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Description of Games Moves and Findings

Move 1: Assessment and Mission Planning

Given a UN mandate and other background documentation, working groups developed a mission plan for the establishment of a Multi-National Force (MNF) peace operation. Their plan needed to include the mission statement, Òend state,Ó key tasks, lead nation considerations, command and control, force organization and composition, rules of engagement (ROE), key service support and logistics considerations.

Move 1 Findings

There is recognition that the non-governmental and humanitarian organizations are already providing or are attempting to provide relief to affected populations, and that the military will likely be asked to provide support to the humanitarians, given the security challenges on the ground.

The restated mission is for Òthe [lead nation] to build and establish a multinational force (MNF) in accordance with the appropriate UN resolutions and other regional agreements in order to respond to the crisisÉOn order, deploy to the [host nation], establish a buffer zone and secure operating environment that ensures that the humanitarian relief effort may take place and separation of forces is maintainedÉOn order, establish the conditions for and conduct mission handover to a follow-on UN force.Ó Or, more simply, the mission is to restore peace and stability to the region prior to the introduction of a ÒBlue BeretÓ UN peacekeeping force.

The initial concerns and focus is placed on traditional military activities using planning assumptions derived from the provided scenario. Tasks were defined as being associated with one of three phases: deployment, employment, and redeployment. Tasks that are identified more or less in order of initiation are:

  1. Building the force architecture prior to deployment
  2. Deploying
  3. Establishing a secure environment by air, land and sea
  4. Establishing a Òbuffer zoneÓ or area of separation
  5. Facilitating humanitarian assistance operations
  6. Assisting in the demarcation of new borders
  7. Ensuring the freedom of movement
  8. Redeployment

Several other critical activities are carried out throughout the entire mission, including coordination at all levels and with all sectors, information and intelligence gathering and sharing, assessments, coordination with the existing in-country UN Mission and liaison activities with the host nation.

Implied tasks include monitoring of weapons and the movement of forces, assisting and supporting the civilian police contingent in maintaining law and order, assisting the SRSG in managing the information structure, participating in cease-fire enforcement, providing infrastructure support to humanitarian agencies when critical to the success of the military mission, and ensuring compliance in the movement of combatants to assigned areas.

The end state is a secure and stable environment, the responsibility for which can then be handed over to a UN peace support mission.

Move 2: Operational Level Humanitarian, Law and Order and Disarmament Planning

Given additional guidance, working groups were asked to develop detailed responses to emerging mission difficulties in other functional areas. Their considerations were based on three specific scenarios, or vignettes, requiring an understanding of key military tasks and support requirements to achieve mission outcome. The three vignettes addressed humanitarian issues, law and order, and management of the area of separation.

Move 2 Findings: Vignette 1 - Humanitarian Issues

Broadly speaking, the tasks in this vignette require analyzing the nature of conducting operations in conjunction with other components, one of which is humanitarian. Humanitarian issues are compelling and are likely to dominate the mission. If not attended to properly, the results may be catastrophic.

The role of the MNF is to stabilize the security situation to allow humanitarians, and where possible under prevailing conditions, to allow the host nation to meet the humanitarian needs of civilian populations.

Determining the who, how, when, how much and where of humanitarian response, though not the responsibility of the MNF, requires an understanding of and participation in the process, and knowledge of the agencies and international humanitarian laws to allow the smoothest possible coordination between the MNF and the lead agency, UNHCR, who in this scenario has the responsibility to design and implement the humanitarian plan. MNF must assist UNHCR in ways that are appropriate: first and foremost by furnishing a secure environment to permit temporary and safe settlement, but also by providing liaisons for continuous coordination and communication, creating or repairing critical infrastructure to insure the viability of the camps and providing ongoing security for areas outside of the camps once they are established.

While the distribution of humanitarian assistance is the responsibility of UNHCR, this agency may ask for MNF for assistance in providing food, water, shelter, health, logistics, transportation and construction if those sectoral needs are not otherwise being met.

Coordination and cooperation between MNF and the humanitarian community must be established as quickly as possible, and made routine. MNF representatives must be knowledgeable what the MNF is and is not prepared to do in support of humanitarian activities, and must be given authority to speak for MNF in meetings, or at the least, respond very rapidly to requests for assistance.

UNHCR is the coordination mechanism for both IDP and refugee camps. The site selection process is a joint effort of the MFN, the host nation where feasible, and UNHCR. UNHCR administers and manages the camps, and they may look for assistance from MNF in building the camps and requisite infrastructure.

Law and order inside of the camps is not the responsibility of the MNF. Security outside of the camps is the responsibility of the host nation to conduct with the oversight of the Civilian Police Commissioner, which may be augmented by MNF, as the dynamic security situation dictates.

Limiting MNFÕs role to support through what is appropriate, reasonable and temporary avoids population and host nation dependency and undesirable uses of military assets. Properly managed and applied, MNF in support of humanitarian activities can be used to help build confidence in the host nationÕs capabilities.

Move 2 Findings: Vignette 2 - Law and Order

Because there are two sovereign entities, there are two legal systems in place. The laws, which apply with the Area of Separation (AOS), are the prevailing domestic law, unless there is a violation of international law. Local authorities have jurisdiction, but MNF may provide support if necessary or if requested, but may not enforce domestic law. In addition, the legal status of the MFN and covered by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and contingents are covered by their own national laws.

Regardless of who has jurisdiction, all people in the theater of operations have basic human rights under situations of arrest, detainment or imprisonment. Military personnel may stop and detail those who are abusing human rights conventions and are expressly permitted to do so by the UN Charter and the International Human Rights Convention, however, civilian police perform arrests. Essentially the civilian police have the internal security mission, whereas the MNFÕs mission is external.

The 3rd Geneva Convention covers rights of the detained. Detention cannot be based upon accusation alone; there must be evidence that a crime has been committed. A distinction must be made between criminal acts versus combatant acts against the MNF. Minimum standards must be observed, including the right of the detained to practice their religion and the right to basic human needs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must have access to detainees and will determine if basic health conditions are being met. Both Geneva Conventions and Human Rights Conventions apply. The MNF should turn detainees over to civilian authorities as soon as possible; the length of the detention will depend upon the nature of the offense and the ability of the domestic judicial system to process the case.

In the event of a crime, the scene should be cordoned off and protected to ensure integrity of the site. The local authorities or UN civilian police should be contacted immediately. SOFAs should cover the rights and privileges of MNF members to provide witness statements or to appear as witnesses in domestic disputes.

There should be close and continuous coordination between the civilian police and the MNF. Structures are needed at every level to facilitate coordination.

Recommendations based upon analysis of the security environment were:

  1. Civilian police conduct a short train program with MNF members that covers differences in the two domestic law & order systems and prevailing trends inside of the AOS.
  2. Establish a detention facility
  3. Select Rules of Engagement suitable for detained personnel
  4. Develop SOPs for essential information required by local authorities, contact procedures and on-site procedures and include in all MNF training programs
  5. Consider a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the civilian police and the MNF determining who is responsible for what, the mechanism for support, and what the MNF could provide in terms of support.
  6. Provide for a liaison officer exchange between civilian police and MNF.
  7. Request a specialized unit from one of the donor nations that is trained to handle riot control and crowd dispersal, and possesses specialized equipment
  8. Rules of engagement are needed for the possession and use of non-lethal weapons

Move 2 Findings: Vignette 3 - Management of the Area of Separation

Major problem areas were identified as borders, coordination between MNF and other sectors, a shortage of civilian police, discipline, and lack of a unity of command.

The strategic aim of the MNF is to establish conditions that will build trust between the nations party to the conflict and to improve the capacity of both so that they may enjoy stable relations.

The end state is determined to be the redeployment of a peacekeeping force in the traditional sense, i.e., once agreement is reached and belligerents are brought under the control of legitimate authority, there is a peace to keep, and a peacekeeping force can be deployed.

Some of the factors identified as critical to management of the AOS are:

  1. Establishment of dialogues between the parties in dispute
  2. Coordination among all of the components and sectors, including military, humanitarian responders and civilian police
  3. Use of traditional leaders, given the nature of the dispute and the cultures involved
  4. Dissemination of a public information campaign aimed at dispelling rumors and supporting the efforts of the MNF and the peace process in general

Move 3: Strategic Planning

Given the successful deployment and conduct of MNF operations, the UN needs to prepare to assume responsibility for peacekeeping in the area of operations. Participants in working groups were asked to develop a UN strategic estimate, develop a course of action, recommend a mandate and force structures and identify key information requirements.

Move 3 Findings

It is critical that several key conditions in the environment be present in order to enable a successful transition to a UN mission, and if not in place at the time, will have to be dealt with before progress can be made. They are:

  1. While the aggressors remain a potential threat, they are politically and diplomatically contained;
  2. The security and political situation in the affected areas, including the AOS, is stable;
  3. There is a balance of force between the belligerents;
  4. The participating nations are supportive;
  5. The law and order situation has improved;
  6. Hot spots and borders have stabilized;
  7. Population movement has abated and the displaced are repatriating;
  8. Local agencies are functioning;
  9. The humanitarian mission is fully established and conducting operations effectively with little assistance from MNF.

In short, all tasks within the mandate are being adequately met.

The strong possibility of isolated but well coordinated and orchestrated clashes, unfulfilled aspirations of warlords, capability of the aggressors and the potential for outbreaks of violence and crime indicate a need for a UN mission operating under a Chapter VII mandate with rules of engagement as robust as politically possible. While violence has lessened, Chapter VII is required because of the potential to reverse the progress made to date.

Key transition requirements include devising the mandate, adopting rules of engagement, addressing force restructuring, determining new contingents, sorting through logistics issues and taking measures to insure the inter-operability of force. In the broader picture, the political and diplomatic efforts and transition to robust civilian led and run institutions must continue for long-term success.

Some transition issues are force commander retention or replacement, the composition of contributing nations, equipment compatibility, budget constraints, wet or dry lease, force integration, inter-operability (language, training level, culture), changes in force structure, infrastructure and support ramifications, and timing of transition activities.

With stability in the region achieved, the success of this new phase of the mission depends on the ability of the UN force to solidify security, presence, discipline, trust and leadership.

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