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Move
1
The
Role of the Military in Peacemaking and Peace Building
Guidance for the Discussion on the Potential UN Operation
in Tindoro
The
regionally led Multi-national force (MNF) has been successful
in stopping the fighting in Tindoro and has established
a basic level of security that is permitting the humanitarian
community to support the displaced populations and those
at risk. The threats of small insurgent group activity,
banditry and from extensive land mines continue to pose
problems. The United Nations has been examining the situation
in preparation for the deployment of a UN force to replace
the multi-national force as soon as two months from now.
The
Secretary General has issued a preliminary report and a
draft resolution has been developed as part of the planning
process. Representation from all potential Troop Contributing
Nations (TCNs) has been requested for a UN sponsored meeting
in Seoul, Korea to examine the potential mission and to
make recommendations.
The
Special Representative of the Secretary General, who has
been appointed to lead the UN Mission in Tindoro (UNMIT),
leads the discussions. He has requested the presence of
the new Police Commissioner, the Humanitarian Coordinator
and the Chief of the DPKO Mission Planning Service. Attending
nations have indicated a willingness to participate as troop
contributors for the potential UN operation in Tindoro with
participants representing the appointed staff from their
national headquarters.
Requirements
Based
on the game scenario provided, the supporting agreements,
the Secretary General's report, the draft resolution and
personal experience, group members were instructed to develop
a presentation for the Special Representative and key leadership,
that identifies, discusses and recommends the key issues
related to the role of the military in support of peacemaking
and peace building in Tindoro.
Specific
requirements for the out brief for Topic 1 were:
- Define
missions and tasks, including direct missions outlined
in the draft resolution and the Secretary General's report.
Identify implied tasks in the draft resolution, reports
and agreements. Add in those roles that your nation may
feel are essential to perform in support of peacemaking
and peace building;
- Outline
the force structures to achieve these mission and tasks,
including recommendations on the types of components and
their roles, capacities required, the integration of civilian
agencies input into the military planning, and the military
criteria for success, to include common, coordinated and
complementary end states;
- Elucidate
specific issues related to management and control of the
Buffer Zone, and military support to the Border Commission
and Civilian Police operations.
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1
Findings
Recommendations
The
scenario and its supporting documents were designed to be
realistic. As a result, contradictions, ambiguities, and
shortfalls in the mandate became apparent as the groups
considered the issues. Participants were asked to make recommendations
to the SRSG to influence revisions to the draft to ameliorate
these problems, thereby increasing the possibility of UNMIT's
success.
Geographic
areas in which the military would need to be operating were
first identified as the Transition Zones, the Buffer Zone,
the Border Area, the routes to and from the Transition Areas
and Buffer Zone, and access to the two nations, to include
the air and sea approaches.
1.
Increase Force Size
Examination
of the initial allocation of force was determined to be
sufficient for the buffer zone only. It was inadequate for
other stated and implied tasks, however. The specific areas
identified as requiring additional forces were de-mining
and explosive ordinance disposal, force reserve, high mobility,
reconnaissance, surveillance and observation, aviation,
naval capability, maritime, C4I, engineering, special operations,
DDR expertise, public affairs, and medical. A minimum of
6,300 personnel was recommended to complete the highest
priority tasks over the 12-month mission period. However,
the mission would likely need to be extended, based upon
an evaluation of the achievement of these tasks.
2.
Prioritize Tasks
Participants
recommended at least three echelons of prioritized tasks.
Level I accounted for those tasks that were the responsibility
of the military solely. They were the specific reasons for
a military mission to the region. Level II priorities could
be implemented over a period of time, as the most serious
security breaches were mollified. Ultimately, if Level II
priorities could not be addressed, sustainable stability
would not be achieved. Many of these tasks require cooperation
and coordination with the other mission components, including
political and diplomatic, humanitarian and civilian police.
Finally, the achievement of Level III priorities would help
to insure long-term prospects for sustainable peace and
security in the region; a return to conflict would be unlikely.
Specific
stated and implied tasks and recommended priorities were:
- Level
I: Maintenance of Peace & Security in the region; Provide
physical security for 12 months; Maintain the buffer zone;
Complete tasks of the MNF; Implement San Francisco & Siam
Agreements; Control irregular forces;
- Level
II: Complete additional demilitarization; Determine non-compliance
with agreements; Establish border checkpoints; Stop flow
of weapons; Support law and order functions; Control transition
area; Conduct civil military coordination with the humanitarian
community; Monitor safe return of displaced persons and
refugees;
- Level
III: Control shipping; Implementation of Confidence Building
Measures; Assist critical infrastructure repair; Provide
mine action support for humanitarian support; Support
border commission; Implement public relations plans; Conduct
civic action programs; Support human rights activities;
Provide security for elections.
While
a 12-month duration for Level I and II priorities might
be achievable, Level III priorities was determined to take
a much longer period of time, perhaps as long as a decade,
and would require additional and/or different capabilities
and troops.
A
full complement within the initial deployment is required,
to include combat elements, quick reaction forces, light/mechanized
infantry, engineering, military police, aviation, maritime,
communications, light armor, HQ plus service and support,
civil affairs, medical, logistics, and legal.
3.
Request Changes to the Mandate
Participants
felt there was a need to explicitly state in the mandate
that the support of returnees and their relocation is a
role for the military. In addition to monitoring the security
situation as it relates to refugees and IDPs, the military
may need to provide de-mining capabilities. Likewise, if
reconstruction of critical infrastructure, such as bridges
and roads, is required for expediting their return, greater
engineering capacity is necessary.
Civilian
Police are required in the transition areas; therefore the
mandate should be adjusted to request their presence. As
one option, troop-contributing nations should be requested
to send civilian police for interim law and order.
Certain
civic action programs that will support peace building are
recommended for long term stability, and may be stipulated
in this or future mandates. These programs include the provision
of military lift capacity via shipping or air to assist
ongoing humanitarian action, engineering capacity to rebuild
infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and critical
failed infrastructure such as railroads and bridges, additional
medical teams to assist the local population and conduct
immunization programs (to be coordinated closely with humanitarian
efforts), agriculture and animal husbandry programs and
veterinarians, and coordination of additional indigenous
humanitarian support.
4.
Request Clarification
The
military would request additional support not currently
provided through documentation, to include: detailed intelligence
coordination on security threats from SRSG, MNF and outside
sources, a new map showing final borders, and clarification
of the maritime area of responsibility for UNMIT forces.
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