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Move 2
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Move 2

Transitions in Peace Operations

Guidance for the Discussion on Potential Transitions in UNMIT

Of great concern to the SRSG are the threats to the mission on the ground. The major security threat remains the uncontrolled elements of both parties and criminal elements that have taken advantage of the conflict situation. He gauges that both parties are likely to honor the agreements for the most part, however Samagaland continues to exploit the situation through propaganda broadcasts, indicating that the UN mandated border solution is being imposed by force. It is felt that they might be prepared to exploit any weakness in the transition area through paramilitary means, particularly through controlled insurgents that are supported by Samagaland in the North.

As the evaluation continues, the SRSG has requested examination of some of the many issues surrounding transitions within the UNMIT mission. The SRSG has provided key guidance to guide the discussion on transition issues:

  1. The military mission is to provide a secure military environment to permit UNMIT to accomplish its mission;

  2. The issues related to the new and old border, the transition zone, the buffer zone and the humanitarian situation represent the key points of the mission;

  3. Rule of law is identified as the critical facto;.

  4. The Mission will concentrate its activities on security, access, support and the establishment of the rule of law.

Requirements

Group members were reshuffled for Topic 2 discussions. They continued to represent the appointed staff from their National Headquarters.

The out brief for Topic 2 identifies critical points, the indicators of success, and actions to be taken, if any, for each of the following four key transitions:

  1. The transition between the Multi-National Force (MNF) and the UN force that will replace it. This will have implications for planning and deployment priorities. Based on the force levels and tasks derived, the Secretary Generals report and the draft resolution, explore the issues that devolve from this military transition and brief the SRSG and his team on the implications. As a minimum, consider assumptions regarding the MNF activities, major changes that will impact the transition, and how the transition will be accomplished;

  2. There will also be changes within the mission as it progresses over time. Changes in force structure can be expected and will need to be planned and executed. Address what will trigger these adjustments and what impact they will have;

  3. The transition of territory from one state to another also presents unique challenges. The SRSG has responsibility for this transition and will depend upon the military component to assist this process. Of particular interest are issues that impact the military mission, and the key military-civilian coordination and cooperation issues that must be considered from a military perspective as the UN Force operates in the transition areas;

  4. The final transition to be examined is the Military End State and the Exit Strategy. Determining when the military mission is complete is a very difficult process. Explore the criteria and conditions necessary at the end state, and determine who sets the conditions and the relationship of the military end state to the mission end state.

Move 2

Findings

A. Transition from MNF to UNMIT

Factors

The first issue to consider is the degree of success of the MNF mission. It is unlikely to have been completely successful; there would be no need for the UNMIT mission if this were the case. Likewise, it is unlikely for the MNF mission to have been a complete failure. The most probable situation is that the MNF mission was a partial success, however, the MNF may declare success complete, or success of a greater degree than is the reality. his tendency to overstate the positive may be balanced through the use of appropriate professionals and experts to conduct careful analysis and assessment of all sectors. A key component would be the assessment of threats, using intelligence gleaned from many sources, including local information and human intelligence.

Many factors will impact the MNF to UNMIT Forces transition: increase in the number of participating nations, changes in force structure and size, boundaries and sectors, leadership and command structure, military command vs. civilian authority, rules of engagement, logistics set-up, mandate and tasks, opportunities for training, education and orientation (TOE), changes to the security situation, the degree of local population support, the emergence of spoilers, the occurrence of infectious disease among the MNF, and inclement weather.

Recommendations

Accomplishment of a successful transition from the MNF to UNMIT Forces follows from careful planning to address all of the factors, which will impact the transition, starting from the above:

  1. An increase in participating nations will require early planning and coordination with the troop contributing nations;

  2. Necessary changes to force structure and size are best met through joint planning of timelines and liaising through the deployment of an advance party;

  3. Assessment and detailed planning and coordination of current problems with the MNF and Civil Administration will greatly assist with the challenges posed by changes to boundaries and sectors;

  4. To address the changes to the leadership and command structure, some MNF HQ staff should be retained to contribute knowledge that is new to UNMIT HQ staff, and the UNMIT Force Commander (FC) should arrive prior to the departure of the MNF FC;

  5. When mitigating the effects brought about by the change from military command to a civilian authority, education and training for new UNMIT forces and the remaining MNF forces, liaising, coordinating, and the defining of roles and responsibilities help to ease the transition;

  6. To address the changes to the mandate and tasks, planners have to assess in advance in order to make recommendations on force structure, locations, sectors, boundaries, etc;

  7. Training, orientation, education (TOE) should be conducted both pre-deployment and in-theater and should involve retained MNF personnel;

  8. The potential for the degradation of the security situation calls for early identification of problem areas, early coordination on planning and public affairs, rapid phased execution, and synchronizing of security plans to avoid parallel security plans;

  9. Positively influencing local population support demands the design and implementation of an information campaign;

  10. Weather can impact the transition, but its influence can be minimized through proper planning to include appropriate gear;

  11. The threat posed by infectious diseases can be reduced through health surveillance, inoculations, and TOE.

Other coordination activities should address the establishment of standard operating procedures, new rules of engagement, joint use of facilities (APOD, SPOD), information and psychological operations, an advocacy campaign, interface with the humanitarian community, the provision of relief in place, and the redeployment of the MNF. Indications of a successful transition may be that all planning, coordination, liaison, and deployment of UNMIT Forces are completed in a timely fashion.

B. Transitions within the UNMIT mission


Factors

There are factors within the mission that will require evaluation of their status to help to determine what kinds of changes are necessary to accommodate the changes in peace, security in the broadest sense, and the establishment of law and order that they represent. The table below illustrates some of these factors in the general sense, which will influence adjustments to the mission, force structure, tasks and capacities:

Factors influencing adjustment Impact of the changes
Perceived threat from potential peace spoilers
Insecurity, additional humanitarian task
Cessation of ceasefire
Withdrawal or revision of mandate
Accelerated IDP and refugee return and reintegration i.e., secure environment, de-mining
Prioritizing de-mining tasks and humanitarian support
Need for electoral support during mandate
Re-prioritizing military task for electoral support (riot control, physical security, security of ballots, etc.)
Intervention from regional political actors (N. Tindoro, Samagaland etc)
Revision of mandate may be required, impacting tasks of mission.
Political change within the mission area (e.g., new leadership)
Political change may incite instability or may promote stability.
Improvement in security
Accelerated peace building activities, allowing re-allocation/reduction of forces/change to ROEs.
Improvement in law and order (e.g., establishment of local police)
Accelerated peace building activities, allowing re-allocation/reduction of forces/change to ROEs.
Progress in DDR process
DDR unsuccessful: Possible impact on mission duration. DDR successful: Improved security and stability.

One group examined specifically the triggers for adjustment to force structure. Positive changes in the security situation will likely result in changes to the mandate, to include the rules of engagement, force size and capabilities, logistics support, and the tasks the forces are required to perform. An improved security situation could be due to a combination of the establishment of law and order within the border zone and transition areas, demilitarization in the border zone and transition areas, the fulfillment of basic needs, an improving economic situation, a developing civil society, and an increase in civilian participation, all of which would also necessitate a shift in the focus of non-governmental and international organizations.

C. Transition of Territory

Factors

Issues identified as critical to UN operation in the transition area are:

  1. All aspects of security;

  2. Law and order (e.g., restoration of law and order; addressing the shortage of civilian police; ethnic issues, major crime, local police training);

  3. Command and control within the transition areas (to manage all the activities by SRSG and his deputies);

  4. Establishment of the local government with administration capability and supported from grassroots;

  5. Rehabilitation (facilitate reconstruction and post-conflict reconciliation process at the same time);

  6. Communication Structure (language, culture, grassroots organization, media support);

  7. Harmonization of majority and minority groups (protection, displacement, refugees, border issues);

  8. Property and Ownership (legal context, registration, claim process, regulation, business registration);

  9. Citizenship Issues (passport, documentation, marriage, vehicle registration, birth certificate, taxation, driver licenses);

  10. Border Establishment and Demarcation;

  11. Clearing of Mines;

  12. Eliminating access to and flow of small arms;

  13. Maximum utilization of local capacity and engagement with every phase of transition processes.

Specific military tasks within the transition areas include facilitation of trans-border movements through established crossing and check points, de-mining operations, information operations, support to local authorities, support to humanitarian organizations, protection of minorities, Quick Reaction Force, employment and maintenance of security in the transition areas. Strong civil-military coordination is required in the transition areas, to include coordination and liaising through civilian-military liaison officers, humanitarian coordination with CIMIC, CMOC, etc., and coordination with the transitional authority and local civic and religious leaders.

Recommendations

  1. Rapid positioning of UN Civilian Police with executive powers;

  2. The transitional authority should expedite the creation of a judicial system;

  3. Encourage donor support to recovery and reconstruction efforts, particularly the reintegration of former combatants;

  4. Regional actors should be called upon for full participation and cooperation in all aspects of the process;

  5. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be established;

  6. Increase the capabilities for ancillary tasks, for example, de-mining, which will assist the country in not only security but in economic recovery;

  7. Opportunities for information campaigns must be included in UNMIT mandate;

  8. Allow sufficient capacity to properly demarcate border;

  9. Establish coordination mechanisms between UNMIT and humanitarians;

  10. Establish coordination mechanism between UNMIT and civilian authorities of Host Nations;

  11. Establish a coordination mechanism between UNMIT forces and human rights monitors;

  12. Establish an inter-ethnic reconciliation program;

  13. Support monitoring by independent regional organizations (UN/OSCE models).

D. Transition Related to the Military End State and the Exit Strategy

Criteria, Conditions and Indicators

The criteria and conditions that need to be established by mutual agreement and expert assessment in order to consider disengaging the UNMIT forces are as follows, with indicators of success in parentheses include:

  1. Political resolution (transformation of militias in political parties, undisputed and secure border);

  2. Demilitarization (ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, creation of new integrated armed forces under civilian control);

  3. Basic needs are met (affordable shelter, water, healthcare, food are available);

  4. Human security (freedom from fear, freedom from want, resettlement of IDPs/refugees);

  5. Public security (law and order, functioning local police system);

  6. Good Governance (functional legislative/judicial/administrative bodies/grass roots support);

  7. Functional economy (emergence of experts, markets are open w/stable prices);

  8. Functioning civil society ('free' media, health, education, local NGOs, etc).

It is ultimately the SRSG who determines the conditions for termination of UNMIT military force activities. The SRSG does so under advisement from host nations, the troop contributing nations, the UNMIT Force Commander, Humanitarian Coordinator and Civilian Police Commissioner as to when the military end state is achieved. There are, however, many other secondary advisors determined by sector, including international organizations, international and national non-governmental organizations, donors, international financial institutions, local businesses, human rights organizations and the media.

Relating the Military End State to the Mission End State

The relationship between the military end state to the mission end state is that the military end state focuses on the prevention of armed confrontations by a fighting force, while the mission end state focuses on establishing durable peace supported by an observer force. The mission end state is broader in its context, as the achievement of the military end state indicates movement toward peace and success of UNMIT, or the broader civilian-led civil-military operation. It is useful to compare the differences between the military end state and the mission end state side by side:

Military End State Mission End State

Security is established:

  • Threat of armed attack is under control

  • Militias demobilized and disarmed

  • Integrated armed forces are established

Peace and stability are established:

  • Law and order are established

  • Reintegration of foreign combatants is complete

  • Armed forces are under civilian control
Border guards are established, trained and deployed
Demarcation of the border is peacefully accomplished
Successful return of refugees and IDP
Successful return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDP
De-mining of key areas of operation is complete
De-mining of identified contaminated areas is complete
Deployment of a full complement of UN Civilian Police
Hand over of law enforcement tasks to local police
Freedom of movement is established, creating enabling environment for humanitarian assistance operation to take place
Transition from emergency relief to reconstruction/development program is successful

 


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