Introduction

Twenty-two December 1993 was a day to remember in Sarajevo, Bosnia, particularly for the unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs). These observers counted over 3,000 artillery impacts that day. Unless casualties resulted, sniper fire was ignored in calculations. Additional staff had to be brought into the UN military observation organization in Sarajevo (UNMO Sarajevo) headquarters to plot artillery hits and process reporting traffic. More UNMO patrols had to be dispatched to verify injuries and body counts. Observers were sent to investigate whether fire was "incoming" or "outgoing". On that day, as on so many other days during the author's nine months as Senior UN military observer (SMO) for Sector Sarajevo, personnel security considerations loomed large for members of this UNMO organization.

At any one time, UNMO Sarajevo had between 120 and 200 officers from any one of 39 different countries deployed in or around Sarajevo, or in the Eastern Bosnia pockets of Gorazde and Zepa working as military observers. Although these officers wore uniforms, they were unarmed and thus in the same position as most non-military actors in any peace support operation.

Without a defensive weapon, the roles that relationships played in assisting the unarmed UN military observers in facing security challenges of 1993/94 in Sarajevo are highly relevant to members of any partner in the peace process working in a conflict situation. Moreover in many cases in Sector Sarajevo, the use of armed personnel was not the appropriate response, even if such an option had been available. Relationships provided protection where military force could not.

My aim is to outline the vital role that relationships played in providing security for the unarmed UNMOs in Sector Sarajevo during the author's time as SMO through several examples, and to discuss the implications for mission planners.

The examples that follow are anecdotal but demonstrate how relationships saved lives. There are of course "down-sides" which will also be mentioned.

Relationships, Vice Force, Can Provide Security.
Example 1: Extraction from a firefight.

In no man's land, a team of three UN military observers came under fire. They were attempting to assist three civilians who had been hit in the crossfire between two opposing sides. The UNMO team leader in this area asked the senior observer (SMO) for help by radio. What were the options?

Asking the military commanders, General Soubirou, the Sector Commander, or General Rose, the UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander, for a quick military intervention was not feasible. Instead the SMO headed directly to the headquarters of the battalion responsible for the retalitory shooting. After eight months in Sarajevo he had a relationship with many of the local commanders, particularly in hotspot areas, of which this was one.

The SMO, known to that head-quarter's staff after so long in the area, went directly into the Commander's office. This action was not possible by his newly arrived subordinate who was at that point an "unknown". The reason for the firefight was the sniper killing of a popular young battalion soccer star. This became apparent only after talks with the Commander, who was violently upset over the incident. A cease-fire permitting extraction of both the UNMOs and the civilians was negotiated.

In this instance, a personal relationship brought protection when the physical security of Sector Sarajevo military observers was greatly threatened. Military intervention by the nearest UN military force would not have achieved the same result without further loss of life – unfortunately several civilians caught in the firefight died. Had other combatants died, there would likely have been further repercussions and retaliation, which could have jeopardized the future use of the UNPROFOR troops involved, if not the mission itself. Keep in mind that, at that time, the mission was the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Example 2: Intervening with hostage-takers.

Just before Christmas 1993, Vasko, a Bosnian Serb terrorist, pursued a terrified Sarajevo UNMO who feared for his life. In December 1993, no armed UN military were allowed on the territory held by the Bosnian Serbs, except to escort humanitarian convoys. The only UN intervention possible was by the unarmed UNMO organization itself. To complicate matters further, the Bosnian Serb liaison officer, who was asked to escort the SMO to talk to Vasko, refused, saying a military observer's life was not worth the risk to his own.

Anxious to settle the situation without bloodshed, UNMO Sarajevo contacted the local Bosnian Serb brigade with whom they had a distant but professional relationship. By the time the SMO arrived on site - accompanied by a pregnant Bosnian Serb interpreter who volunteered, although desperately afraid, and a Bangladeshi UNMO - the local Bosnian Serb commander had resolved the crisis with Vasko. Resorting to relationships, as opposed to a UN military response, was the only timely option open in this particular security crisis.

Example 3: Obtaining better treatment as a hostage

The April 1994 hostage-taking of all UNMOs on the Bosnian Serb side provides further evidence of the role relationships can play in obtaining personal security.

One UNMO team was approached by the local brigade commanders and asked who was to go on leave that day via Sarajevo airport. These particular UNMOs were identified and escorted by Bosnian Serbs to the airport gates. The remainder of the team was put under loose house arrest or custody.

In contrast, in another location at the same time, a different team was taken from their quarters and locked in a Bosnian Serb barrack room without access to washroom facilities while their personal possessions were searched and items taken. It took two days to establish contact with this team and even longer to persuade their captors to provide better treatment. No military intervention was possible by the

UN because even armed UN personnel guarding the Weapons Collection Points on the Bosnian Serb side were also being held hostage.

Example 4: Working where there are no relationships

Probably the most dangerous mission assigned to an UNMO Sarajevo team was not an investigation in a shooting hotspot, as one might expect, but rather to patrol to an area where Sarajevo UNMOs were personally unknown. Attempting to determine what was happening in the Gorazde pocket in early April 1994, the SMO sent a patrol to approach from the town of Foca, an area where UNMOs and the UN military had not previously operated. This patrol was taken hostage, weeks before the well-publicized hostage taking that occurred after the 1994 Gorazde air strikes. To secure the release of the UNMOs held at Foca, UN military intervention was not an option, not only because the UN had no capability to act with force, except airpower, on the Bosnian Serb side but also because the whereabouts of these UNMOs was unknown. UNMO contacts in the Bosnian Serb organizations around Sarajevo were exploited to secure the release of the UNMOs taken hostage after a very worrying 24 hours.

Example 5: Relationship As Flak Jacket

Personal relationships can, on occasion, provide better protection than a flak jacket. While investigating a reported heavy weapons violation, the SMO and another UNMO came under fire. The SMO immediately identified who he was on the radio as his net was monitored by all belligerents. This action designated the UNMOs being targeted as individuals with important relationships, not with only the UN commanders but also their own commanders. This ensured that the bullets fired in their direction continued to miss even though within a few feet. If the UNMOs had done a combat roll, taking cover, they could well have been killed under the guise that they had acted as would soldiers on a patrol and thus the shooters had to shoot to kill, not knowing that these were unarmed UNMOs.

Example 6: The Role of Organizational Identity in Relationships

At least one well-known international organization has indicated that it relies on respect of locals for their organization to provide security. When an incident occurs in which one of their personnel is injured, then obviously the relationship must be reviewed with the possible consequence that the organization will withdraw its assistance teams.

In Sarajevo, UNMOs had to clearly identify themselves as unarmed. To this end, UNMO vehicles added red stripes - not normally found on UN vehicles - to aid all belligerents in identification of UNMO vehicles. Media programs made clear the special unarmed role of UNMOs. In fact, when the identity of the UNMOs became confused with the armed Joint Commission Officers established after the Sarajevo February 1994 cease-fire, the UNMOs, although still unarmed, began to receive the same confrontational reception given to the armed components of UNPROFOR.

The Responsibilities of a Relationship

It was an operating principle in Sarajevo that no one should come to harm on a route that UNMOs had just traveled. Moreover, in addition to sharing information about threats, it was important to be accurate. Therefore ensuring that the words "UNMO confirmed," meant reliable information was stressed at all levels, often at some personal risk to the observers concerned.

The UNMO Sarajevo operations center became known as a location where all known information would be given to whoever wanted it. Individuals and organizations also came to share information. Thus the UNMO shelling reports were used by many agencies in planning their travel. For example, UNMOs reported that a diesel tank truck had slid into a snow-filled ditch and was blocking a convoy route. The subsequent traffic backup was being shelled by the Bosnians although it included more than just Bosnian Serbs. This was certainly useful information for any agencies about to dispatch convoys to take the Pale road around Sarajevo or even for individuals from any of the humanitarian organizations about to travel in that direction. For relationships to provide security, there must be a flow of information in all directions.

Contact and Time: Two Critical Requirements
for Developing of Relationships

There are two aspects to developing relationships in a conflict area such as Sarajevo 93/94: contact and time. Contact with other stake-holders is needed to develop a relationship, and this process takes time. Of course it must be accepted that relationships are unique to the individuals involved. Some individuals may not be able to develop a relationship for whatever reason, and so someone else in their organization may have to do the work of relationship development at that particular location, be it a headquarters or a checkpoint.

A courageous Jordanian officer provides an example from Sector Sarajevo of what it takes to make the most of personal relationship building. He was assigned as an UNMO on the Bosnian Serb side immediately after the February 1994 cease-fire. As an officer from an Arab country in their front lines, the Bosnian Serbs did not want him. This Jordanian UNMO's personal courage and impartial reporting earned him the respect of the Bosnian Serbs, but it took months of "face-time" in the trenches. Six months later, when this UNMO was selected for a move to another Sector, the same Bosnian Serbs who hadn't wanted him now requested that he stay! He had developed a relationship.

The Disadvantages of Relationships

The "down side" of developing strong relationships is that they can be too close, resulting in a loss of impartiality. In Sarajevo this led to UNMOs yelling over the radio at their colleagues on the Bosnian Serb side to stop shelling, as if the UNMOs controlled the Bosnian Serb artillery fire! On the other hand, UNMOs on the Bosnian Serb side became angry at their opposite numbers in the city as result of Bosnian snipers killing pregnant women just to draw retaliatory fire in time for CNN news.

The warring parties also were aware that relationships had developed. They would instruct their own personnel to act more aloof and refuse to accept UNMOs who had served on the other side of the line, or who knew the other side to the conflict.

Other Security Measures

Relationships were not the only factor contributing to the security of unarmed UN military observers in this time and place. Other factors were also important - knowledge, for example. There were three aspects to the application of knowledge to security: It had to be determined who was threatening or shooting, the belligerents had to know who the UNMOs were, and finally, all UNMOs had to continuously acquire knowledge so as to avoid unnecessary security risks.

Every individual bore responsibility for his own security in Sarajevo in that each had to remain alert and aware. For example, in December 1993, empty streets meant a sniper was active and those streets were to be avoided.

Passive protective measures such as flak jackets, helmets and shelters also contributed to security. However, all such measures are useless without procedures for their use at the right time and in the right place.

Conclusions

Relationships played a major role in ensuring security for UN military observers in Sector Sarajevo in 1993/94. There are examples where intervention by the UN military component was not possible or could have even endangered security. On the other hand personal intervention, based on developed relationships, saved lives.

Headquarters of all peace partners at all levels must take into account the dangers of new missions, or moving into new areas where there are no relationships, or the dangers that come at rotations of personnel, either those within an organization or within the parties to the conflict. In the case of relationships, fear of the "unknown" is a valid security concern!

Time is always needed to develop relationships that function in security crises. Mission planners must consider the dangers of operating in an area with no relationships and the time needed to create these ties. Moreover, handovers at rotations must consider relationships in place and factor in enough time to at least permit building on the contacts made by outgoing personnel.

Mission planners must consider how relationships will develop in their mission from the start of the planning process. It may be necessary to create artificial opportunities or mechanisms for this purpose. In Sarajevo, chatting about soccer or even soccer games with UNMOs served to initiate relationship development.

Organizational identity must also be factored into any appreciation of developing relationships to help with security. The ICRC, for example, is known worldwide, a recognition that assists in making contacts and until recently has even provided some protection.

If a situation is too chaotic to permit development of relationships then perhaps it is too dangerous for deployment of the unarmed. A situation that doesn't appear to permit development of relationships certainly has to "ring warning bells" for planners.