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Each group was presented with a series of three tactical- and operational-level vignettes built around a particular task that addressed potential problems mission members would confront. While each syndicate was asked to consider their response to all three vignettes, they were required to report on only the one assigned to them. The three vignette scenarios and their tasks were:
For each vignette, the working groups developed a concept of operations and identified issues, concerns, opportunities, and interagency considerations attendant to that vignetteÕs scenario. The outcomes were briefed to UNMID Leadership in plenary session. FINDINGS 2 VIGNETTE 1 The mission in vignette 1 is for UNMID to assist in establishing an IDP camp to alleviate human suffering and to establish a minimum standard of living conditions. To this end, UNMID has brokered a shaky cease-fire and the camp is to be erected before clashes resume. 25,000 IDPs are gathered at a single location and are living in the open, with NGOs providing limited medical and food assistance. The primary security threat is from roving bands. There is poor transportation, poor sanitation, multiple health issues, and the NGO workers are at odds with the media covering the situation. The end state is to voluntarily return the IDPs to their origins. Syndicate 1 proceeded to categorize tasks for completion by the host nation, political/diplomatic, humanitarian, military and civilian police components.. Each sectorÕs tasks were further grouped into phases. It was observed that phases overlap within a sector, and have an inter-relationship with the phases in the other sectors. Host nation, political and diplomatic efforts are critical to mission success, as is an information campaign geared toward informing the IDPs, local residents, neighboring countries and the international community and world media. Refugees are outside of the operational area of the mission, however they represent a major effort for the IO/NGO community. When they start to return to their origins, the military may be asked to assist at the border crossing with security, transit camps, transportation, feeding stations, etc. Also, a secure environment must exist in the return location. Therefore, coordination among all of the sectors is paramount. Emergency support to the group of IDPs requires extensive coordination with numerous agencies (who have management responsibilities), host nation authorities, political authorities, and civilian police. External security is the normal role of the military with internal security provided by the indigenous capacity whether police, guards, etc. Civilian police represent and excellent resource in the area. Coordination mechanisms are required to mitigate problems and synchronize efforts. Disarmament of IDPs is a difficult issue that needs a team effort by police, military, international organizations and NGOs. VIGNETTE 2 Several planning assumptions were necessary to proceed with a discussion of the details associated with conducting free and fair elections. It was assumed that the election would receive popular support, that the majority of IDPs and refugees will be registered to vote, that adequate resources will be made available for the conduct of the elections, that there is a Joint Interagency Council operating effectively, and that the security situation will permit elections. Mission Objectives were to develop the environment for the conduct of free and fair elections, to use local governmental infrastructure as much as possible, to secure the environment during elections, to develop a quick reaction capability and to contribute to an overarching information campaign. The end state is defined as a fair, free and transparent election resulting in a democratic government. As with the first vignette, syndicate 2 sorted out tasks by component, including those for the military, civilian police and civilian authorities, both host nation and those assigned as part of UNMID. The syndicate identified several integration issues that must be addressed, such as the training and status of observers, common and integrated communication networks, exchange of liaison officers, rules of engagement, and areas of responsibility requiring additional clarification as the countdown to elections proceeded: security, logistics and the election process itself. The successful conduct of free and fair elections is dependent upon the dissemination of accurate information. To help insure a complete information campaign, efforts should be focused on maximizing local contacts and sources, such as the civilian police force and NGOs, and a facility for briefing the media and a joint information electoral cell should both be established. Avoid mission creep by focusing on mandate and ensuring that local, national, and international institutions and agencies execute their pieces of the mandate. Monitoring election results and facilitating a proper and peaceful transition of power to legitimate elected officials will secure a smooth transition to a new government. A few key lessons learned include the need to prioritize mission objectives and to pay particular attention to perceptions, through efforts aimed at coordination, liaison, and integration of effort. To attain objectives, it is necessary to determine the scope of authority by understanding responsibilities, the Security Council Resolution calling for free and fair elections, and any applicable standard operation procedures. It is important to monitor existing government actions and to address any post-election power-sharing issues. In the area of command, control and coordination, there must be a clear understanding of the full complexity of the situation by all parties involved. Key issues for discussion were defining the areas of responsibility for all parties, the role of existing government bodies, the elections process pre-, during, and post-elections, logistic arrangements, and security considerations. VIGNETTE 3 The task is to plan for the withdrawal of military forces. The security situation has to sufficiently stabilize such that humanitarian mandates are being met and free and fair elections have been held. There are a number of conditions that must be met, such as: low threat level, minimal criminal activity, UN civilian police have set up a training academy provide security in cities and towns, the local police are not armed, de-mining activities are in place, improved public infrastructure and stabilizing economy, positive return of IDPs, and so on. Planning assumptions at the six-month prior to redeployment timeframe are stabilized areas of tension, facilitated return of refugees & IDPs, facilitated delivery of humanitarian aid, demobilization and professionalization of the army, assistance in development of the civilian police, assistance in emergence of independent and democratic state of Darlan, and freedom of movement restricted only in selected sectors where necessary. At twelve months, assumptions include the first four plus: assistance in emergence of independent and democratic state of Darlan with a set election date, opened air and sea ports, and a civilian sector security warden and registration system in place. A concept of operations was then developed which outlined the mission objectives of the safe and smooth withdrawal of all UN personnel, equipment and property, the smooth hand-over of authority to another agency and the elected government, and the assurance of a safe environment for the continuation of peace and security. The mission would be a three-phase event in a two-month time frame consisting of preparation, handover and withdrawal. Component tasks were developed for the military, civilian police, civil administration and humanitarians. Other key elements of the concept of operations were integration, information and intelligence, command, control and coordination mechanisms, and transition, mission creep, end state and exit considerations. The end state was described as a smooth hand-over to the newly elected government under a secure environment, the continuation of reforms in civilian police and armed forces, and the safe withdrawal of all UN assets. Recommendations include the continuation of effort under UN and "friends", such as police and military training teams, humanitarian coordinators, current government staffing assistance and from the UNGA, continued economic and political support to the elected government. Key lessons learned are not progressing as you initially prioritize, and the importance of knowing who is in charge: the SRSG is in charge of UNMID overall, with the lead component for conducting the withdrawal being the military. There may be a need to establish a "Withdrawal Coordination Office" to assist with an integrated, orderly and phased withdrawal. Some important concepts critical to success and common to all three vignettes are:
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