldn't be charities that provide the equivalent of compensation when limbs are lost due to mines when the local person injured is working for an international organization. Team leaders have responsibility for all their people: some are less able than others to look after themselves when personalities or institutions move on.

Designate someone responsible at all levels for interpreters

One way of ensuring that interpreters (or language assistants as the UN and others classify these individuals) receive proper equipment, have their security needs considered, have training requirements identified then catered to, and have long term consequences made part of the organization's personnel plan, is to have someone in the organization dedicated full-time to the health and welfare of these people. Someone needs to be responsible for the "interpreter" function in the field just as someone is responsible for all the other functions that contribute to mission accomplishment. It is not a "secondary duty" if the AK-47 is pointed at you and words fail!

CONCLUSIONS

People involved in disaster response and the provision of humanitarian assistance, particularly in those crises participated in by other humans, will need help to overcome language barriers. One common practice is to employ local persons as language assistants, even on a very temporary basis, to perform the function of "interpreter." If these individuals aren't integrated into the teams of the parent organization with responsible leadership, it is difficult to imagine these human language bridges willing to share the physical and social risks so often associated with such work in conflict-ridden areas. Making local interpreters part of the team, and doing it the right way, goes a long way towards ensuring that language will not be a further difficulty when crisis situations occur.

Interpreters as team members become reliable cultural bridges. In the long term, local interpreters may be conduits of change, taking expatriate conduct and conversation back into their parent communities. These communities may not accept their members working for outsiders. The many aspects of interpreter security will be one of the challenges facing a team leader, as will be issues related to training. Treating interpreters as important members of the team will ensure that many of their needs are looked after, or at least raised as concerns. Interpreters need the right leadership just as other members of a team no matter what the activity.

Locals employed as language and cultural bridges also have the long-term potential of being "peace bridges" between warring communities. This aspect needs careful consideration at the team level, and at higher planning levels. Incorporating interpreters as full-fledged team members will go a long way towards achieving this indirect goal. Interpreting requires people, not machines, and these people must identify with the team through leadership.

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