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The panel was chaired by the Japanese Ambassador for Civil Society and was composed of two moderators, two role players, and one NGO.  What follows are the panelists' observations on the content of the preceding four days and a transcription of the panel discussion which closed the event.

Observations on the Seminar by Panelists

Panel members assessed the game content to be realistic. They expressed the belief that the game format went beyond a superficial level by examining in detail the challenges presented by joint planning.  They felt the game provided excellent preparation for any complex operation in the Asia Pacific Region.

The panelists opened the session by providing comments on the lessons they felt participants should take away from the seminar:

• By focusing in detail on the issues specific to an MNF combined with a UN mission, this seminar broke new ground.  In future crises, MNFs will have to work in concert with UN forces, international organizations and non- governmental organizations.  Participants should continue to think about policy with regard to civil-military activities, attitudes and leadership, within the contexts of the local community, the international community, and the mission itself. 
• Joint civil-military planning is a challenge and a necessity.  As a result of the attention paid by participants to this issue, they will leave as different people, with new skills.  
• Developing integrated strategies in a complex and dynamic situation is a creative process.  Each crisis presents different requirements and demands unique solutions.
• Participants have to be passionate about these topics, able to dream about how to improve international interactions, and eager to learn how to better coordinate missions.  Without these characteristics, they will fall back to habitual practices.
• The military cannot bring peace; they can only supply a security umbrella. The area underneath the umbrella is the civilian realm, including the humanitarian community, the non-governmental organizations, the international organizations, finance, and so on.  They do the bulk of the work.  Otherwise, the result of having only a security umbrella is an expensive cease-fire. 
• The military's exit strategy is in the hands of the civilians.  Only when civilians achieve their work can the military go home. 
• Military and civilian organizations are different and separate.  Militaries are highly and rigidly structured, commands are given from the top down, and they are designed to function under crises situations.  Even though these characteristics appear alien, civilians should not try to change them. Governments invest money, assets and time to make militaries that way.  If civilians understand the way militaries are structured and operate, they may use this knowledge to work for civilian goals, and as a means to an end.
• The roles and objectives of the military and civilians may be different but the goals are the same: peace and stability.  However, there needs to be a clear understanding about the difference in roles and how each is key to success. 
• Separation needs to be maintained, because of the need for neutrality and impartiality on the part of humanitarian responders.  It is critical to understand and respect the roles that each plays. 
• But too much should not be made of organizational cultural differences. Civilians and military personnel are all human beings, just trained differently.  Seminars such as this one do a lot to better the relationship because they permit one-to-one interaction.
• NGO personnel take risks that create respect in militaries.  Risk-taking, then, provides a basis for understanding and a commonality that improves understanding.
• There is a need to think through such complex missions, as the one examined in this seminar, and their consequences, because going through this exercise in the field is too late.  The consequences of military intervention must be thought through.  In Australia, ACFOA began discussions seven years ago with the Australian Defence Force, and now a draft of doctrine for a CIMIC is in place.  This effort reflects many of the issues that NGOs say need to be incorporated. 
• The importance of law and order and the role of the civilian police need to be appreciated and understood.  They are key to lasting peace; the military should be used only as a last resort.
• Think and plan early to find sufficient funding early for reintegration of combatants.  The reintegration of child soldiers is especially important to address.  They are not hardened people, but boys and girls who know nothing beyond having a gun and being told to shoot it.  Collectively we cannot wait until the conflict is over to think about this critical issue.

Comments, Questions and Responses

NGO Comment:  I feel this exercise has been totally useful.  My organization works in Iraq.  Even though we have hired armed guards, we are still limited in what we can do.  The military provides security, making it safer to do our work. 

NGO Comment:  Participating in this seminar is the first experience of its kind for me.  My work up to now has been in the field, but I have had a positive experience working in this seminar.  Hearing directly from the military has been very useful.  The military way is clear-cut, with precise preferences, but civilians prefer to not be so clear-cut, because it allows for greater flexibility.  Through this seminar I have been made aware of this difference and also the differences in structure.  Planning has also proven to be very important; all must do their utmost to prepare well. 

Military Participant Comment:  I recently completed training with a civil affairs unit and I witnessed police from East Timor undergoing training.  I understand now much better how I fit into the picture.  The discussions here have been at a strategic level.  My country is now developing doctrine.  Prior to this seminar, I felt I couldn't contribute, but now I feel I can.  Working with civilians is very important.  I'm a professional civilian first, and then a part time soldier.  The lesson I have learned is there are times when we need to disagree, and that at the same time there is the need to work as a team environment at all levels. 

Participant Question:  I now have an appreciation of the interface needed to work together from our work in the group sessions this week, but how do you translate that into the field? 

Panel Responses:

SRSG:  The burden of translating civil-military concepts into the field from the policy level can best be borne and developed by the military.  The military is huge by comparison, and civilian efforts are diminished because they fly no flag.  Thus, the burden is on the military to come forward, especially military commanders and subordinate commanders.  In this regard, the military has to be forward leading.

NGO Representative:  On policy and practice, nothing prevents NGOs and IOs from writing our own guidelines and doctrine.  There is the need to develop policy and practice documents alongside military, based on experience, and therefore informing.  SPHERE standards are an example, which were born out of large central African crises.  The humanitarian community felt it had to do better.  It took a few years to reach agreement, followed by the huge process of dissemination, followed by the cycle of improving standards.  The practices have been put back into day-to-day practice.  I suggest we do the same for civil-military practices.  In effect, we are discussing the conditions that result from having a 'big M' and a 'little c'.  Civilians are very poor at networking and interfacing amongst us.  Money is a factor, but not the only one, and more could be done.  The C-M interface is important but equally important is the C-C interface.

Force Commander:  There are many ways to spread the word; one-on-one from this seminar is one way.  Then there is the official way, as discussed earlier.  A lot of what's produced during this seminar will end up in military doctrine.  COE is another way, because they are a source of much information.  These discussions find their way through staff colleges, teaching institutes, personally through me, and so on.  Our host nation and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a huge part of the system of finding ways to incorporate knowledge into practice.  You are all part of the network and you have your own networks. 

Japan Ambassador for Civil Society:  This is a very unique seminar, compared to most that we usually have.  Typically, we may discuss the military, but here they are in the process, in the same room.  Many NGOs in the world are taking positions on these issues.  Offices of Disaster Assistance funds are at 7 percent for Australia, 10 percent in the U.S.  In Japan, while the amount is increasing, it is still only 1-2 percent.  Japan expects to contribute more but also expect NGOs to organize themselves for greatest efficiency.  JANIC is a good start, but it is not a real umbrella organization.  I feel it will be important for NGOs to create these umbrellas to improve their and our activities.  I encourage Japan NGOs to increase and improve their interface with others.  From my Africa experience, NGOs are promoting activities but they are doing so in situations of great danger.  Also, the ICRC plays a role.  NGOs feel safer in the presence of the ICRC as they feel greater protection.  On the subject of a flag, I think it would be beneficial if one was adopted, known and recognized, as it may provide additional protection.

NGO Comment:  In the mission to East Timor, my organization did work in the area of conflict resolution, particularly for refugees.  Early on, the area was dangerous but because there was a request for our services, we decided to go and help.  The biggest concerns were for the food supply, and for new conflict arising from refugees, which would lead to insecurity.  It was important to provide for the infrastructure, including health and education.  Refugees recognize they are in a dire situation and they lose hope in their ability to move forward.  Short and long terms needs must be addressed in concert with local government, the refugees, the NGOs and IOs.  It would be best to organize some kind of seminar to deal with these situations.

Panel Comment: 

NGO Representative:  There is reluctance for NGOs to even talk to the military, and it is often perceived that to inform them is crazy or irresponsible.  NGOs don't want to be targeted and they should not be viewed as a threat to anyone; they are there to assist everyone.  There is an idea floating around of developing a flag to make the statement that a broad humanitarian effort is in place, rather than the current situation where there are many organizations, which can be confusing and appear un-unified in effort.  This flag concept may be useful to consider. 

Military Participant Comment:  I would like to speak on behalf of the professional soldier.  Soldiers are now selected to be peacekeeping specialists and professionals, including protocol and civil affairs officers.  My country has had force commanders in East Timor who did a good job.  Furthermore, they were successful in negotiation and coordination, and this I would propose is a part of the Asian Peacekeeping Context.  The Asian Peacekeeping Context involves not only picking up a gun to kill, but also learning how to negotiate.  My experience from this seminar points out the wrong things and ideas from missions in the past. So, we have to do things in a new way, and we have to be able to recognize when it's not done well, and then when to correct and create to make it better. We have all of the key players here: officers, NGOs, they will all be there and will see each other again.  When we get to the mission and things start, it will bemuch easier to work together and talk to one another.  We can aim for the same target. 

Panel Comments:

Moderator:  The Asian Peacekeeping Context as a concept comes out every time we hold a seminar.  There are ways we can do things that will be effective that will be different from the way things are done elsewhere.  The question is, can we do this?

Force Commander:  It's like kicking in an open door.  The answer is yes.  You have to adapt the way you operate.  We keep each other honest.  I believe we benefit through having many nationalities.  It's best to mix different nations, troops from different parts of the world, to have the complete spectrum, and if you do well, if they listen to each other, you can react well to each and every situation.  I believe in including the international, wider spectrum.

Moderator:  We have this experience of commanding the UN mission in East Timor.  Asian nations should continue to participate.  It is an open discussion as to whether we can form a SHERBRIG-type rapidly deployable force made up of Asian forces, but we need more confidence building within Asian nations to form this.

SRSG:  First, I see an opportunity for regional cooperation, and militaries that are much more willing to interface with civilians.  Militaries should develop that idea further.  Second, there is an increase in attention paid to law enforcement and civilian policing.  Many governments have taken big steps forward to develop capacities for civilian police to be deployed and set up in these operations.  This issue also needs further work.  Third, I believe Asia has a robust capability, as evidenced by the participants in this room, and this idea represents fertile ground. 

Civilian Police Commissioner:  The participants picked up readily on the importance of law and order.  Many people do not know that civilian policing exists in the mission; they are an unheralded and unsung group.  Civilian police have participated in 23 missions since 1963.  Civilian police care for people, monitor human rights, assist humanitarian agencies, and organize and train new police services.  For the most part, they are sent by UN troop contributing nations and most are volunteers with different levels of training and experience.  These differences are a weakness.  It's a fact that training is not sufficient in many cases, but most nations and the civilian police who volunteer are trying.  Training is crucial.  In Iraq and East Timor, the civilian police were put into positions to be law enforcement officers, with executive powers, meaning the ability to arrest and detain.  Seminars like this serve as educational tools.  They make you aware of the police component, but they also need to emphasize the fact that civilian police have to be trained.  For example, different constitutional laws are practiced throughout the world.  Then there are humanitarian rights laws and international humanitarian law that will be in place. Civilian police will do what they do at home: help to serve and protect.  The message is, encourage their use and bring them into seminars for training.  Do not only your civilian police a service, but any UN mission a service, because, for example, in a mission when you make a promise to attend a local meeting and cannot make the meeting, and people get upset as a result, the civilian police will be there to maintain law and order. Civilian police are deployed in the mission area in small groups, mixed together, and they will be there always to help the people.

NGO Panel Participant:  This has been an extremely useful educational experience, particularly the advice to do peacekeeping wisely and well.  Without doing it wisely and well, the peacekeeping mission will make the situation worse. People are traumatized by the conflict, and then re-traumatized, and this is the important lesson I gained.  Women and children are affected most severely.  By allowing a repeat of the same actions, and through perpetuation of hate, a conflict re-emerges 10 to 15 years later.  So I ask you to remember the affects of both conflict and peacekeeping missions on children.  My first question is: we witnessed the beginning of the children's movement a year ago.  How do you see the role of children playing a part in assisting in peacekeeping efforts?  And question two relates to the fact that the best way of dealing with the conflict is to not allow it to occur in the first place.  There are ways to prevent conflict, and saying that it's just human nature provides no hope.  But efforts have been positive of late:  Life Skills Training, including training in empathy, mediation, self- control, beauty in differences, etc. is an example of an attempt to address future conflicts through prevention.  During peacekeeping, do you see your job as putting out the fire, or, is it possible there is another function, and that is to do something to prevent the situation from happening again?

Panel Comments:

NGO Panel Representative: As an outsider, we have a need to learn and understand the complex nature of cultural and social organization, if we, collectively, want to harbor any hopes of sustaining the benefit.  If NGOs struggle with this, and they do, so does the military.  There likely exist extended family and affiliations to ethnic and political groupings.  If we have no understanding of these relationships, interventions can go disastrously wrong.  Putting pressure on community leaders is easy to say, but not easy to do.  We have to be cognizant of the real and artificial power structures.  As a case study, we can examine the roles of mothers in ending conflict in Bougainville.  There is a huge role for Asia and Pacific nations in peacekeeping and peace building, with a particular focus on building on existing NGO networks.  Also, the focus should be on end states. There should be appropriate policing and the use of military force in only exceptional circumstances.  And there is a need to help the level of understanding of western outsiders. 

SRSG:  It is important that the leadership of the mission believes in and contributes to the success of the mission in a very personal way.  To commit to visiting camps every day until the last refugee is left, for example, and thereby demonstrating interest and commitment.  But how far do you take this?  Band-aidsare the wrong solution.  What needs to happen is the facilitation of a fundamental transformation.  Asian peacekeeping could be a part of that process.  An NGO here just mentioned short-term and long-term strategies: we must have both, and they must be integrated and linked, with all having a role to play. 

NGO Panel Question:  It is extremely meaningful that militaries would consider planning a mission together.  I have two questions on security.  The first question is, how can safety be secured for civilians in the field?  Please share your thoughts from the seminar.  The second question relates to the fact that NGOs are different from one another.  But there are those who do not have assets, local language skills, etc.  So how does the military identify partner NGOs?  Are there guidelines? And how do you approach or contact them? 

Panel Comments:

Force Commander:  The military is always an extensive of politics: the military is a political tool.  Usually, it's best to stay away as far as possible from them, but it is wise to talk.  You need to determine which areas to stay away from.  And while you need to talk, keep in mind there is no recipe because every situation is different.  First, understand your own organization and then find the optimum match.  In the end, you try to achieve the same thing.  The end state can never be an expensive cease-fire.  The goal has to be to create, or recreate, a nation to prosper. 

NGO Panel Representative:  This is a military problem and an NGO problem.  The CIMIC is a good development.  It has to be established in planning and then in the field very early.  You need to identify communication channels early on, for example.  When we define relationship, we refer to those in the military we have relationships with not as 'partners', but as 'players'.  There are many stakeholders and each has a role to play, but we reserve the word 'partners' for NGO relationships.  For NGOs my advice is good intentions are not enough.  It is not enough to have a charitable motivation, but you must also have a capacity to do something useful in the field.  NGOs have to adopt codes and understand what they mean in practice.  They have to adopt minimum standards, because vulnerable populations suffer if you don't.  Keep in mind that the military cannot talk to 15-20 organizations, but they can talk to one "boss," the humanitarian assistance coordinator.  This structure requires NGOs to accept direction, and this creates a problem within the NGO community.  There therefore needs to be more honesty from partners, because if they can't contribute effectively maybe they shouldn't be there.  The result is fewer NGOs, which frankly makes for easier coordination.

Military Participant Comment:  I recommend the formation of some kind of planning team, which would provide an estimate of the situation.  The team must be inclusive of everybody going to the mission.  DPKO has come out with a handout but I don't know if it includes the NGOs.  Also, we need to get to know each other well prior to departure to the mission area.

Force Commander:  One of the greatest problems I see with the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA is that neither has money or assets.  As a consequence, many military planners go directly to WFP, UNHCR, and so on.  This destroys the process.  There has to be support given to OCHA.  The luxury of this seminar game is to conduct planning alongside NGOs.  Having a comprehensive campaign plan is the ideal.  But realistically, the planning process is continuous and stove-piped.  The amount of detail that goes on in military planning is useless to NGOs. So everyone with a stake needs to identify those key areas for coordination and liaison work to occur.  The steps are: identify the issue, call a meeting, and solve it. 

SRSG:  The intention behind performing a comprehensive situation assessment is good.

Moderator:  The military has to be extremely flexible.  It has to be able to change in large part due to the humanitarian emergency at hand.  This is not mission creep, but it is mission shift.  There is a desire among Asian officers to conduct joint planning and establish linkages within the Asian context.

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