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Conclusions
- Five
global tasks are critical to the successful conduct of any
mission: 1) interpreting the political intent of the parties
to the peace enforcement process, including that of the
SRSG, 2) generating trust in the partnerships on the ground,
3) establishing a common language, for the comprehension
of all aspects of the operations of participant parties,
4) understanding who responds to the media, including within
one's own forces, parties to the conflict, local population,
national audience and the international community, and 5)
the movement and understanding of information.
- Law
and order is likely to be the most critical aspect of modern
PKO missions. The military need to understand the complexity
of the law and order issue. Civilian police operations are
an essential component of the security mission. This issue
extends beyond civilian police, to include judicial systems,
prison systems and legal reform. The military functions
in a supportive role, and it is important for mission leadership
to understand the military's support requirements.
- Security
extends beyond the understanding of military security to
include physical security and protection from violence,
humanitarian security, and safe areas. Security is a combined
effort that involves all mission components, and as such
it requires integrated planning and close cooperation.
-
This broadened concept of security raises several implications.
1) The military's role in peace making and peace building
includes more complex tasks than traditional military missions,
tasks that will impact the force structure and command and
control arrangements. Examples are the need a wider range
of personal skills, and to include capacities for joint
planning, coordination, and liaison activities. 2) There
must be recognition by the mission leadership, components
and donors that political and humanitarian aspects of the
mission may be as important as the military. 3) The military
mission end-state is part of the overall mission end-state
and its success depends upon the success of other components.
4) Because the achievement of a truly secure environment
in the broader sense is a combined effort, the decision
to end the military mission is made through consensus by
a wide range of players. 5) The military need to establish
clear indicators of success and all components need to understand
what are the legitimate tasks that each of the components
has to achieve.
- In
this example, and in similar circumstances, the military's
end state generally includes these aspects: 1) Security
has been established, specifically, the threat of armed
attack under control, militias have been demobilized and
disarmed, and integrated armed forces have been established,
2) border guards have been established, trained and deployed,
3) refugees and IDP have successfully returned to their
homes, 4) key areas of operation have been de-mined, 5)
a full complement of UN Civilian Police has been deployed,
and 6) freedom of movement has been established, creating
a safe, enabled environment for humanitarian assistance
operations.
- It
is impossible to discuss the military's role in peace making
and peace building without some attempt to define the overall
mission end state. Because the military's end state is dependent
upon the success of all components at achieving those objectives
that intersect with the military's tasks, the overall mission
end state would encompass 1) the establishment of peace,
stability and law and order, 2) the reintegration of former
combatants, 3) civilian control of the armed forces, 4)
a peacefully demarcated order, 5) the successful return,
resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, 6)
identified areas de-mined, 7) the successful hand over of
law enforcement tasks to local police, and 8) the transition
from emergency relief to reconstruction and development
is successful.
- When
defining critical transition issues, it is important to
understand that the mandate and mission will change. Therefore,
re-evaluation of the mission may be necessary on a continuous
basis. This has several implications throughout the course
of the mission. It demands that cooperation and coordination
mechanisms be established early. Ultimately, the transition
planning process requires continuous coordination between
political actors, the Multi-National Forces, and UN headquarters,
at a minimum.
- It
should be stated that early planning, by its nature, requires
making key assumptions, but the act of making assumptions
does not eliminate the problems that underlie these assumptions.
Lack of re-evaluation of these assumptions can lead to mission
failure.
- The
transfer of authority and assumption of the security mission
from the MNF to the UN mission is a self-evident transition.
What is less obvious is that internationalization of the
force will occur, and different training standards, interoperability,
communications and language may become problems.
- Support
structures will also have to be renegotiated in the UN mission
in such key areas as logistics, finance, and personnel,
including the transition of key staff. It is clear, for
example, that the MNF Commander should leave as part of
the transition from the MNF to the UN mission. Command relationships
are critical in the UN: they may be understood differently
by different partners and will need to be renegotiated.
A critical aspect of transition is to understand the potential
changes to rules governing the use of force, particularly
as the security situation changes. Changes to and applications
of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be a difficult part
of transitions.
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