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The content of the discussion periods have been condensed and organized around central issues raised during the seminar. 1. Understanding the Parameters, Definitions and Dynamics of Terrorists and Terrorism Why is a definition of terrorism important? Coming to terms with a useful definition is important because of what is excluded and included in the definition, and the implications thereafter. Once an act is labeled as terrorism, there is not a wide variety of options on how to treat the situation. Some governments espouse the policy not to negotiate with terrorists, so they cannot take certain actions as a result. Many people, engaging in what are normally thought of as terrorist activities, don't refer to themselves as terrorists. The search for a definition prompts many questions. What is the difference between crime and terrorism? A terrorist is, at the least, a criminal. Some countries have taken the approach of treating terrorists only as criminals, in order to contain the rhetoric they associate with their actions. What about organizations in the definition of terrorism? What about military targets? Why is it okay to kill a soldier okay but not a civilian? Where is the line? Who draws the line? Everyone draws it in a different place. We must be careful with labels. Governments use the term rather loosely and so sometimes an act against a military target is not terrorism. It depends on whom you ask. Should it be seen as politically motivated crime or individual act? There are legal implications on the status of individuals. In Ireland, for example, the IRA is now seen as a legitimate political partner. The IRA actually gained one of their objectives, in that they obtained the British government's acknowledgement of them as a legitimate political partner. The problem of governments labeling everything they dislike 'terrorism' is that the term loses it uniqueness. What is the significance of the counter terrorism spiral? The phrase 'counter terrorism spiral' can be explained this way: an individual or group feels they are justified in committing acts of terror. The government responds by counterattacking and/or persecuting (as opposed to prosecuting) the attackers. The government may also limit freedoms of citizens in an effort to control the ability of attackers to carry out a successful attack or to prevent the public from being attacked. This is thought of as the cost of insuring security. This method of dealing with acts of terrorism in turn leads to more attacks and/or a greater loss of freedoms. The challenge is to keep governments out of the counter terrorism spiral. Terror invoked on the terrorist contributes to the perception that they are legitimate, and matching method with method makes the governments sanctioning terrorists' acts by their own forces no better than the terrorist. The question is how do we want to fight this war? Governments have to decide to dictate the terms, and not be caught in a cycle of reaction. Who is the intended audience of terrorist acts? It depends upon who was attacked and by whom. Timothy McVeigh planned and executed the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He was very angry with the US Federal Government. Who is the audience for the attack in Bali or the USS Cole? For the Cole, the audience was the U.S. public and the ship was just a convenient target. The message was, 'U.S., stay out of here.' Is there a corollary between terrorism and insurgency? Insurgents use terrorists' actions. We must examine insurgents' methods vis-á-vis terrorist acts. Terrorists frequently act as tools for the insurgents' debate. Can we use the old insurgency model in today's environment? Why did this attack on Bali not happen in all of the other possible places in the world? Is there a relation between it, the events of 9-11, and President Bush's threat to attach Iraq? These issues must be related on a worldwide scale. The larger the organization is, the larger the group dynamics will be. Organizations respond to terrorism. We decide who these organizations are and select the individuals who will respond. There are similar organizational dynamics on the terrorists' side. You have to work on both problems at once - you have to both stop the terrorism and at the same time try to remedy the problems that led to terrorism. Terrorist organizations with very different audiences, but similar goals, are now sharing information, exchanging training opportunities with each other, and so on. The exchanges between the IRA in Ireland and FARC in Colombia serve as an example. What is the relationship of democratic society to terrorism? When there is terrorism in a country the elements that can respond most quickly that will be given more funds to counter the threat will be the military and police, possibly leading to an unbalancing of the government checks and balances that support democratic society. Also, one of the goals of terrorists is to disrupt the bonds of faith between the state and the population on an individual level. A goal of a democratic society to counter terrorism is to transform the terrorists from using force to using non-violent means available in a democracy to achieve their ends. Local and community support for a group that commits acts of terrorism is also a critical element, and especially relevant to control and transform terrorists where possible. The methods of dealing with the supporters must be in keeping with democratic principles. How do you determine if an attack was domestic or international? Rand Corporation believes an attack can be characterized as domestic or international depending upon the nature of the target(s). In Bali for example, the targets were from many different countries and so that attack, according to their classification, is international in nature. Are there philosophical constructs underlying acts of terrorism? Some believe what we are experiencing today - - with the recent bombing in Bali, the terrorist activities in the Philippines, and the attacks on the U.S. - - a war of civilizations, or a clash of civilizations, as described in a book by the same words. Some experts accept these attacks as just that: the clash of the western, Christian world with the Muslim world. But those they purport to represent do not agree to the views they represent. Terrorist forces such as Al Qaeda are working with a worldview that is a bastardization (i.e., a corruption or perversion) of these civilizations. We can say this is a clash of civilization and the rule of law with their opposites - anarchy and barbarianism. Why is it important to understand terrorist behavior and motivations? Understanding motivation is an essential element of risk management. A child throws a rock at an armored vehicle. What meaning is there in this act? If it becomes a matter of martyrdom - - when one loses one's life in sacrifice to a cause - - it cannot be considered suicide. This places the act beyond the normal constraints operating in an ordered society. Linking religion and terrorism is a mistake - you have to make a distinction between judging the religion as bad, versus people using religion as a reason for terrorism. When Bin Laden speaks he speaks as a devout Muslim. He has always had the reputation of being a very devout person. This devotion does not condone acts of terror. The main goal of the terrorists is fear - at least in the short run. We used to be able to name the name, location and agenda of most terrorist groups. That is no longer always true. Partly the reason for not claiming responsibility for these acts is that this lack of identity serves the terrorist's cause. Why did no one claim responsibility for the bombing in Bali? Perpetrators can operate more effectively if they can maintain deniability. There is also the power of rumor and the spread of a conspiracy theory - that Bin Laden was not involved in the events of 9/11, but that the acts were masterminded by the Jews to discredit Bin Laden. Many people in other parts of the world believe this. It may not be in Bin Laden's best interests to accept responsibility in many parts of the world. To claim responsibility may be dangerous for the terrorist organization. What motivated the selection of the targets for the 9/11 attacks, and were the attackers successful? To expose vulnerability at an economic level was one motivation. The symbolism of the targets is very important also. The attackers were hoping this act would divide the world into two sides - Islamic and non Islamic. They were hoping there would be retaliation, without thought, and on a huge scale. This was the greater goal. Beyond the economic impact and the loss of life, perhaps they were not as successful as they had hoped. For example, while it was hard to find an English translation of the Koran after 9/11, an unexpected result for the terrorists was that many people immediately wanted to learn more about Islam. Rather than go the way of Uber-terrorism - - the complete annihilation of the people, history, thoughts, and cultural manifestations of the 'other' - - the non-Muslim world became more interested in understanding the Muslim world, and, Muslims not of a radical mindset desired to have non-Muslims understand that they did not share these radical views, and that it was not appropriate for others to assume that these radical elements spoke for all Muslims. In other words, the dialogue went the other way. Are there any models for responding to terrorism? One model that has been published, Wilkinson's model, was founded on the Irish independence issue. Wilkinson is British and so he frames his model from the British post-colonial perspective, which is limited and limiting. Not accounted for in his model was the broad support for the Irish cause in North America, especially monetary support from private citizens in the United States. Before the British could be successful in Northern Ireland, outside support had to be cut off. Wilkinson is reactive instead of proactive. He does not address the underlying problems that led to terrorism in the first place. Some countries don't have effective internal justice systems, unlike British society in Wilkinson's model. There has to be a balance between security and liberty. Also, some European countries (Germany, Italy, etc.) have very effective national police forces. In the United States, the military can't normally be used to solve domestic problems, such as a police force would have the authority to do. This is not true in Great Britain, and elsewhere. Taking a hard line approach worked in Germany, Italy and Belgium, but the common factor was a national police force, a resource not all countries have, including the U.S. A hard line approach also worked in Malaysia in the use of the military in combating communists, however, they were under civilian control and the use of military force was temporary. In reference to special security laws - it is much easier to create them than it is to repeal them. The security services do not want to give up their prerogatives. A periodic review of the threat is essential. If the criminal justice system can't handle terrorists effectively and the military must intervene, then the military must be certain to uphold basic human rights. To complement this situation, military assets when used against terrorism must act under the rule of civilian law and civilian control. 2. Applying National Resources and Assets to Counter Terrorism How can intelligence be made a key management tool for dealing with the terrorist? It depends on what the decision makers want to know. What isn't known can be frightening just because of the volume of the unknowns, causing a shift in resources and balance toward intelligence assets. The operational process inherent in the "stove pipe," or vertically organized structure helps to keep intact the line of authority, but there is a danger of having too powerful an intelligence agency where there is the real possibility of control and authority not always being under elected officials. You need to separate when intelligence personnel are suggesting operations that will affect foreign policy versus reporting. Determining policy is not the role for intelligence organizations. When the intent of the threat is not known, the focus should be on capabilities-based forces. Is it appropriate to put out warnings to the public when you have intelligence that there is a planned attack? The question that needs to be answered is, is there enough intelligence to catch them? If not, sources are exposed and there is a risk of losing information from that source in the future. There is no good solid answer to this question: elected officials should handle the issue. Generally, by giving the population a long-range warning based on the capabilities of the terrorist, conventional thought is this helps the society to become more vigilant and safe. What is the media's role? How does it shape acts of terrorism? Terrorists manipulate the media. The media is a message system, and a medium of communication for the terrorists. We can all agree that there is a line and a threshold that the media should not cross, however, voluntary self-restraint of coverage by a free and open media is very difficult because of competition for market share. There is a bias in the media because they determine what gets reported and why it's reported. Free speech, as manifested through the media, has a cost associated with it. Too many news cameras can reveal to the terrorist where people that are their targets are situated. When immediate tactical information is given through the media, the opposition uses the information to its advantage, ultimately endangering that freedom of speech. Are terrorist actions related to and influenced by movie and novel plots? If they are, should there be restrictions on content? The use of an aircraft to make an attack was plotted in a 1985 film. There are also many novels with scary, realistic scenarios. However restrictions would be viewed as an attack on the freedom of expression and censorship. Based on what was found in Afghanistan, terrorists do pay attention to the movies and books and the best that can be done is to be aware of the content. If it is known that people who are part of a religious group are often terrorists, and people from that group want to come in to the country, should they be let in? It is hard to take action, because of the rule of law, until these specific people commit a crime. Still, they can be watched very closely, and their actions and activities trailed. The amount of money they are making and how much in taxes they should be paying can be tracked. They can be charged with tax evasion, for example, if they have not been paying what is owed. The objective is to legally catch them before they take action. Be aware if they are drug trafficking or kidnapping. Their weakness must be used against them. What can be done to balance the human rights of the individual with gathering the needed information to protect the population? Take only the steps that are only absolutely necessary to put these structures in place through law. Situations should be handled on a case-by-case basis and elected officials need to be involved in the process. Wherever possible, the police should be on the front lines and participating through the investigation process, gathering evidence, and then turning it over to either the intelligence or to the judicial system for prosecution. 3. Building Coalitions to Counter Terrorism How can different groups work together internationally against terrorism? Some ideas are: integrate all national agencies, work with geographic neighbors and work with international organizations. Some agencies use different measures of effectiveness than others. The U.S. is now involved in an experiment integrating military and non-military personnel - nationally and internationally. A combatant command sets up a coordinating group of different organizations, to include the FBI, CIA, military, and so on. It is responsible to the commander, but it is a coordinating group, and not a command group. The group has no authority over diplomatic issues, police, etc., but members share information. This group is about keeping all of its members informed about what the big picture looks like. Another idea is to establish a Regional Counter-Terrorism Center. In the end, stove piped, or vertically organized, structures are the problem - each agency does things differently, in their own way - and they need the coordination of goals and the coordination of the means to achieve those goals. What are the challenges to this approach? Much time and effort must be expended on determining the enemy or enemies. Larger countries have more threats - more things to defend, as well as overseas interests. What works for the United States, or Malaysia, or the Philippines or Indonesia may not be applicable to the situation of other countries. Threats change. It's important to stay vigilant. The key is to not become complacent: just because what is working or has worked well in the past doesn't mean it will work well in the future. The response to the threat from the Abu Sayef is a great example of interagency cooperation and coordination in the Philippines with the military, the Department of Social Welfare, and non-governmental organizations. Is there a top authority for the enormous number of coalitions to control or coordinate them within the UN? There is no absolute process. One, two or more different countries come together in a joint endeavor. The same problems are inherent when establishing regional centers for educational purposes. The UN has no authority to direct any country to cooperate on any level. Because of a common threat, countries will come together to affect a show of force and cohesiveness. This is done with no permission from any higher authority. For example, the operations that NATO have been involved in are a result of multinational coalitions, which are much more common situations than treaty efforts. Another example is the formation of the Central Battalion, a coalition of peacekeeping forces from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, three countries which traditionally do not cooperate but who have united for a common purpose. As nations are added to a coalition, the complexity of managing that coalition increases. For example, sharing information of benefit to all countries is very sensitive and difficult. Coordinating that information with the coalition partners is also an issue. If funding for development earmarked to reduce poverty is eliminated, how is the fight against terrorism impacted? Resources and energy must be focused on what resources are in hand, not in anticipation of funding. A country that anticipates receiving funds must articulate its needs to donors. Specific and focused input influences how the monies can be directed. 4. Assessing the Threat and Evaluating Countermeasures How do you assess the strength of the terrorist? Look at what they have done in the past. Look at their ability to get money and where it comes from, and assess what they can do with different amounts of money. Also, it is a fact that there are terrorists who stay in the target place and never perform the attack themselves, but give information about targets and observe reactions after the attack. Some organizations don't have a large number of people dedicated to this role and instead have these people moving from one place to another, following the targets. With the tools of assessment available, why do we continue to have attacks? A threat assessment done prior to an attack may be ignored. Or disparate pieces of information were viewed in a comprehensive way. For example, in the World Trade Center situation, France had told the U.S. that Al Qaeda was planning an attack using airplanes on big targets. Foreigners were taking a lot of flight training and that they were only interested in flying, but not in landing the plane. This was the second attack on the same target. The U.S. had been successful in catching people in the first attack but that does not mean that they would not try again. It is easy to ignore the obvious. And when success is achieved in thwarting an attack that was not suspected, there is no credit, because nothing happened. What areas can be measured so that a decision can be made when counter terrorism activities are successful? Some areas, as a start, are recruiting, funding, logistic support, training, level of legitimacy, the number of terrorist training camps, and the amounts of terrorist money frozen. A baseline will provide a foundation so that measurements are meaningful and comparisons can be made. You have to decide first what you want to achieve and also consider the requirements for integrating efforts among the sectors involved - financial, police, customs, and so on. You also have to decide what the situation will look like once you get to where you want to go, in other words, your exit strategies and end state. What determines what is important to measure? If the terrorist act is viewed as a criminal act, then it follows to use measures of effectiveness that can be borrowed from criminal justice. Also to be considered is the nature of the threats that characterize the situation in a particular country - are they national or international, for example? When can it be certain that the threat is over? There is no hard and fast guide, but a review process involving all of the relevant sectors - military, police, judiciary, financial, etc. - and periodic examination of the government's willingness for partisan participation both go a long way to securing civil society. How important are planned responses? Having planned responses is very important. Practice must be realistic, planned and rehearsed. For example, a planned response now exists for a subway gas attack, such as the one that occurred in Tokyo. A team is ready to move with one hour of warning. This is the direction of readiness for specific events to move toward. Security requires the cooperation of many parts of the society, including the government. What gets measured will get done. For example, there are many gauges in an aircraft, but some are more important than others in reaching the destination. In this example, fuel is most important. If integration and relationship of some form cannot be found to indicate when success is achieved, then failure is for certain. Have measures of effectiveness been used by civilian organizations or military? There are many factors that need to be considered. Poverty is one root of terrorism. Internally displaced people wanting to return home to normal lives is a factor. In many situations, workers are working overseas, and sending remittances back home. So the measurements can be quite intangible and complicated. Once an area seems to be peaceful, soldiers leave it, but then maybe the problem returns - the presence of the military appears to be essential to maintain security. Peace is the goal of most nations, and peace requires a long-term, sustained commitment. There is no quick fix. Often development is essential to the process. |
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