Afghanistan has always been one of the worldÕs most unique and exceptionally difficult places for aid agencies to operate. When the new Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Andrew Natsios, decided early in 2001 to send a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (a "DART") to Islamabad, Pakistan to run a cross border emergency relief program into Afghanistan, there was no illusion on anyoneÕs part that the challenge would be immense. But no one could ever have imagined how enormous a challenge that would become after September 11, 2001.

Even before that now historic date, years of drought and misrule by the Taliban had created one of the worldÕs worst scenarios at the time for famine and misery. When I was assigned as the first DART/Afghanistan Team Leader in June 2001, approximately $10 million had already been committed for humanitarian assistance, leaving only about $1 million still to be programmed. However, by the time I left the assignment late November, the 9-person DART was vetting proposals and making recommendations regarding over $100 million in humanitarian assistance.

This was not the first time I had run just such a program for Afghanistan Ð cross border from Pakistan. However, when I was Afghanistan Mission Director in the early 1990s, we were able to get into Afghanistan to assess the situation and impact of the programs. This time things were very different. In the early Ô90s, the major Afghan players were the Mujahideen, flush with success at having thrown out the Russians. This time it was the Taliban, allowing the pestilence of al Qaeda to fester in their midst. Very few people had ever heard of al Qaeda at that point, a term that is now one of the most familiar in the world lexicon. In weekly Country Team and other meetings in the Embassy in Islamabad, al Qaeda was routinely discussed. It was the main cause the DART could never get permission to go into Afghanistan, for the threats it presented were very real, as we now know all too well.

Nevertheless, despite being hindered by a lack of physical access to program areas, the DART was able to establish extremely useful and effective relationships with the vast donor community in Pakistan, including INGOs/NGOs (International and indigenous Non-Governmental Organizations) that were on the ground in Afghanistan, as well as with the various UN field offices. As fast as money could be made available, the DART and its partners had plans and programs ready to go to address AfghanistanÕs vast requirements. The DART also helped form USAID/WashingtonÕs longer term strategy and Action Plans.

While the Taliban could be said to have ruled, they did not provide a government and the administrative machinery associated with a government. Essential services (such as health, agriculture, roads, water, etc.) were provided nearly exclusively by INGO/NGOs. In fact, just before its collapse, the Taliban had begun to stop operations and abuse, imprison and expel the workers of these INGO/NGOs, further reducing the provision of even the most essential of services. The DART helped establish and support an effective network of INGO/NGO partners to address the most urgent needs in the most critical parts of the country (mainly north and west, but covering all geographic regions).

The DART also played a critical role in assuring the increased effectiveness of the all-important World Food Programme (WFP) effort in Afghanistan, which delivered nearly all the basic emergency food aid to the country, of which the USG was providing approximately 85%. One of the most important interventions proposed by the DART was a comprehensive food movement and delivery transportation plan that relied upon road transport rather than more costly and less effective airlifts or airdrops. The DART also kept strong and successful pressure on the local management of the WFP to take more risks and become more active in the delivery of food aid to the most critical areas.

Due largely to this sustained effort, by November 2001, the WFP, for the first time, was actually beginning to exceed its targets for the movement of food into the country.

Headquarters support, of course, is critical in any such major programming effort. In my over 35 years of experience in Foreign Service work, I have seen only two USAID Administrators who were as focused on a major US Government (USG) program as this one. The first was Peter McPherson, at the time of the Ethiopian famine of the mid-1980s. The second is Andrew Natsios, whose dedication to USAIDÕs principal role in this major USG effort is proving to be one of the main reasons for the success of humanitarian operations in Afghanistan.

Regardless of the long history in the conduct of international humanitarian operations, there are always lessons to be learned. When one has been through enough of these kinds of crises, much is predictable. Problems with the UN bureaucracy of agencies seem endemic in such situations (although UNICEF field leadership stood out, following the intervention of Administrator Natsios and WFP). The UN bureaucracy can also appear to be extremely heavy-handed, even with its own donors, as it was in this case. INGO/NGOs, critical to the effort, with the best of intentions rush in poorly written and structured proposals that, even on a minimal basis, take considerable effort to rework into a satisfactory product. USAID and INGO/NGOs also seem to have a "love-hate" relationship in such situations, both needing the presence and funding of the other, but with NGOs often feeling overly-constrained and impatient, while USAID feels more direction is required to meet its oversight requirements and is slower (too often much slower) to make decisions or provide financing. That having been said, during my tenure with the Afghanistan program, the collaboration proved very successful and the local INGO/NGO leadership was superb.

Finally, there is a direct correlation between how important a field operation is and how much headquarters wants to be involved. This has both good and bad aspects. Headquarters support is essential to the success of any operation, as indicated above. But the more important the program, the more players there are at headquarters who become involved with direction and communicating conflicting or badly thought out advice or guidance. This can become confusing to field management and counterproductive to the overall effort. It can also cause unnecessary and undesirable conflict between headquarters and the field. The legitimate role of field personnel can be undermined and decisions imposed that actually undercut the objectives to be achieved. I have seen this criticism raised even in the case of military operations in Afghanistan, and I also found it to be the case in my years as a Mission Director overseas, so it is not surprising that this happens. However, in my view, the most effective management styles have headquarters setting policy, general frameworks for action and resource allocations, but relying heavily on field management to use its judgment in how best to carry out actual implementation.

From the very beginning, the Coalition (principally U.S. and British in Islamabad) military liaison with the DART was exceptionally good. The first US military civilian affairs liaison officer depended nearly entirely on the support and knowledge of the DART to function. When the US military presence and operations expanded greatly in the Embassy in Islamabad after 9-11-01, the US military leadership on the ground considered the DART one of the key USG players with which to relate and coordinate planning and actions. Also, relations between the DART and all Embassy staff and officers, from the Ambassador on down, were exemplary.

INGO/NGO field staff, both international and national, have good reasons for not wanting to be seen in too close a collaboration with a military operation, even one including the provision of relief assistance. But the national and international relief personnel also have the most experience and knowledge of the actual humanitarian situation on the ground. The DART, therefore, served to bridge the gap between the two entities, providing information from the relief community to the Civilian Affairs (CA) personnel which helped protect and advance relief operations. This information helped protect truck convoys carrying emergency assistance during Coalition bombing campaigns, protected civilian workers in relief centers on the ground, and identified inaccessible parts of the country where situations were critical and where airlifts or airdrops might be needed as a last resort. This information also helped with arguments to expand UN and INGO/NGO relief fleets to move assistance by less costly road transport, in lieu of military transport.

Thanks to the massive outpouring of humanitarian assistance from the international donor community in 2001 in Afghanistan, a catastrophe threatening the lives of millions of Afghans, who could have died of famine ala Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, was averted and an increased focus on longer-term recovery was initiated.

What needs to happen now, and quickly, is a much more rapid delivery of promised international donor funding to provide both short-term and long-term relief, recovery and development for the people of the country, including security and support for an effective central government. It is extremely important for our own international credibility to demonstrate to the people and government of Afghanistan (and the rest of the world) that we really do mean what we say about a long-term commitment to this shattered nation. Once other major world events start to take center stage, as they will, such as in Iraq, the resources and priorities will simply no longer be there for Afghanistan. This is clearly a place where history must not be allowed to repeat itself.

About the author

Dr. Machmer served as the first DART/Afghanistan Team Leader from June through November 2001, and was appointed by the USAID Administrator as USAID Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Central Asia. In prior assignments, he was USAID Mission Director in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Nepal and regional director of the Caucasus, as well as director of the Office of Middle East Affairs for USAID at the time the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accords came into place. He retired as a Senior Foreign Service Officer, rank of Minister-Counselor. Dr. Machmer also assisted USAID as a participant and evaluator of disaster management and assessment training courses in 1999. Early in 2002, he delivered a presentation to senior staff members of US Pacific Command on lessons learned regarding civilian-military coordination in Afghanistan.

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